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ABSTRACT
Crucial to human interaction and development, emotions have long fascinated 
psychologists. Current thinking suggests that specific emotions, regardless of the 
chaimel in which they are communicated, are processed by separable neural 
mechanisms. Yet much research has focused only on the interpretation of facial 
expressions of emotion. The present research addressed this oversight by exploring 
recognition of emotion from facial, vocal, and gestural tasks. Happiness and disgust 
were best conveyed by the face, yet other emotions were equally well communicated 
by voices and gestures. A novel method for exploring emotion perception, by 
contrasting errors, is proposed.
Studies often fail to consider whether the status of the perceiver affects emotion 
recognition abilities. Experiments presented here revealed an impact of mood, sex, 
and age of participants. Dysphoric mood was associated with difficulty in interpreting 
disgust from vocal and gestural channels. To some extent, this supports the concept 
that neural regions are specialised for the perception of disgust. Older participants 
showed decreased emotion recognition accuracy but no specific pattern of recognition 
difficulty. Sex of participant and of actor affected emotion recognition from voices.
In order to examine neural mechanisms underlying emotion recognition, an 
exploration was undertaken using emotion tasks with Parkinson’s patients. Patients 
showed no clear pattern of recognition impainnent across channels of communication. 
In this study, the exclusion of surprise as a stimulus and response option in a facial 
emotion recognition task yielded results contrary to those achieved without this 
modification. Implications for this are discussed.
Finally, this thesis gives rise to three caveats for neuropsychological research. First, 
the impact of the observers’ status, in terms of mood, age, and sex, should not be 
neglected. Second, exploring multiple channels of communication is important for 
understanding emotion perception. Third, task design should be appraised before 
conclusions regarding impairments in emotion perception are presumed.
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1INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction to emotion perception
Emotions are crucial to human interaction, and as a consequence, they have captivated 
researchers from a diverse range of disciplines. The development of new imaging 
techniques has given new impetus to the exploration of emotion perception, and 
research on the subject has exploded in recent years. Within the psychological 
framework, some studies have addressed overt recognition of emotion portrayed by 
human expressions, whilst others have examined the inter-relationships between 
emotions and the particular scenarios and contexts that they might evoke. Some have 
investigated physiological responses to emotion-eliciting stimuli including skin 
conductance and heart rate changes; in contrast, others have examined brain activation 
or attenuation patterns to emotional stimuli.
Processing emotions is fundamental for social communication, since interpreting 
emotional cues enables us to ascertain our counterparts’ intentions and internal states, 
and guides appropriate responsive behaviour. When the ability to interpret such cues 
breaks down, social consequences can be extensive. This thesis is concerned with two 
distinct aspects that might influence the interpretation of emotional states. The first is 
the observer’s status, which is often neglected in neuropsychological research. To 
address this, the impact of moods (Chapters 3-5), sex (Chapter 6), and age (Chapter 8) 
on emotion perception is explored. The second aspect involves the way in which 
emotions are communicated. Research specifically examining the recognition of 
emotions has generally been restricted to using components of facial expressions and, 
to a lesser extent, vocal expressions. The face is a widely used research tool since it is 
considered by many to be the most telling bearer of a person’s emotional state. 
Despite this, in a genuine social situation when one person obsei*ves another 
displaying an emotion, several types of cues can determine the emotion that is 
expressed. These cues include body posture, gestures, speech content, prosody, eye
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gaze, and contextual signals, such as situation. Consequently, this thesis describes a 
series of novel studies that investigate recognition of emotion from multiple 
communication channels, including facial, vocal, and gestural expressions. The 
efficacy and potential diagnostic value of the tests of expression recognition employed 
are explored.
Following this, a clinical exploration of emotion processing in a population with 
limited expressive abilities due to neurological disease is presented in Chapter 9 and 
neural pathways involved in emotion perception are conjectured. The motivation for 
this research has been the drive for knowledge of neural processes associated with 
emotion perception. To provide insight into disorders associated with emotion 
processing dysfunction, it is important to further our understanding of the structure of 
emotion and its neural basis. This is the focus for part of this review.
This thesis presents a short account of theories of emotion, how emotions differ, and 
how they relate to experience. This is followed by a review of neuroscience studies 
that have provided evidence for a partial separation of the brain structures subserving 
different emotions. Limitations of neuropsychological research are highlighted and 
addressed within the studies described in this thesis.
1.2 Basic emotions -  different approaches
1.2.1 Introduction to different theories of emotion
In the last one hundred and fifty years, theories of emotions have emerged in different 
areas of human knowledge, including biological, behavioural, and cognitive 
approaches to the study of emotion.
The James-Lange Theory (James, 1884; Lange, 1885) is one of the foremost 
biological approaches to emotion. The theory states that a stimulus triggers a
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reflexive physiological response and body movement (e.g. perspiration, heart rate 
elevation, facial expression). Emotions occur when the individual evaluates and 
inteiprets his/her own bodily changes.
Cannon (1927) challenged this stance by arguing that since humans can respond to an 
affective stimulus within a few milliseconds, whereas the viscera respond much 
slower than this, visceral changes are too slow and insensitive to be the source of 
emotional feeling. Artificial induction of physiological changes did not produce 
characteristic real emotions. As a consequence, Cannon concluded that emotion is a 
cognitive event, enhanced by bodily arousal, which occurs simultaneously to the 
experience of the emotion. Cannon provided the first substantial theory of brain 
mechanisms involved in emotion. He proposed that the thalamus is activated by the 
perception of an event and then it alerts the cortex and hypothalamus for action: the 
cortex is responsible for emotional feelings and behaviour, and the hypothalamus is 
responsible for arousing the body.
In support of this, disturbance to the hypothalamus causes impairments to the 
experience of emotions. For instance, Hess (1950) applied electrical stimulation to 
the hypothalamus region in cats; this aroused and alerted the cats. If stimulation was 
prolonged, the cats became aggressive.
Another classic theory of emotions is the Cognitive Appraisal Theory, proposed by 
Schachter and Singer (1962). This theory concurs with the James-Lange Theory that 
the experience of an emotion arises from the cognitive labelling of a physiological 
sensation. Nevertheless, the Cognitive Appraisal Theory suggests that this labelling is 
constrained by context. To test this notion, Schachter and Singer induced a state of 
arousal in individuals (using injections of adrenaline). The participants were not 
informed with regard to the effect of the injection. When placed in a pleasant social 
situation, the participants felt happy. Yet participants placed in a frustrating context 
felt and acted angrily. Thus, there appears to be a misattribution of ‘feelings’ in these 
cases. Despite these findings, replication of this result has proved difficult (Oatley & 
Jenkins, 1996).
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Lazarus (1991) described emotional responses as the outcomes of internal and 
situational appraisal processes. The three possible emotional responses may be; 
biological urges to act, subjective affect, and physiological changes.
A somatic-marker hypothesis was presented by Damasio (1994), in which he argued 
that humans have ongoing awareness of their somatosensory system. For instance, 
when an emotion is experienced, the memory of this experience becomes associated 
with the concurrent bodily changes and state. Subsequently, when that emotion is re­
experienced in perception or memory, the bodily state that marks this emotion is also 
re-experienced. This associated between emotion and bodily state is a ‘somatic 
marker’. Somatic markers, in this sense, represent emotional learning. Damasio 
suggested that the nemal mechanisms underlying emotion and those involved in 
reason partially overlap.
Another key emotional theory suggests that specific dimensions define emotions, in 
terms of their perception and experience. The idea that emotions may be dimensional 
has its original roots in a simple concept that emotions can be defined as varying 
along a positive or negative dimension (Tomkins, 1962; 1963). Models pioneered by 
Woodworth and Schlosberg (1954), and developed further by Russell (1980), indicate 
that emotions can be defined by the specific dimensions of pleasantness- 
unpleasanteness, attention-rejection, and sleep-tension. The differences between each 
emotion are determined by their positions in relation to these dimensions.
Phillips and colleagues (2003a) have proposed neural systems for underlying 
processes involved in emotion perception: a ventral system, including the amygdala 
and insula, would mediate the identification of emotionally salient cues. In response, 
an affective state and emotional behaviour would be produced. These behaviours and 
states would then be regulated, involving a dorsal system, including the hippocampus.
There are several more theories of emotion than those discussed and new theories are 
progressively being developed; yet those described are some of the primary theories 
regarding emotion, its structure, and neural bases.
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1.2.2 Basic emotions
In order to study emotions and to understand their structure and inter-relationships, 
finite lists of ‘basic’ emotions have been proposed. The psychological view is that 
there is a small set of emotions from which all emotions stem (Ortony & Turner, 
1990). A basic emotion, in this sense, would be irreducible. It would not overlap 
with any other emotion. Non-basic emotions would be blends of these emotions. 
Thus, the entire human repertoire of emotions could be explained in terms of basic 
emotions. Table 1.1 summarises key researchers and their proposals for basic 
emotions.
Table 1.1: A selective list o f  ‘basic emotions’. Adapted from Ortony & Turner (1990).
Reference Fundamental emotions Reason for inclusion
Arnold (1960) Anger, aversion, courage, dejection, desire, despair, fear, hate, hope, love, sadness. Relation to action tendencies.
Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth 
(1982) Anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise. Universal facial expressions.
Frijda(1986) Desire, happiness, interest, surprise, wonder, sorrow. Forms o f  action readiness.
Gray (1982) Rage and terror, anxiety, joy. Hardwired.
Izard (1971) Anger, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, guilt, interest, joy, shame, surprise. Hardwired.
James (1884) Fear, grief, love, rage. Bodily involvement.
M cDougall (1926) Anger, disgust, elation, fear, subjection, tender-emotion, wonder. Relation to instinct.
MacLean (1990) Desire, affection, fear, anger, sadness, ecstasy Derived from activities in the 
limbic system
Mowrer (1960) Pain, pleasure. Unlearned emotional states.
Oatley and Johnson-Laird 
(1987) Anger, disgust, anxiety, happiness, sadness.
Do not require prepositional 
content.
Panksepp(1982) Expectancy, fear, rage, panic. Hardwired.
P lutchik(1982) Acceptance, anger, anticipation, disgust, joy, fear, sadness, surprise.
Relation to adaptive 
biological processes.
Tomkins (1984) Anger, interest, contempt, disgust, distress, joy, fear, sadness.
Density o f  neural firing. 
Related to facial expressions.
Watson (1930) Fear, love, rage. Hardwired.
Weiner and Graham (1984) Happiness, sadness. Attribution independent.
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Disparities between lists of basic emotions can largely be accounted for by different 
reasons for their inclusion. For instance, some researchers suggest that emotions exist 
for motivation, others emphasise their role in communication, while others consider 
that emotions play an important role in cognition. Some theorists propose that 
emotions must be affectively valenced (i.e. either positive or negative). Other 
proposals infer that basic emotions have specific neurophysiological and anatomical 
substrates, which would suggest that these emotions are universal to all human 
cultures and could appear in other animal species.
The diversity of language provides further complications in the search for a set of 
basic emotions. Consider anger and rage: the terms are relatively synonymous in 
western cultures and may refer to the same phenomenon, as could happiness, joy, and 
elation.
A convincing evolutionary explanation of basic emotions would account for their 
functions, their phytogeny, and why they exist at all. Darwin (1872) believed that 
each basic emotion should have a distinct expressive correlate that is demonstrated 
cross-culturally. His primary argument was that basic emotions must have some sort 
of universal status. The central tenet of his research was that these emotions have 
evolved for functional purposes, such as a role in social communication and the 
regulation of emotional experience. He was not the first researcher to propose the 
universality thesis, but he was among the first to link emotions with evolution. 
Darwin (1872) described approximately a dozen basic facial expressions of emotion 
that he believed were vestiges of once-useful physiological reactions. He enunciated 
three general principles that guided the evolution of expressions. The first is related 
to serviceable associated habits, such that certain states of mind become associated 
with a particular action in order to relieve or gratify that state, and force of habit leads 
one to perform this actions whenever that state is experienced. The second is 
connected with antithesis (when happy, the mouth turns upwards; when sad, the 
mouth turns downwards; when in a positive state an animal’s ears may point upwards, 
when in a negative state, they may turn down). The final principle is that of direct 
action of the nervous system -  senses are excited, bodily changes induced, and 
expressive effects result. Daiwin's seminal work provided an important departure 
point for modem scientific emotion research.
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Over a century later, Plutchik (1982) proposed an alternative list of basic emotions. 
Each emotion, he claimed, has a different form of expression in various species, but 
there are identifiable, common elements. Researchers, like Plutchik and Darwin, 
believe that basic emotions are hard-wired, i.e. they are part of our genetic and 
evolutionary composition.
Ekman and his colleagues (1971; 1969) collected facial expression data from 
preliterate cultures in Borneo and New Guinea that had very little contact with the 
outside world. The rationale behind this study was that if people living in these 
cultures demonstrated similar facial expressions to those of people in western 
cultures, and recognised them in others, then these facial expressions must have a 
universal quality, which may be genetic in origin, and are not necessarily socially 
learned.
The first task adopted forced-choice procedures, in which the participants were shown 
photographs of people displaying different facial expressions and the participants had 
to indicate which emotion (from a list) it was that they were expressing (Ekman et al., 
1969). The second task involved telling the participants stories that would elicit 
emotions, such as ‘You see a dead pig that has been lying there for some time’. The 
participants’ task was to firstly, pick one face from three photographs that 
corresponded to the emotion that would be experienced; and secondly, to adopt a 
facial expression, which would be appropriate in that particular situation. Their facial 
expressions were presented to American students to identify. There was slight 
confusion between participants’ displays of fear and surprise, but all the other 
expressions were recognised significantly better than at chance levels. This 
investigation led to the conclusion that there are six basic, universal emotions defined 
by distinctly different facial expressions: happiness, surprise, sadness, fear, anger, 
and disgust. Contempt has since been added to this list (Ekman, O'Sullivan, & 
Matsumoto, 1991), despite being contested to some extent.
Russell (1994) criticised Ekman’s conclusions. He attacked the forced-choice 
procedure that Ekman initially adopted (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman et al., 1969). 
By using such a method, Russell argued that it is possible to over-estimate the
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participants’ accuracy at recognising specific emotions, as forced-choice procedures 
restrict choices. Russell’s critique is supported by work carried out with the same 
tribe that Ekman studied: Sorenson (1976) found that when the tribe members were 
presented with photographed facial expressions, and asked to label them freely, they 
demonstrated difficulties in recognising surprise and disgust faces.
Calder and his colleagues (1996) carried out a study that involved a series of facial 
expressions, which were blends of easily confused emotions from Ekman and 
Friesen’s list of six emotions. Each target face contained proportions of two 
expressions (0:100, 10:90, 20:80, 30:70, 40:60, 50:50, 60:40, 70:30, 80:20, 90:10, 
100:0). They asked people to indicate which emotion each face depicted. There was 
not a gradual change in labelling from one emotion to the other that mirrored 
proportion shifts. Distinct perceptual shifts were observed, given that transition 
occurred from labelling the faces as one emotion to labelling it as the other at a 
specific point when discrimination was most sensitive. This was evidence for 
categorical perception of facial expressions. Etcoff and Magee (1992) achieved 
similar results, using line drawings as opposed to photogiaphs. Furthermore, 
Ekman’s basic emotions may also have distinct experiential, physiological, as well as 
expressive components (see Section 1.3).
If human facial expressions of emotion evolved solely due to communication needs, it 
would be expected that emotional displays would he most informative about 
expressers’ intentions or emotional states when expressers are in the presence of 
others. Humans’ evolutionary ancestors needed observers before they gained an 
advantage from emotional/communicative displays. Nevertheless, people do display 
emotions when in isolation, which suggests that emotion is not purely a 
communicative tool.
Some cultures show an inhibition of negative facial expressions when accompanied. 
Ekman (1972) presented film clips to 25 American and 25 Japanese men. These clips 
ranged from neutral, to unpleasant, to disturbing (canoe trip, baby delivery, 
circumcision). Participants initially viewed the clips alone. Then they were asked 
questions regarding their feelings towards the clips. In the final phase, the 
participants were shown the clips again, whilst the experimenter was seated facing
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them. They were asked to give commentary concerning how they felt during the film. 
During the entire study, their facial expressions were videotaped, unbeknown to them. 
In the first phase, the two groups showed very similar facial expressions. But in the 
final phase, the Japanese participants expressed more positive expressions, and 
inhibited any sign of distress or discomfort. Ekman postulated that though emotional 
expressions are universal cross-culturally, cultures determine display rules for these 
expressions in social contexts. By contrast, Fridlund (1994) replicated this video 
viewing experiment and suggested that the Japanese were more polite and looked 
more at the experimenter, rather than the clips. Thus, he implied that culturally 
determined display rules do not exist.
Neuropsychological research and imaging studies have provided evidence which 
indicates that there may be a degree of emotion-specific functional organisation for 
some emotions within the brain (see Section 1.5.2 for more information). In this 
thesis, recognition tests for the six basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, and surprise) as proposed by Ekman and Friesen (1971), are employed, since 
this is one of the most popular lists of hasic emotions used in neuropsychological 
research.
1.3 Basic emotions -  descriptions
Components of emotions include cognitive processes, subjective feelings, 
physiological arousal (such as perspiration and heart rate changes), and behavioural 
reactions (such as facial expressions). There are a variety of definitions for each of 
Ekman and Friesen’s (1971) basic emotions. To summarise from the Collins English 
Dictionary (Sinclair, 1994): happiness can be described as a state of well-being, 
pleasure and contentment. Surprise is defined as the state of being presented with 
something unexpectedly. Sadness is to be affected with grief and unhappiness. Fear 
is an intense awareness or anticipation of danger. Disgust is a marked aversion 
aroused by a highly distasteful observation. Anger is a strong emotional state induced 
by displeasure.
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Following Ekman and Friesen’s (1971) conclusions, the emphasis on the concept of 
universal emotional expressions obscures the wealth of variation within and between 
facial expressions; that is, everybody expresses individual differences in their facial 
emotions. Nevertheless, these basic emotions have universal units in the facial 
vocabulary (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Heise, 1985). Happiness is revealed in upturned 
comers of the mouth (laughing also raises the cheeks which in turn may push the 
lower eyelids up). Surprise combines arched eyebrows with wide-open eyes and a 
dropped open mouth. Sadness is depicted by flattened and lowered brows, with the 
upper eyelids drooping and sloped, and the comers of the mouth are pulled 
downward. Fear shows in raised and flattened eyebrows, raised and tensed lower 
eyelids, along with side-stretched lips. Disgust involves raised lower eyelids, and the 
upper lip curled up so as to raise the nose (the upper nose may be crinkled). In anger, 
the brows pull down and inward, the eyes squint, and the lips either are pressed tight 
or squared into a snarl.
Research has also shown that emotional state can also be determined by physiological 
responses (Cacioppo, Bemtson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000). Levenson and 
colleagues (1990) asked participants to pose specific facial movements corresponding 
to expressions of Ekman and Friesen’s six basic emotions. Participants were unaware 
of which expression they had adopted. Their heart rate, hand temperature, skin 
conductance, and forearm muscle tension were measured. A distinct pattem in the 
bodily responses was shown for each particular emotion. For example, heart rate 
increased with displays of sadness, anger, and fear. In an extension of this research, 
Levenson and his co-workers (1992) examined a group of males in West Sumatra, 
where public displays of negative emotion are strongly disapproved. The participants 
had to adopt facial movements, typical of specific facial expressions of emotion, 
while their physiological responses were recorded. Similar pattems to the American 
participants examined in the previous study were revealed. Therefore, it seems likely 
that each of Ekman and Friesen’s basic emotions is characterised to some extent by a 
specific physiological response.
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1.4 Production and recognition of basic emotional expressions
Central to the concept of universal basic emotions is the notion that emotional 
communication might be inherent or learned early in life.
1.4.1 Production
At birth it has been reported that infants show signs of interest, distress, disgust, and 
contentment (Shaffer, 1999). In contrast, Izard and colleagues (1995) reported that 
basic emotions (defined by Ekman and Friesen, 1971), except disgust, emerge 
between 2.5 months and 7 months of age. This could be a sign of maturational 
mechanisms, or the consequence of an element of social learning involved in emotion 
production.
Imitation and manipulation of facial gestures are observed in human neonates 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983) and to an extent in non-human primate neonates 
(Visalberghi & Ferrari, 2004). This also suggests that learning to differentiate among 
facial expressions may begin directly jfrom birth.
Children who are bom deaf and blind display similar emotional expressions to normal 
children (Goodenough, 1932). This substantially bolsters the idea that basic emotions 
have some innate quality. In accordance, Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1973) filmed five children 
who were bom deaf and blind, and one other child who became deaf and blind at the 
age of 1 year. The children also had a range of birth defects and varied in intelligence 
levels. Close examination of the videos revealed that these children expressed crying, 
affection, surprise, frowning, frustration, pouting, conflict, and more, in a mamier 
similar to expressions shown by normal children. Thus, children who are sensorily 
restricted and have reduced mental capacity show the same basic repertoire of 
spontaneous facial expressions as normal children, yet social learning is virtually 
impossible in their cases.
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In contrast to this, Rinn (1984a) reported that congenitally blind participants were less 
proficient at posing basic emotional expressions than sighted control participants. 
This could reflect the functioning of two systems responsible for the production of 
facial expressions: a subcortical system, which controls spontaneous facial
expression and a cortical system, which controls volitional facial movement (Rinn, 
1984b). Therefore, since the ability to produce spontaneous facial expressions seems 
to follow a fixed developmental sequence resistant to developmental disruptions, as 
demonstrated by Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s work, this bolsters the idea that there are innate 
capacities for expression.
From a phylogenetic point of view, it would be expected that there should be evidence 
of basic emotions in other species. In support of this, there is a close similarity 
between emotional facial expressions displayed by non-human primates and humans, 
fear, anger, and smiling, in particular (Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). Chevalier-Skolnikoff 
(1973) argued that some human expressions, such as those for anger, sadness, and 
affection, seem to be homologous and related through evolution to non-human 
primate expressions. There is further evidence for functional and emotional vocal 
communication systems in non-human primates (Gouzoules, Gouzoules, & Marier, 
1984; Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marier, 1980). A bulk of literature discusses emotional 
displays, both vocal and visual, in non-human primates, but for this brief introduction, 
only key papers have been cited. Generally, research corroborates the idea that 
production of facial expressions is innate or has some phylogenetically-programmed 
maturational quality.
1 .4 .2  R é c o g n it io n
If expression of emotions is genetic, it is plausible that reception might be learned. 
Nevertheless, substantial evidence for an innate recognition mechanism was provided 
by Sackett (1966). Eight captive monkeys, given no visual access to any other 
monkeys, showed signs of disturbance and vocalization when they were shown 
threatening pictures of monkeys. This behaviour consisted of fear, withdrawal, 
rocking, and huddling. The animals displayed exploratory and play behaviours
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towards the pictures when no direct threat was presented. Monkeys learned to avoid 
threatening faces during an operant reinforcing task. This indicates that animals may 
have some sort of innate fear response.
Research exploring emotion recognition has also focused on human infants. Using a 
visual habituation task, Field and colleagues (1982) reported that infants with an 
average age of 36 hours, discriminated between happy, sad, and surprised facial 
expressions. Furthermore, a one year-old infant will play with an unfamiliar toy if a 
stranger nearby is smiling; however, they will avoid the toy if the stranger looks 
fearful (Klinnert, Emde, Butterfield, & Campos, 1986). This provides support for 
early perception of emotion in the face. By 4 or 5 years of age, most children can 
accurately label emotions conveyed in various nonverbal channels, including the face. 
Caron and his colleagues (1988) established that dynamic expressions of anger and 
happiness are discriminated at 7 months of age, and vocal expressions are 
discriminated earlier than facial displays. Thus, vocal expressions may communicate 
more information to an infant than facial expressions. This research, combined with 
Sackett’s study, supports the idea of an innate emotional recognition mechanism, 
perhaps specialising in fear processing, that matures with age.
1.4.3 Summary
Though there is a dearth of research concentrating on the issue of innate recognition 
and production of emotions, prime research suggests that there is an innate 
mechanism responsible for producing and recognising facial and vocal expressions of 
basic emotions, and this may be maturational in nature.
1.5 Emotion and related brain structures
Given that emotions seem to be recognised and expressed innately, this has led 
researchers to question what neural processes might be involved in these abilities.
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The current neuropsychological view of functioning is that there are specific pathways 
within the brain dedicated to particular functions, such as motor control. The case of 
Phineas Gage, who suffered a major personality change following an accident, in 
which an iron bar became lodged through his cheek and into his frontal lobes, 
demonstrated that there are regions of the brain associated with social functioning. 
Despite no memory, language, or motor difficulties. Gage exhibited socially 
inappropriate behaviours and had difficulties with reasoning and judgement tasks 
(Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994; McMillan, 1987).
Since basic emotions have distinct expressive, physiological, and experiential 
components, it has been proposed that they may also have discrete neural components 
too. This has led to an explosion in investigations for neural bases of social 
functioning, particularly of the perception of emotions. Understanding the roles 
played by particular brain stmctures and pathways in social functioning can be gained 
from animal research, human lesion studies, and imaging techniques. Fundamental to 
neuropsychological principles is the concept that to comprehend how a system works, 
we should observe what happens when it goes wrong, such as exploring perception 
abilities in populations with selective damage to the brain. Such clinical groups might 
show atypical pattems of processing as a result of deterioration or impairment to brain 
functioning. Behavioural correlates of particular brain regions in healthy people 
could be identified in this way. Furthermore, the recent emergence of imaging 
techniques, such as Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET), has provided a means for investigating brain functions 
in healthy individuals. Combined, these research tecliniques have imparted much 
information regarding the neural nature of social communication.
1.5.1 Dissociable identity and expression recognition systems
Experimental and neuropsychological studies support the existence of two dissociable 
systems for recognising facial identity and for recognising facial expressions. This is 
central to Bmce and Young’s (1986) cognitive model of face processing (Figure 1.1).
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Face Recognition UnitsExpression Analysis
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Name Retrieval 
(Speech Output Lexicon)
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Figure 1.1: A model for face processing, adaptedfrom Bruce & Young (1986).
Associative prosopagnosia is a condition whereby people have lost the ability to 
recognise familiar people by their faces. Prosopagnosics may rely on cues from 
voices, gait, and so on, to recognise that person. This condition does not result from a 
visual deficit; prosopagnosics do not have difficulties in describing facial features of 
that person or facial expressions of emotion (Etcoff, 1984; Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 1988). There are also conditions in which recognition of facial identity is 
intact, but recognition of some facial expressions is impaired -  these cases are 
discussed in more detail in Section 1.5.2. Young and colleagues (1986) provided 
behavioural support for the dissociation between identity and expression processing. 
Participants were given an identity-matching task, in which they were asked to decide 
whether simultaneously presented photos were of the same or different people. 
Participants were faster to decide if they were familiar faces, regardless of facial 
expressions. In an expression-matching task, there were no differences in response 
times for familiar and unfamiliar faces -  thus, judgements of expression were not 
influenced by identity or vice versa.
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This work is supported by neurophysiological investigations. Hasselmo and 
colleagues (1989) explored single cell recordings of forty-five neurons in the temporal 
visual cortex of macaque monkeys. Nine neurons responded to expressions 
independent of identity and these were found in the superior temporal sulcus. By 
contrast, fifteen responded to identity, regardless of facial expression. These were 
mainly located in the inferior temporal gyrus.
In an fMRI study. Puce and co-workers (1998) established that moving faces 
preferentially activated the human lateral temporal cortex, in comparison to static 
faces, which led to the conclusion that this neural region may find parts of the face 
more salient than the whole. Since identity is stable, yet facial expressions are 
constantly changing. Puce and co-workers may have provided evidence for a neural 
mechanism that may distinguish between processing of identity and expressions.
1.5.2 Independent neural pathways for specifîc emotions -  a proposal
A topical and controversial debate in neuropsychology is whether a single, unifying 
model can explain emotion. Some primary views regarding the brain mechanisms 
involved in emotion have been presented in Section 1.2.1. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that the right hemisphere mediates all emotions (Tucker, 1981). A second 
theory posits that the brain organises emotions differently as a function of valence: the 
right hemisphere may process negative emotions and the left hemisphere processes 
positive emotions (Sackheim et al., 1982). The basal ganglia have been implicated in 
the expression and recognition of emotions, from both the face and the voice 
(Cancelliere & Kertesz, 1990).
Many researchers take the perspective that there are discrete neural substrates for the 
recognition of each basic emotion. Research has focused on the aforementioned basic 
emotions, described by Ekman and Friesen (1971), since these are considered to be 
pan-cultural and therefore, may result from innate mechanisms that have their bases in 
neural architecture. Research salient to this proposal will be discussed in Section
1.5.2, and evidence in conflict with this proposal will follow (Section 1.5.3).
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Research relevant to the findings reported in this thesis will be reviewed; this includes 
explorations regarding the neural basis o f  fear and disgust exclusively.
L5.2a Amygdala and fear processing -  neuropsychological evidence 
Close links have been established between fear and the amygdala. The am ygdala is a 
set o f  subcortical nuclei that lie beneath the tem poral lobe. It receives inputs from 
m ultiple modalities, not simply the visual domain (Amaral, Price. Pitkanen, & 
Canriichael, 1992). it is extensively interconnected with the frontal cortex, 
mediodorsal thalam us and the medial striatum (see Figure 1.2). This makes it an ideal 
structure to co-ordinate or integrate neural signals from structures involved in emotion 
processing from multiple com m unication channels (Nahm, Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 1993).
Figure 1.2: Amygdala and its neighbouring structures.
/ .  Corona radiata 2. Sagittal striatum 3. Head o f  caudate nucleus 4. Body o f  caudate nucleus 5. Tail o f  
caudate nucleus 6. Connecting piece bettveen lentiform nucleus and tail o f  caudate nucleus 7. 
Amygdaloid body 8. .Anterior commissure 9. Stria terminalis 10. Internal cap.sule IL  Cut .surface o f  
basis pedunculi. Source: http://www.vh.ore/Providers/Tejctbooks/BrainAnatomv/BrainAnatomv.html
Animal studies have revealed that lesions to the am ygdala and temporal lobe interfere 
in the acquisition and display o f  fearful responses (K1 liver & Bucy, 1939). ‘Kliiver- 
Bucy syndrom e’ is characterised in monkeys by tam eness and loss o f  fear primarily. 
This attenuated expression o f  fear and aggression is also dem onstrated in monkeys 
with lesions restricted to the am ygdala (W eiskrantz, 1956). Researchers have 
concluded that the am ygdala has some involvement in the appraisal o f  threat and 
danger. See Calder and colleagues (2001) for a detailed review. Symptoms o f
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Klüver-Bucy syndrome have been demonstrated in brain-injured humans, in whom 
some degree of bilateral damage has occurred to the amygdala and inferior temporal 
cortex. Neuropsychological studies have indicated that bilateral amygdala damage 
interferes with the recognition of fear from facial displays, while leaving recognition 
of most other basic emotions from facial displays relatively unaffected in comparison 
with normal participants or participants with brain damage sparing the amygdala 
(Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 1995; Broks et al., 1998; Calder et al., 2001; Calder, Young, Rowland et al., 
1996). The amygdala patients have no problems identifying familiar people, or 
describing a fearful situation. While damage to this structure is associated with 
disproportionate impairments in perceiving fear, it also results in difficulties in 
perceiving anger from faces (Adolphs et al., 1999; Calder, Young, Rowland et al.,
1996). This fits with the idea that the region is involved in the appraisal of threat.
If the amygdala has a role in threat evaluation, since threat is not only presented 
visually, but sometimes auditorily as well, this structure would be expected to act as 
some sort of multi-modal mechanism for tlireat processing. Neuropsychological 
research has indicated that the role of the amygdala in emotion processing may not be 
restricted to facial emotion: Scott and colleagues (1997) have shown that when 
emotions are conveyed nonverbally (such as screaming), bilateral amygdala damage 
compromises recognition of fear and anger. In addition, following bilateral amygdala 
damage, interpretation of fear is not simply impaired from facial and vocal domains, 
but also from static body posture cues (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999).
Unlike monkeys, humans suffering from amygdala damage can express fear 
(Anderson & Phelps, 2000), yet they often exhibit inappropriate responses to fearful 
situations, which is indicative of a link between experience, expression, and 
recognition of emotions (Adolphs et al., 1999). Perhaps a more central mechanism 
fundamental to the experience of fear is compromised by amygdala damage. 
Amygdala cases enhance the argument that one particular neural region exists, which 
is responsible for fear processing from multiple modalities. Nevertheless, a deficit for 
not just fear and anger, but recognition of other negative emotions is often 
compromised following amygdala damage. Please refer to Section 1.5.3b for more 
information.
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1.5.2b Amygdala and fear processing  -  a functional imaging perspective
Imaging teclmiques such as fMRI and PET have also examined the brain processes 
involved in fear perception. The amygdala shows more activity in response to facial 
displays of fear when compared to responses to neutral faces, (Breiter et al., 1996; 
Hariri, Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 2000; Phillips, Young et al., 1998; Phillips et al., 
1997; Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel, & Przuntek, 1998). Elevated amygdala activity 
is associated with fearful faces and voices in comparison with disgust faces (Phillips, 
Young et al., 1998; Phillips et al., 1997) and in comparison with happiness facial 
stimuli (Morris, Friston et al., 1998; Morris et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 1998). From a 
number of studies, Calder and co-workers (2001) summarised the maximally activated 
voxels involving the amygdala in response to the presentation of fear faces. They 
reported a propensity for left amygdala activity in response to facial expressions, 
while fearful displays engage the amygdala bilaterally. Fearful facial displays 
especially involve dorsal amygdala activity. Phelps and co-workers (2001) 
manipulated experimental conditions, so that participants thought that they would 
receive a shock (threat) when a particular coloured square was presented. In this 
condition, skin conductance levels changed and there was significant activity within 
the left amygdala.
LeDoux (1989) proposed a fear reaction system, in which threat signals are 
transmitted from the thalamus to the amygdala (fast subcortical route) and from the 
sensory cortex to the amygdala (the cortical route). Indeed, support for the subcortical 
route has come from numerous studies (DeGelder, Vroomen, Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 
1999; Moms, DeGelder, Weiskrantz, & Dolan, 2001; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998,
1999). These studies suggest that cortical blindness or lack of conscious awareness of 
threat-related stimuli do not prevent activity in the amygdala in response to the visual 
presentation of fearful faces. In contrast, Phillips and collaborators (2004) 
demonstrated that overt presentation of fear stimuli (170ms) is cmcial to activating 
the amygdala, yet short presentation (30ms) is insufficient to trigger responses of this 
structure.
Imaging studies have supplemented neuropsychological research, providing evidence 
for amygdala involvement in cross-modal fear perception, since facial and vocal 
expressions of fear activated the amygdala and superior temporal gyrus (Phillips,
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Young et al., 1998). Morris and colleagues (1999) reported a decreased response in 
the amygdala and left anterior insula for fearful voices in comparison to sad, happy, 
and neutral voices. Thus, while the type of response differs, the amygdala is 
associated with listening to fearful voices in both of these studies.
1.5.2c Neural substrate fo r  fear processing  -  a summary
In summary, neuropsychological studies of people with damage to the amygdala have 
indicated that this structure plays some role in fear recognition, since these people 
have difficulty recognising fear displayed by others and to a lesser extent, 
experiencing it themselves (Adolphs et al., 1994; Adolphs et al., 1995; Adolphs et al., 
1999; Broks et al., 1998; Calder et al., 2001; Scott et al., 1997; Sprengelmeyer et al., 
1999; Wang et al., 2002). Functional imaging research has supported this, by 
showing that the amygdala is activated when participants are exposed to threat-related 
stimuli (Morris, Friston et al., 1998; Morris et al., 1996; Morris, Ohman et al., 1999; 
Morris, Scott et al., 1999; Phillips et al., 1999; Phillips, Young et a l, 1998; 
Sprengelmeyer et a l, 1998). Please see Sections 1.5.3a-1.5.3b for discussion of the 
shortcomings of the amygdala theory.
1.5.2d Basal ganglia, insula cortex, and disgust processing  -  a neuropsychological 
perspective
There is strong evidence for the involvement of the insula cortex and basal ganglia in 
emotion processing. Their role is not clear, but research has posited that these regions 
are related to understanding and expressing emotions (Cancelliere & Kertesz, 1990). 
The basal ganglia are a collection of nuclei, which include the striatum (the caudate 
nucleus, putamen, nucleus accumbens), global pallidus, substantia nigra and the 
subthalamic nucleus (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4).
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caudate S t putamen
globuspallidus
thalamus
subthalamic nucleus
substantia nigra
Figure 1.3: The connections o f  the basal ganglia.
p.c. - substantia nigra pars compacta, p.r. - substantia nigra pars reticulata. 
.Source: http://thalamus, wustl.edu/course/
Figure 1.4: The basal ganglia.
I. Corona radiata. 2. Corpus callosum. 3. Head o f  caudate nucleus. 4. Body o f  caudate nucleus. S. Tail 
o f caudate nucleus. 6. "Foot" o f lentiform nucleus. 7. .Amygdaloid nuclear complex 8. Optic tract V. 
Putamen. 10. Bridges o f  grey matter between putamen and caudate nucleus 11. Pulvinar o f  thalamus. 
12. Bulb o f  occipital horn o f  lateral ventricle. 13. Calcar avis. 14. Collateral trigone. 15. Collateral 
eminence. 16. Hippocampus. 17. Inferior longitudinal fasciculus. 18. Short arcuate fibers 
Source: http://www.vh.org/Providcrs/Textboo/cs/BrainAnatomy/Braift4natomy.html
Double dissociations in neuropsychological research provide further support for the 
hypothesis that there are independent mechanisms underlying the processing o f  
specific emotions. In contrast to fear research, the emotion o f  disgust has been 
associated with a distinctly different neural correlate. H untington’s disease is a severe 
neurogenetic disorder, characterised by late-on set degeneration o f  the striatum. 
Patients suffering from H untington’s disease experience impaired recognition o f facial 
expressions o f  disgust in comparison to other facial expressions o f  emotion
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(Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Sprengelmeyer, Young, Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997; 
Wang, Hoosain, Yang, Meng, & Wang, 2003). Fear perception remains relatively 
intact, thus a double dissociation between fear and disgust processing has been 
claimed. The same facial tasks administered to amygdala patients (Broks et al., 1998; 
Calder, Young, Rowland et al., 1996; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999) were used in these 
experiments. Sprengelmeyer and colleagues (1996) also reported that Huntington’s 
patients had abnormal performance in a task assessing disgust recognition from vocal 
cues. Moreover, the presence of the gene mutation responsible for the development of 
Huntington’s disease leads to problems in perceiving facial disgust, even when the 
symptoms of this illness are not present (Gray, Young, Barker, Curtis, & Gibson,
1997). A degree of basal ganglia degeneration is associated with this state. These 
studies provide neuropsychological evidence for some role of the basal ganglia in 
disgust processing.
Abnormal metabolic activity within the basal ganglia is observed in cases of 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and Tourette’s syndrome (Braun et al., 1995; 
Rapoport, 1989; Rapoport & Fiske, 1998). OCD is a complex, heterogeneous anxiety 
disorder, defined by presence of either self-recognised irrational or unreasonable 
obsessions or compulsions, which affect everyday functioning. Tourette’s syndrome 
is a tic disorder that is characterised by early onset and social or occupational 
functioning impairment and often includes OCD-type behaviours (APA, 1994; Braun 
et al., 1995). Interpretation of facial displays of disgust is also disturbed in OCD and 
Tourette’s, but only if OCD symptoms are detected in its diagnosis (Sprengelmeyer, 
Young, Pundt et al., 1997). Sprengelmeyer and colleagues suggested that the presence 
of obsessive-compulsive behaviours is a defining feature of the disgust deficit.
Dysfunction in regions of the basal ganglia, particularly the striatum and the 
substantia nigia, also occurs in Parkinson’s disease. Consequently, research has 
focused on whether there are interferences in the processing of disgust stimuli in 
patients with this disease. Unmedicated Parkinson’s patients were significantly worse 
at perceiving facial disgust than their medicated counteiparts and a control gioup 
(Sprengelmeyer et al., 2003). This disgust deficit, specific to faces, has been reported 
in another study (Kan, Kawamura, Hasegawa, Mochizuki, & Nakamura, 2002). 
Facial and vocal fear recognition accuracy combined is impaired in Parkinson’s
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patients with bilateral Parkinson’s disease (Yip, Lee, Ho, Tsang, & Li, 2003). Yet 
groups with Parkinson’s symptoms exhibited on their right side were less accurate at 
perceiving disgust and sadness from the facial and vocal channels pooled together.
Disgust is believed to have evolved in order prevent us from ingesting hannful 
substances and to communicate this danger to others (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 
2000). Thus, one would expect this emotion to involve multiple sensory inputs. In a 
neuropsychological case study, an individual with insula cortex and putamen damage 
had gieat difficulty recognising disgust from faces and from voices, both from non­
verbal cues and prosodic cues (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000). Yet 
he understood what was meant by disgust. Thus, the concept and recognition do not 
seem to be related. The basal ganglia and insula are highly interconnected. Adolphs 
and colleagues (2003) also examined a participant with extensive neural damage, 
particularly to the insula cortex, and found him to have profound difficulties in 
perceiving disgust from dynamic facial expressions and emotional descriptions, and 
he seemed to have an abnormal experience of this emotion. These two studies imply 
that when the insula-striatal system is compromised, disgust processing is impaired, 
thus indicating a role for this system in disgust processing. It is also important to note 
that an abnormal increase in activation of insula in response to sensory processing and 
movement processing is also associated with Huntington’s disease (Boecker et al., 
1999; Weeks et al., 1997). Thus, the insula cortex would be a suitable candidate for 
processing disgust. It has also been labelled as the gustatory cortex since it contains 
neurons that respond to pleasant and unpleasant tastes (Small et al., 1999; Yaxley, 
Rolls, & Sienkiewicz, 1988). This is fitting, given the proposed phylogenetic origins 
of disgust as a rejection response to bad tastes (Rozin et al., 2000). Therefore, disgust 
seems to be linked with gustation and the insula cortex. There are studies that conflict 
with the proposal that disgust is processed by a separable neural mechanism, however. 
Please see Sections 1.5.3c-1.5.3d.
1.5.2e Basal ganglia, insula cortex, and disgust processing  -  afunctional imaging 
perspective
Functional imaging studies have been particularly informative because the brain 
regions involved in disgust are not clear; Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease, and
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OCD are not associated with overlapping or selective neural degeneration. fMRI was 
used to compare neural activity when participants viewed neutral and disgusted faces. 
Strong and mild expressions of disgust activated the insula and basal ganglia nuclei 
(Phillips et al., 1997). The amygdala was not activated by disgust. This provides a 
further evidence for separable structures involved in fear and disgust processing. 
Extensions of this work revealed that the anterior insula, the caudate, and putamen 
were involved in facial disgust perception (Phillips, Young et al., 1998; 
Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998). Recordings of intracerebral event-related potentials 
further revealed the importance of the ventral anterior insula in the perception of 
facial expressions, particularly those representing disgust (Krolak-Salmon et al., 
2003).
A recent fMRI exploration has examined the neural activity of a group of pre- 
symptomatic Huntington’s disease gene-carriers when disgusted faces were exhibited 
(Hennenlotter et al., 2004). Gene caiTiers had reduced responses within the left dorsal 
anterior insula in response to disgusted but not surprised or neutral faces, which in 
control participants showed an increase in activation. Behaviourally, the gene carriers 
were impaired in perceiving disgust. This study provides additional evidence for the 
role of the insula cortex in the processing of disgust.
Furthermore, disgusting pictures also seem to activate the insula cortex (Phillips et al.,
2000). Heining (2003) found that the insula responded to the presentation of disgust 
in auditory, gustatory, visual, and olfactory channels. This suggests that there may be 
some sort of multi-modal system for processing disgust, which involves regions of the 
insula and basal ganglia. Various research contests this idea, however. Please see 
Section 1.5.3c.
l ,5 ,2 f Neural substrate fo r  disgust processing -  a summary
In summary, disgust has been associated to neural structures including the insula 
cortex and the basal ganglia, but not the amygdala. Neuropsychological studies have 
provided strong support for the role of the basal ganglia and insula cortex in disgust 
processing (Adolphs et al., 2003; Calder, Keane, Manes et al., 2000; Gray et al., 1997;
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sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Sprengelmeyer, Young, Pundt et a l, 1997; Wang et al,
2003).
The studies presented in Section 1.5.2e support the neuropsychological proposal that 
processing facial disgust may be separable from fear processing; and that disgust 
perception may rely on the insula or basal ganglia (Hennenlotter et a l, 2004; Phillips 
et a l, 2000; Phillips, Senior, Fahy, & David, 1998; Phillips, Young et a l, 1998; 
Phillips et a l, 1997; Sprengelmeyer et a l, 1998).
1.5.3 A case for questions against independent neural pathways for specific
emotions
Despite the research outlined above, there is also a case against the concept of 
partially distinct pathways for processing fear and disgust regardless of modality.
1.5.3a Amygdala and imaging studies
Substantial evidence links the amygdala to fear processing, but also to the processing 
of most facial expressions of emotions (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). For 
instance, fMRI and PET studies have shown that activation of the amygdala changes 
in response to angry, sad, happy, and disgusted faces not just fearful faces (Blair, 
Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999; Breiter et a l, 1996; Gomo-Tempini et al, 2001; 
Hariri et a l, 2000; Morris, Friston et a l, 1998; Whalen et a l, 1998). No specific 
distinctions between amygdala activation in the processing of different emotions 
could be reported in another study (Winston, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). Crying and 
laughter (which are associated with sadness and happiness) have been found to 
strongly activate the amygdala bilaterally and the insula cortex (Sander, Brechmann, 
& Scheich, 2003; Sander & Scheich, 2001). Davis and Whalen (2001) suggested that 
the amygdala may have a more general role in emotion processing, such as evaluating 
salience of stimuli.
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1.5.3b Amygdala and neuropsychological studies
 europsychological research also demonstrates a more multifarious role for the 
amygdala in emotion processing. For example, Phelps and Anderson (1997) have 
reported that interpretation of sadness and disgust, along with fear is impaired in 
populations following amygdala damage. Two case studies, whilst reporting that 
amygdala lesions are associated with disproportionate reductions in recognition of 
fear, also reported impairments in perceiving sadness (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999) 
and disgust (Wang et al., 2002). Adolphs and collaborators (1995) reported that right 
amygdala damage resulted in no marked impairments in the recognition of specific 
emotions, and left amygdala damage led to impaiiinents in the recognition of most 
facial emotions. Yet bilateral amygdala damage does not always give rise to fear 
recognition deficits either (Hamann et al., 1996). The culmination of this research 
suggests that the amygdala has a more complex role in emotion processing than 
simply an involvement in the processing of fear stimuli.
Rapcsak and his colleagues (2000) carried out a comprehensive study with sixty-thiee 
patients who were suffering from a wide range of neurological damage. Patients who 
exhibited difficulties in perceiving particular facial emotion did not suffer from any 
clear pattem of brain damage. Furthermore, the amygdala was not associated with 
deficits in fear processing, but more with general problems in emotion processing. 
Rapcsak and collaborators suggested that disproportionately poor recognition of fear 
displays described in other research might be explained by an exacerbation of normal 
task difficulty in patients suffering from amygdala damage. This study provides 
evidence to suggest that the amygdala is not a modular system for processing fear or 
threat selectively.
The amygdala has been proposed to be part of a defence mechanism involved in the 
appraisal of threat. Since threats are not only visual, this mechanism would be 
expected to function across communication channels. Yet the involvement of the 
amygdala in vocal perception of fear is by no means an established finding. For 
instance, selective amygdala damage may impair recognition of facial but not vocal 
fear (Adolphs, Damasio, & Tranel, 2002; Anderson & Phelps, 1998). The opposite 
pattem was reported by Ghika-Schmid and colleagues (1997): in patients suffering 
from bihippocampal damage, facial fear processing was intact, but not vocal fear
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processing. This neuropsychological evidence suggests that non-verbal channels for 
fear recognition are partially dependent on different brain structures. This is 
discrepant with other neuropsychological research, and further suggests that amygdala 
involvement in emotion processing is not fully understood.
In accordance, though bilateral amygdala damage has been associated with impaired 
facial and vocal deficits in fear perception (Scott et al., 1997), it has been reported that 
for the vocal stimuli used in this study, the healthy control group found fear the most 
difficult emotion to perceive (Scott, personal communication). If the effects of task 
difficulty are worsened by amygdala damage, this could also explain the 
disproportionate influence on vocal fear perception in this task.
Adolphs and Tranel (2003) observed that amygdala patients had difficulties only with 
recognising negative emotions, particularly anger, when expressed by the face. They 
had no difficulties when these emotions were represented by inferred body 
movements and positions (with faces obscured) in still images from films. For 
instance, one image showed a person about to strike another, and the victim cowering 
in fear. When facial expressions were included in these scenes, this confounded their 
recognition. It could be postulated that amygdala association with fear perception 
might be restricted to facial perception only.
In the light of this finding, a point made by Meadows (1974) in the context of 
prosopagnosia should be considered here. He suggested that any residual capacity of 
the intact brain regions (normally competent) to complete a task might not be 
sufficient enough for accurate processing, perhaps as a consequence of inhibition by 
the damaged region. In support of Meadows’ suggestion, Perrett (personal 
communication) presented famous faces to the right visual field of a prosopagnosic 
patient and found evidence for some remaining intact left hemisphere face processing, 
but when faces were presented to the whole unrestricted visual field, the patient could 
not recognise the faces. Thus, it is likely that the patient’s damaged right hemisphere 
prevented the intact left hemisphere from being accessed. This could be related to the 
emotion perception studies. It is possible that the patients described in Adolphs and 
Tranel’s (2003) study might have some remaining ability to complete the emotion
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scene perception task, but when the incapacitated amygdala becomes involved (due to 
the inclusion of faces), it affects the task’s accomplishment.
1.5.3c Basal ganglia, insula cortex, and imaging studies
It is not only research focusing on the amygdala that has encountered scrutiny of late. 
Basal ganglia and insula activity have been associated with processing of emotions 
other than disgust. Observing happy face activates the basal ganglia, particularly the 
ventral striatum and putamen (Morris, Friston et al., 1998; Morris et al., 1996; Phan et 
al., 2002; Phillips, Bullmore et al., 1998; Whalen et al., 1998). Happiness-related 
stimuli also trigger responses in these regions (Lane, Chua, & Dolan, 1999; Lane, 
Reiman, Ahem, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1997). Phelps and co-workers (2001) 
reported that the insula responded to the production of several emotions, not simply 
disgust, and they suggested that the insula may act to integrate emotional infonnation. 
Moreover, Schienle and colleagues (2002) reported that the insula was activated in 
response to fearful, as well as disgusting, images.
In contrast with the view that disgust might operate multi-modally, facial and vocal 
communication channels seem to be dissociated. Imaging studies have failed to 
reveal basal ganglia or insula cortex involvement during the presentation of vocal 
disgust s(Phillips, Young et al., 1998). This contrasts with results following facial 
disgust presentations. Moreover, Heining (2003), Yaxley and colleagues (1988), and 
Small and collaborators (1999) report that the insula responds not simply to bad 
tastes, but to pleasant tastes as well.
1.5.3d Basal ganglia, insula cortex, and neuropsychological studies
In the populations described in Section 1.5.2d, who have a difficulty in perceiving 
disgust, fear perception is also affected. For instance, Sprengelmeyer and colleagues 
(1996) also found that Huntington’s Disease patients were significantly worse than 
healthy individuals at recognising all negative emotions, despite focusing on the 
disturbance in disgust processing. Reanalysis of Gray and colleagues’ (1997) data 
indicate a greater deficit in fear perception than disgust perception (Milders, 
Crawford, Lamb, & Simpson, 2003). Milders and co-workers (2003) also examined a
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population suffering from Huntington’s disease and they failed to replicate the disgust 
deficit reported by Sprengelmeyer and colleagues (1996; 1997). Indeed, Milders and 
colleagues reported that recognition of all negative emotions was affected, in 
particular fear, which they accredited to task difficulty. In addition, while a disgust 
deficit in Parkinson’s disease patients was focused on, Sprengelmeyer and colleagues 
(2003) also found a fear impairment in all Parkinson’s patients.
Further neuropsychological studies contest the proposal that there are specialised 
neural substrates for emotion processing fiom multiple channels. Kan and 
collaborators (2002) explored emotion perception in Parkinson’s disease. Parkinson’s 
patients were significantly worse than healthy participants in their perception of facial 
fear and disgust. This did not extend to prosodic or written stimuli. All static facial 
displays were particularly hard for the Parkinson’s disease participants to identify. 
The dissociation between Parkinson’s disease patients’ abilities on these different 
tasks indicates that the neural substrates implicated in emotion processing may not be 
the same for emotions expressed by different channels. Neuropsychological studies 
exploring the processing of vocal disgust are limited in other population groups, such 
as Huntington’s disease patients, so it is unclear whether a deficit in recognition of 
this form of stimuli could be replicated.
As noted earlier, Huntington’s disease, Tourette’s disorder, and OCD are not 
characterised by the same neuropathology. Since these disorders have been related to 
a disgust perception deficit, it is difficult to conclude that disgust is processed by a 
unitary neural mechanism, particularly as the actual brain regions associated with 
disgust deficits in neuropsychological populations are unclear. Furthermore, the 
disgust recognition deficit observed in OCD has not been replicated (Kornreich et al., 
2001; Parker, McNally, Nakayama, & Wilhelm, 2004). Perhaps a disgust deficit is 
confined to an undefined subset of OCD sufferers.
While some neuropsychological and imaging studies provide support for a link 
between visual and vocal disgust recognition, there are still a number of discrepant 
research findings. The issue whether disgust is processed supramodally is not 
resolved.
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1,5.3e Complex neural systems
As a result of the inconsistencies in research, it has been acknowledged by most 
researchers that the neural systems involved in emotion are more complex than simply 
distinct circuits underlying the processing of each emotion. The neural mechanisms 
associated with emotion may involve overlapping networks, rather than being wholly 
distinct. As a result of these overlapping circuits, some mechanisms may be 
disproportionately involved in the processing of one emotion more than others.
1.5.4 Mirror neurons and emotion processing
MiiTor neurons have been explored in non-human primates, namely macaques. They 
respond during execution of a goal-directed action, and also when this same action is 
obseiwed being performed by someone else (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
1996; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002; Rizzolatti, 
Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). This system 
might not be restricted to object-oriented actions, such as grasping or ripping actions, 
but also to communicative gestures shown in monkeys, such a lip-smacking or tongue 
protrusion (Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi, 2003). Evidence for a mirror 
system can be found in human brains (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). 
In humans, however, the mirror-neuron system has different properties to those in 
animals. For instance, meaningless movements and movements that comprise an 
action activate this system in humans, but not in monkeys (Rizzolatti & Craigliero,
2004). This has been regarded as support for proposals that, as a species, humans 
have the ability to leam via imitation.
Perhaps perception of emotion is dependent on matching an emotion and how it 
would feel, via an internal simulation of its characteristic expression (Adolphs, 
Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, in press). 
Inteipreting another person’s nonverbal cues to emotion could involve activity of 
minor neurons.
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There is growing evidence that the mirror system matches more than action execution 
and visually presented actions. Kohler and colleagues (2002) described a set of 
mirror neurons with both visual and auditory properties. They reported that some 
neurons in monkeys’ ventral premotor cortex respond when the monkey executes an 
action, when it observes an action executed by someone else, and when it hears the 
corresponding noise associated with that action, even though it cannot see the action 
being carried out. Further evidence for the receptive aspects of audiovisual properties 
of mirror neurons has been presented by other researchers (Barraclough, Xiao, Baker, 
Oram, & Perrett, in press; Calvert & Campbell, 2003).
Fadiga and co-workers (2002) used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to 
explore the relationship between vocal expression and perception in humans. This is 
based on a proposal by Liberman and Whalen (2000) that the phonetic elements of 
speech, underlying linguistic communication, are not sounds but rather the 
articulatory gestures that generate those sounds. In order to understand speech, the 
sounds of speech would activate the listener’s articulatory gestuies representations 
(motor representation). Participants took part in a speech listening task, which 
involved listening to a variety of sounds, words, and pseudo-words. Threshold for 
tongue movements triggered by TMS to motor cortex was reduced by listening to 
speech sounds that relate specifically to those tongue movements. Similar findings 
were also reported by Wilson and colleagues (2004).
A similar mechanism to that which governs action perception (both auditory and 
visual) and execution, involving viscero-motor regions, has been proposed to underlie 
understanding of others’ emotions. Specifically, there is evidence to suggest that 
humans model internally or match another’s state onto our own corresponding neural 
representation for that state, in order for us to assign a label to this state (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998). For more information on this simulation theory approach, please 
refer to Goldman (1992), Gordon (1996), and Gallese and colleagues (in press).
Further evidence for the link between perception and expression can be demonstrated; 
when others are observed expressing emotion in their face, researchers report that 
humans have a tendency to involuntarily activate the same muscles involved in that
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expression within their own face (Dimberg & Lundquist, 1990; Greenwald, Cook, & 
Lang, 1989; Schwartz, Brown, & Ahem, 1980).
Wicker and colleagues (2003) provided imaging support for this theory, linking 
perception and expression. Feelings of disgust induced by unpleasant odours 
activated the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex. These regions were also 
activated when facial expressions associated with feelings of disgust were observed 
visually. In several neuropsychological cases, patients, who have disturbed 
perception of particular emotions, also suffer disturbances in their experience of those 
emotions. This confirms a close relationship between experience and identification. 
Mirror neurons might be activated when emotions are perceived in others and when 
experiencing that emotion oneself, perhaps helping emotion recognition.
Further links between emotion perception and premotor (including the frontal 
operculum) and somatosensory cortices (which may be included in mirroring) have 
been reported. Kesler-West and collaborators (2001) observed that the frontal 
opercular cortices were activated in response to emotional facial expressions. This 
was also reported by Adolphs and co-workers (2000), who, in addition, found 
integrity of right somatosensory cortices is important for the recognition of emotional 
expressions. Winston and colleagues (2003) observed activation of somatosensory 
cortices in response to facial emotion. This activation is not restricted to reactions to 
facial expressions, but activity also occurs in response to presentation of prosody 
(Adolphs et al., 2002). Thus, it is reasonable to postulate the role of a mirror neuron 
system in the processing of a range of emotional stimuli.
Familiarity with your own emotional displays would improve recognition of others’ 
emotions. This idea is strengthened by the work of Grèzes and collaborators (2004), 
who reported that participants’ action-related neural regions were activated earlier 
when viewing their own pre-recorded body movements than when viewing the 
movements of others. This suggests that participants may recognise familiar 
movements more quickly, based on familiarity with their own production of such 
signals.
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eurons that process actions and inferred actions are found along the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), and this region is activated in response to an array of stimuli. 
This region is not considered to be part of the mirror neuron system, since it lacks 
motor properties, (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004); the STS responds to sensory input, 
but not executed action. Nevertheless, this region may play a role in the interpretation 
of emotional stimuli. For instance, human vocal infonnation triggers changes in 
activity along the STS (Belin, Fecteau, & Bedard, 2004; Belin, Zatorre, Lafaille, 
Ahad, & Pike, 2000; Gervais et al., 2004). Moreover, viewing dynamic, and to a 
lesser extent, still speech pattems, without the corresponding auditory display also is 
characterised by a Blood Oxygen Level Dependent response in STS (Calvert & 
Campbell, 2003). Thus, STS neuron activity appears to be important in the 
processing of human vocal pattems. hi addition, the STS is activated when body 
movements are presented visually (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Bonda, 
Petrides, Ostry, & Evans, 1996; Grossman et al., 2000; Howard et al., 1996; Puce & 
Perrett, 2003). Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) provided evidence for a degree of STS 
neural activity during stories in which biological movement was described. Together, 
these research studies suggest that the processing of verbal and nonverbal cues are 
related to STS neuron activity, thus interpretation of emotions, if presented 
nonverbally, may well involve this system.
In summary, this research shows that mirror neurons are involved in the processing of 
vocal information and nonverbal cues from others (e.g. body movements), and also 
when the participant executes these verbal and nonverbal behaviours themselves. 
Since many emotional cues are nonverbal, it is likely that the processing and 
communication of these signals might involve STS neurons; the STS may provide the 
sensory input to the mirror system. In tum, interpretation of these sensory cues may 
engage mirror neuron system structures. This mirror system may enable 
comprehension of emotion displayed by others, and elements within the system may 
allow the differentiation of fear, disgust, anger, happiness, sadness, and so on, 
performed by others. The system, as a whole, however, is unlikely to be designed for 
one particular emotion.
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1.5.5 Expression versus recognition of emotions
While the above proposal suggests than motor imagery is related to the interpretation 
of emotions, there is substantial literature describing an impairment in emotion 
recognition but not in emotion expression abilities. Please see Anderson and Phelps 
(2000), for instance. This is indicative of dissociable mechanisms responsible for 
processing emotion -  one that has its roots in perceiving and interpreting emotion; and 
one that is responsible for expressing emotion, which seems to be unaffected in these 
instances. Expression may be independent of motor imagery.
1.6 Limitations of emotion research
1.6.1 Modality of stimuli
One of the key criticisms for the theory that emotions have evolved for functional 
puiposes and, as such, are processed by somewhat independent neural structures, is 
that research examining emotion recognition from multiple modalities is limited. 
Generally, most neuropsychological research has focused purely on interpretation of 
facial emotion, and the conclusions of the few studies examining vocal emotion 
perception have been mixed. The face is believed by several researchers to convey 
more information than other emotional cues, such as those communicated by voice or 
body gestures. Yet, relatively little is actually known about the processing of other 
forms of emotional expression. To what extent neural systems may be specialised for 
processing cross-modal emotional stimuli has not been addressed comprehensively. 
Therefore, it would be beneficial to investigate the neural structures associated in 
processing different types of vocal emotional expressions and also emotion expressed 
fi'om other visual cues, such a gestures. Drawing conclusions regarding emotion 
processing multi-modally on the basis of one channel of communication may be 
misguided.
Facial emotion perception is favoured as a research tool, since it has been 
demonstrated to be effective cross-culturally, yet vocal expressions and gestural
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expressions of emotion are also believed to be universal (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; 
Hejmadi, Davidson, & Rozin, 2000; Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1993; Scherer, Banse, 
& Wallbott, 2001).
1.6,la  Vocal emotion perception
The voice can convey a wealth of information as well as the face, but this mode of 
communication has been neglected to an extent in emotion research. This lack of 
research reflects the practical and technical complexities of studying expression and 
perception of vocal emotions. Research that has examined vocal expression of 
emotion has used several different types of stimuli, which could explain contradictory 
results. For example, some studies examine perception of non-verbal sounds, such as 
growls, screams, and laughter, while others examine responses to verbal expressions -  
this can vary from one word being spoken with different types of emotional inflection, 
to whole sentences. Alternatively, some studies have investigated vocal expressions 
of emotion presented in meaningless sentences, or nonsense-words. The voice is a 
fundamental conveyor of emotion. Darwin (1872) said that ‘with many kinds of 
animals, man included, the vocal organs are efficient in the highest degree as a means 
of expression’ (page 88).
The argument that each emotion might be processed by a separable neural mechanism 
suggests that should someone be impaired at recognising a specific facial emotion, 
that particular emotion will also be more difficult to recognise when expressed 
vocally. There is substantial evidence for simultaneous and linked visual and 
auditory perception. For instance, when a speaker is seen, speech comprehension is 
enhanced (Sumby & Pollack, 1954). Moreover, the McGurk effect is a well-known 
paradigm, whereby visual cues interfere in the perception of auditory cues (McGurk 
& MacDonald, 1976). If a vocal sound is presented simultaneously with an 
incongment facial movement display, then this significantly affects the way in which 
that sound is perceived. If the sound ‘ba’ is vocalised, but the face is seen to say ‘ga’, 
then a receiver would experience the sound ‘da’, a combination of the two inputs, 
which shows the influence of both communication channels on perception. 
Ventriloquism is a further demonstration that there is simultaneous and linked visual 
and auditory perception. Even the cinema demonstrates how humans combine
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information they see and hear together: audiences perceive the voices to be coming 
from the actors on the screen, rather than from speakers around the room. This 
audiovisual integration provides robust evidence for cross-modal interactions.
1.6,1b Gestural emotion perception
Very little neuropsychological research has investigated the perception of emotional 
cues from body movements. Again, methodological variations limit the 
generalisation of research using such stimuli. For instance, emotions can be conveyed 
by the body using symbolic cues, or natural body movements; some studies have 
focused on still postures, as opposed to moving gestures and vice versa; other studies 
present posed expressions and others present spontaneous expressions of emotion. It 
has been suggested that body language cues are just as effective as facial cues for 
indicating the intensity of an emotional state (Graham, Bitti, & Argyle, 1975). 
Dynamic cues enhance perceptive abilities, since still pictures of people displaying 
emotions with their body are far more difficult to recognise (Walters & Walk, 1988). 
Negative emotions have been reported as easier to recognise from dynamic video 
clips (Sogon & Izard, 1987). Fundamental emotions are recognised across cultures 
when depicted using body movements (De Meijer, 1989; Sogon & Masutani, 1989). 
Such movements may be valuable for the communication of emotions across 
distances, where recognition of emotion from facial expressions is difficult (Walters 
& Walk, 1988). Moreover, Boone and Cunningham (1998) found that children as 
young as four are able to use a number of cues from body movements to identify 
sadness, and by the age of five they can interpret fear and happiness represented by 
the body.
Music and dance are frequently associated with mood and emotional portrayal. Both 
American and Indian population groups recognised emotion when depicted in an 
ancient Hindu dance-fonn (Hejmadi et al., 2000). The style of dance that was 
employed in this experiment was a classical and ancient Hindu-Indian dance foim, 
which displays ten different emotions, with a great deal of emphasis on hand and body 
movements. Other studies have shown that emotions are relatively easy to recognise 
from dance movements (Brownlow, Dixon, Egbert, & Radcliffe, 1997; Dittrich, 
Troscianko, Lea, & Morgan, 1996; Walk & Homan, 1984).
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Point-light displays, in which points at major positions on the body are the only cues 
visible to the observer, are sufficient to give the impression biological motion 
(Johansson, 1973). Recognition of emotions portrayed by dynamic point-light 
displays is very accurate (Dittrich et al., 1996; Walk & Homan, 1984).
Research has demonstrated that body movements can provide information regarding a 
person’s emotional state, and this can be conveyed not simply in normal lighting 
conditions, but also in point-light conditions. Dynamic body movement stimuli have 
rarely been incorporated in neuropsychological research, however. One study 
reported that amygdala damage led to difficulties in perceiving fear and anger 
depicted in point-light conditions by actors’ walking actions (Heberlein, Ravahi, 
Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000). Furthermore, DeGelder and colleagues (2004) 
and Hadjikhani and DeGelder (2003) indicated (using fMRI) that observing fear 
represented by body movements activates neural regions involved in fear processing, 
namely the amygdala.
1.6.2 Underestimating individual differences in emotion perception
The role of individual differences is generally neglected in neuropsychological 
emotion research. For instance, many studies assume that difficulties in perceiving 
emotions are related to neural dysfunction rather than other factors, such as mood 
fluctuations. For the most part, neuropsychologists do try to match patient groups and 
control participants on the basis of age, sex, and IQ, yet studies do not typically 
consider the impact of these factors on emotion processing.
1.7 A proposal for research -  multiple communication channels and 
individual differences
In an effort to understand the neural processes involved in multi-modal emotion 
perception, the research in this thesis will examine emotion perception from a number
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of communication channels. These include facial displays of emotion, vocal 
representations of emotion, and dynamic gestural portrayals of emotion. Recognition 
levels on each of these tasks will be compared and contrasted. Questionnaires 
assessing emotional experience will also be incorporated. The impact of mood, both 
state (transient) and trait (more durable), age, and sex of participant and sex of 
stimulus actor will be investigated. This collection of experiments provides 
information about the ease with which normal, healthy people perceive and recognise 
emotions expressed in different modalities, and thus, could offer clues about the 
phylogeny and ontogeny of emotion recognition.
A clinical exploration of the influence of Parkinson’s disease on emotion processing 
will be presented. This offers a neuropsychological approach to examining the neural 
mechanisms involved in emotion perception. Expression of emotions, both facially 
and vocally, is severely affected in Parkinson’s disease, yet studies on emotion 
recognition hom faces and voices remain inconclusive. Basal ganglia dysfunction is 
associated with Parkinson’s disease, and since these structures have been implicated 
in disgust processing, a comprehensive investigation of the role of the basal ganglia in 
the processing of emotion from multiple channels will be conducted. Few studies 
have explored emotion recognition across multiple channels. Should neural 
mechanisms exist that are specialised for the processing of particular emotions, any 
deficits shown on one task would be expected to extend to other tasks and across 
modalities. This information can be used to help determine the nature of the 
emotional impairment. This also provides an opportunity to examine the role of 
motor imagery abilities in emotion perception, as motor imagery is believed to be 
affected by this motor control disorder (Thobois et al., 2000).
Further, understanding deficits in emotion perception can help researchers to 
comprehend the difficulties faced by clinical groups. Several individuals suffering 
fi'om clinical disorders are prone to becoming withdrawn and isolated socially. This 
social change may arise from several issues, but a major contributing factor could 
result from problems in interpreting emotion of others. Thus, it is of great importance 
to understand whether deficits in emotion perception could contribute to the 
development of such interpersonal difficulties, as this could help and guide carers in 
their everyday interactions with such patients.
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1.7.1 A method for assessing emotional impairments
When exploring emotion processing, most studies focus on sensitivity levels for each 
emotion in order to explore patterns of difficulty. The confusability of the emotions 
in these tasks is rarely examined, yet this could further our understanding of any 
impairment shown in the recognition of emotional stimuli. Researchers in favour of a 
dimensional approach to emotion perception, such that emotions may be related in a 
highly systematic fashion, have examined false positives in response to labelling 
emotional stimuli. For instance, Woodworth (1938) examined confusions made 
between recognition of facial expressions of emotion and this led him to arrange 
emotions on a circular plane, based upon similarity of the emotional displays. 
According to this approach, emotions may be part of emotional space, defined by 
specific dimensions.
Investigating errors and false positives could divulge whether certain populations 
have a tendency to over-use a particular emotional label more than others, whether 
they have heightened recognition accuracy for particular emotions, or whether a 
recognition deficit for a specific emotion exists.
Recently, it has been reported that young people with mood disorders, such as bipolar 
disorder, have a bias to misinterpret the facial expressions of peers as angry (McClure, 
Pope, Hobei*man, Pine, & Leibenluft, 2003). Furthermore, Frigerio and colleagues 
(2002) reported that alcoholics interpret sad faces as being hostile (angry or disgusted) 
more than control participants. Other studies need to explore this mis-labelling of 
emotions to understand any exhibited impairments fully. A method for exploring 
these mistakes is proposed in this thesis, whereby false positives and errors are 
analysed in order to understand patterns of difficulty in emotion processing.
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2EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
This chapter will provide an overview o f  the principal emotional tests employed in 
the research presented in this thesis.
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 The need for a comprehensive set of emotion tests
Communicating emotional states is a skill that most humans exhibit. This skill is 
central to human social interactions, and it essentially directs appropriate behavioural 
responses for such situations. Expression and recognition of emotion often occur 
without awareness, yet there seem to be universal patterns in the way in which 
different emotions are represented through specific channels. For example, facial 
expressions of happiness have similar basic components that are always displayed, 
regardless of the country, society, or context in which that emotion is elicited (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1978). Vocal and gestural expressions of emotion also seem to have 
universal qualities (Banse & Scherer, 1996; De Meijer, 1989; Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2002; Hejmadi et al., 2000; Scherer et al., 2001; Van Bezooijen, Otto, & Heenan, 
1983).
There has been a paucity of research exploring emotional recognition, other than 
interpreting facial expressions. While a set arsenal of reliable, valid, commercially- 
available instmments for measuring various aspects of emotional face perception exist 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988; Young, Perrett, Calder, 
Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002), the extent of measures with potential 
neuropsychological significance for gestural emotion perception and vocal emotion 
perception is less widespread or established. Yet the face may not be the most telling 
bearer of a person’s emotional state. The phylogenetic roots of each emotion may 
determine that specific emotions are displayed most clearly through particular
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channels of communication. Cultural display rules may influence this to a certain 
extent (Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997; Fridlund, 1994; Russell, 1994). The research in 
this thesis uses a comprehensive set of tests, in order to understand emotion 
processing from multiple communication channels and the relationships between 
these channels.
2.2 The tests
The instructions for all tasks are outlined in Appendix 2.
2.2.1 Facial tests
To investigate the perception of facial emotion, two conventional, standardised testing 
procedures have been used in this thesis from Young and colleagues’ (2002) Facial 
Expressions of Emotion: Stimuli and Test (FEEST).
2.2.1a Ekman 60
2.2.1a (i) Stimuli
The Ekman 60 involves the pseudo-random presentation of achromatic photographs 
of faces expressing emotions. The photographs portray ten actors, each posing six 
emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise). The faces are 
originally from Ekman and Friesen’s (1976) series. Figure 2.1 shows an example of 
these stimuli.
<L\
Figure 2.1: Examples o f  Ekman 60 stimuli.
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2.2.1a (ii) Procedure
Participants are presented with the 60 faces on a 15” Toshiba Satellite 2410 computer 
screen. The participants have to indicate which emotion from the list of emotions 
(anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, or surprise) is expressed in the photograph 
they are shown. The labels are visible throughout testing. Their responses are 
recorded by either pressing appropriate keys on the keyboard, or by using the mouse 
to click buttons on the screen. The participants either do this themselves, or the 
experimenter does this for them (for the older and clinical participants). The faces are 
only shown for three seconds each time, and then a blank screen follows, but the 
participants can take as long as they wish to make their decision. The next face is not 
presented until a decision about the previous stimulus has been made. No feedback is 
given regarding their decisions.
2.2.1b Emotion hexagon
2.2.1b (i) Stimuli
The Emotion Hexagon includes computer-manipulated versions of the photos from 
the Ekman 60 (Young et al., 1997). Graphical alterations were introduced by the 
morphing of facial expressions together, with the intention that one face is a 
combination of two different facial expressions. Morphing is a technique that enables 
images to be inteipolated along a continuum between the two prototype images (in 
this case, pictures of faces with different facial expressions of emotion). The basic 
technique involves locating specified points on the two images (delineation), and then 
the shape of one image can be shifted towards that of the other image along a 
continuum (shape interpolation). The final stage involves producing a continuous- 
tone image by waiping and stretching each face to the new shape.
The expressions morphed together are those that are most regularly confounded, 
according to Woodworth and Schlosberg’s (1954) model of emotional space 
(happiness-surprise, surprise-fear, fear-sadness, sadness-disgust, disgust-anger, anger- 
happiness). Therefore, the hexagon is the sequence of facial expressions ordered by 
their maximum confusability. For example, facial fear and surprise are consistently 
confused -  so these expressions were morphed together. This manipulation of the 
pictures created a set of faces in which each face is a combination of two emotions.
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Within a set of faces there was one face which was 10% of the first emotion. 90% 
second emotion; one face with 30% first emotion, 70% second emotion; another that 
is 50% each emotion; one that is 70% first emotion, 30% second emotion; and finally, 
a face that contains 90% first emotion, 10% second emotion. For more information, 
please refer to Calder and colleagues (1996) and Young and collaborators (1997). 
These continua are shown in Figure 2.2. These 30 faces were included in this task.
r%
T f
T.
Figure 2.2: Faces used in the emotion hexagon task.
2.2. Ih (ii) Procedure
In the Emotion Hexagon, the same computerised design as the Ekman 60 is employed. 
I he participants undertake six blocks of trials. Each block includes all 30 morphed
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faces in a random order. The first block is a practice trial. The performance on this 
task is assessed by dividing the thirty faces into six categories -  each category 
contains five faces which should be consistently labelled with one emotion from the 
six. The surprise section, for example, includes five faces, made up as follows: 100% 
surprised, 90% surprised-10% happy, 70% surprised-30% happy, 90% surprised-10% 
fear, 70% surprised-30% fear; and so on, for each emotion. The instructions are 
included in Appendix 2.
2.2.1c Ekman 50
A third facial emotion task was employed in a few studies in this thesis. This task 
included the same stimuli and followed the same procedure as the Ekman 60. The ten 
photographs of actors posing surprise were excluded from this study, as well as 
surprise as a response choice.
2.2.2 Vocal tests
2.2.2a Nonsense vocal emotion stimuli
2.2.2a (i) Stimuli
This task was developed by Sprengelmeyer and colleagues (1996) for use in 
neuropsychological research. In this test, the same German actor vocalised 10 
nonsense plii'ases (made up from meaningless words), using different emotional 
intonations (representing anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise). 
Vocal prosodic cues were varied.
2.2.2a (ii) Procedure
Participants listened to the audio track, which was played through a computer and 
they had to indicate which emotion from the list of six emotions was expressed in the 
phrase that they heard. Participants had their responses recorded by the experimenter. 
The next plimse or expression was not presented until the participant had made their 
decision regarding the previous stimulus.
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2.2.2b Verbal vocal emotion stimuli
2.2.2b (i) Stimuli
The second vocal test was developed by Calder and colleagues (2000) for use in 
neuropsychological research. In this test, a series of numbers (e.g. ‘five, seven, two, 
three, nine’) were spoken aloud in different emotional tones. This test was also 
designed to vary prosodic cues while keeping semantic cues constant. Ten different 
actors conveyed the ten plnases within each emotion condition. The proportion of 
male and female actors was similar for each emotion category. Each emotion was 
represented ten times and the five basic emotions, anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and 
sadness (this excludes surprise) were represented.
2.2.2b (ii) Procedure
The procedure for this test was similar to the previous vocal task. Again, participants 
had to indicate which emotion they thought was represented by the vocalisation. 
Participants taking part in the age study (Chapter 8 ) or the clinical participants 
(Chapter 9) had their responses recorded by the experimenter, all other participants 
indicated their own responses by pressing appropriate buttons on the computer. If 
participants needed to hear the phrase again, it was replayed.
2.2.3 Gestural cue tests
2.2.3a Stimuli
This set of stimuli enabled the examination of emotion recognition when expressed 
gesturally without facial or vocal cues. A series of digital video clips showed actors 
expressing five emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness) in two lighting 
conditions (Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, & Young, 2004). The stimuli consisted of 
ten displays of every emotion in each condition. The same actors did not always 
represent each emotion. For anger, there were five males and five females acting 
these body movements. For happiness, there were four males and six females. For 
fear, there were three males and seven females. For sadness, there were five males 
and five females. And for disgust, there were six males and four females. The two 
different conditions are described below.
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These stimuli were digital video recordings of moving figures. Each clip was 4-8 
seconds long. The actors were filmed against a dark background. Actors wore a body 
suit was made from dark-grey, tight-fitting material, and dark-grey tights were placed 
over their heads, so that facial cues are not available to the observers. Head 
movements and orientation could still be seen though. A specialised camera recorded 
the expressions, so that they could be presented as stimuli in full-light conditions and 
in point-light conditions. Full-light conditions refer to normal lighting but black and 
white transmission of the clips. There were thirteen 20mm-wide reflective strips 
placed at various points on the body suit worn by the actors. These reflective strips 
were placed on each ankle, each knee, each elbow, each hand, each hip and each 
shoulder, and one on the forehead. The strips completely encircled each limb. In the 
point-light conditions, only these strips are visible against a black background. The 
strips are sufficient to give the impression of biological movement, without providing 
cues from form and shape.
In each clip the actor starts in a neutral position, with his/her arms by their side, 5.5m 
from the camera and directly in line with it, and then the actor acts out the emotion 
and returns to the starting position. The five emotions portrayed were anger, disgust, 
fear, happiness, and sadness. From the one hundred clips, fifty show the expressions 
in full-light conditions and 50 show the same movements in point-light conditions. 
These two types of clips were digitally edited and produced from identical footage 
using Apple Computer’s Final Cut Pro 2.0 and Pinnacle Systems’ Commotion Pro 4.0 
DV editing software packages. Figure 2.3 is an example of a full-light movie reel, 
and Figure 2.4 is example of the corresponding point-light movie reel.
The original movies were created in QuickTime movie files. The clips were 
converted from .mov format to .avi format using RAD Video Tools (Roberts, 
Engelberg, Miles, & Powell, 2002), and then compressed (the size of the movie was 
too large to run smoothly otherwise). The movies were also cropped slightly using 
Fast Movie Processor (Tibljas & Nikolic, 1999). The movies were then programmed 
to run automatically using Visual Basic.
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Oms 400ms 800ms 1200ms
1600ms 2000ms 2400ms 2800ms
3200ms 3600ms 4000ms 4400ms
4800ms 5200ms 5600ms 6000ms
Figure 2.3: A reel .showing fram es from  a dy’namic fu ll-light gestural portrayal o f  anger.
This clip is 6 seconds long. The fram es shown above represent the point o f  movement every 400ms.
6 1
Oms 400ms 800ms 1200ms
1600ms 2000ms 2400ms 2800ms
3200ms 3600ms 4000ms 4400ms
4800ms 5200ms 5600ms 6000ms
Figure 2.4: A reel showing fram es from  a dynamic point-light gestural portrayal o f  anger.
This clip is 6 seconds long. The fram es shown above represent the point o f  movement every' 400ms.
Summary
I o reiterate: for each of the fifty selected gestures, footage was used to develop a full- 
light movie and corresponding movie in point-light conditions. For further 
information regarding these stimuli, please refer to Atkinson and colleagues (2004).
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2.2.3b Design
The full-light movie and point-light movie conditions were presented in two separate 
blocks of trials, in a repeated measures design. The order of presentation was 
counterbalanced across participants.
2.2.3 c Procedure
2.2.3c (i) Group presentation format 
The clips were displayed on a projector screen connected to a Dell Inspiron 1100 
laptop. All stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen, with each figure 
appearing roughly 1.5m in height. Participants were seated in front of the projection 
screen. All participants were seated far enough back from the screen so that the entire 
screen was in the centre of their visual field. Instructions were presented to 
participants on the computer screen to read at their own pace, and they were also read 
out by the experimenter (see Appendix 2). Participants were told that they would be 
shown a series of short movie clips showing actors portraying emotions using their 
body and their task was to indicate which emotion they think was expressed by that 
actor. They were then shown an example of the type of stimuli used in that condition. 
The participants chose from a list of the five emotions, which was permanently on 
display on the screen. Participants marked their choice on a response sheet. The trial 
number was also visible on the screen. When the participant had made their choice, 
the experimenter presented the next video clip. No feedback was given concerning 
the correctness of any responses.
2.2.3c (ii) Single participant presentation format 
The clips were displayed on a 15.0 inch Toshiba Satellite 2410 laptop. All stimuli 
were presented in the centre of the screen. The figures were around 3 inches in 
height. Each participant was seated directly in front of the computer screen. The 
same instructions were presented as in the group format. Participants told the 
experimenter their choice and this was recorded. Single participant presentation 
format was used in studies described in Chapters 8 , 9, and 10.
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2.3 Statistical analysis
For most tasks in each study, data were submitted to mixed-design ANOVAs. The 
between-subjects factor was group/task, and the within-subjects factor was 
recognition accuracy for each emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and 
surprise if included in the task). Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were administered 
where possible. If a significant or borderline interaction or group/task difference was 
revealed, then the analysis was generally followed by independent t-tests, equal 
variances assumed where appropriate, in order to explore impairments in specific 
emotions. In some cases, performance for individual emotions was contrasted 
between groups when the emotion by group interaction was non-significant. This was 
because (a) interactions are less likely to be significant when one factor has many 
levels, and (b) since this thesis is concerned with recognition of specific emotions, 
rather than emotion recognition in general. Such analysis methods are precedent in 
the literature (Jacobs, Shuren, Bowers, & Heilman, 1995; Phillips, MacLean, & Allen, 
2002; Sprengelmeyer, Young, Pundt et al., 1997).
2.4 Discussion
Descriptions of the stimuli employed in this thesis are included above. References to 
this chapter will be made thioughout the thesis, when each of the stimuli has been 
employed.
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3MOOD EFFECTS ON GESTURAL EMOTION RECOGNITION
Recent research has shown that clinically-defined mood disorders can affect 
recognition o f  emotion exhibited by others. As a consequence, this chapter 
addresses the impact o f mood traits on emotion perception in a normal population. 
Interpretation o f emotions that are communicated by body movements will be 
explored in this study.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 General background
Emotions are fundamental to human behaviour. The ability to interpret cues from 
counterparts’ faces, voices, and gestures in order to discern which emotion they are 
feeling is integral to social communication and interaction. This facilitates our 
predictions of the intentions and emotional states of others, thus influencing and, 
consequently, guiding our own behaviour. It is not clear how our own internal states 
may influence our interpretation of emotional cues, however. Recent research has 
shown that clinically-diagnosed mood disorders, can affect recognition of emotion, 
yet there has been little research investigating whether less permanent psychological 
states or traits in a normal population may have an impact on the ability to construe 
emotions of others. Moods represent individual differences, and it would seem 
plausible that a person’s own mood state or trait may in turn bias their understanding 
of social and emotional environments.
3.1.2 Mood effects on perception
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders IV (APA, 
1994), moods are a pervasive and sustained ‘emotional climate’, whereas affect
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reflects more fluctuating changes in ‘emotional weather’. Mood traits reflect the 
tendency to experience a particular mood state.
Moods seem to have the ability to influence reasoning, judgements, and decisions. 
Forgas (2000) suggested that moods may not only affect what humans think in terms 
of cognitive content, but also how we think; that is, our cognitive processes may be 
influenced.
For instance, moods appear to evoke more mood-salient thoughts but can reduce task 
relevant thoughts (Seibert & Ellis, 1991). Moods have been reported to impede 
performance on memory, executive functioning, reasoning, and motivation tasks 
(Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & Williams, 
1996; Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). By contrast, Isen (1999) observed that 
positive moods can elicit more associations to targets words, which could, in turn, 
enable participants to interpret situations or stimuli more thoroughly.
3.1.2a Induced mood
Influences of mood on perception of emotions are often mood-congruent. Mood- 
congruence refers to an increased accuracy of perception or faster responses in 
interpreting emotional stimuli that are comparable with the mood being experienced, 
such as a person in a happy mood being faster or better at responding to positive 
stimuli. Mood-congruent effects on affectively loaded words are exhibited following 
mood induction, using musical techniques (Niedenthal, Flalberstadt, & Setterland, 
1997; Niedenthal & Setterland, 1994). In other words, when a person listens to music 
that stimulates a positive mood, then they are faster to respond to words associated 
with happiness. A similar outcome was demonstrated for sad moods and sad-related 
words. This finding did not extend to affective words that were unrelated to the 
happiness-sadness dimension, however. Another study provides further evidence for 
faster reaction times to mood-congruent lexical stimuli than to incongment stimuli 
(Olafson & Ferraro, 2001).
Mood induction also influences facial expression perception (Niedenthal, Flalberstadt, 
Margolin, & Innes-Ker, 2000). Participants had to alter a face using a computerised
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scale until it was perceived as being emotionally neutral. Emotionally congruent 
expressions were perceived to persist longer than those that were incongment with the 
experienced mood, such that the when non-happy participants perceived the face as 
neutral, happy participants were still classifying it as happy. Thus, mood states 
enhance sensitivity to emotion-congruent states in others.
3.1.2 b Anxiety
Anxious people attend more to stimuli that are anxiety-eliciting or threat-related than 
any other stimuli (Mathews & Klug, 1993). For instance, highly anxious non-clinical 
participants show an attentional bias to briefly presented threatening facial 
expressions (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 
2000; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). This bias is 
characterised by fast reaction times to probes following tlneatening faces, and 
increased direction of eye movement towards these stimuli. A heightened tendency to 
respond to negative stimuli is found in groups with high trail anxiety (Bradley et al., 
1998; Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987) and those with high state anxiety 
(Mogg, Bradley, DeBono, & Painter, 1997). This bias for various forms of threat- 
related stimuli occurs regardless of stimulus duration (Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg 
etal., 1997).
In summary, mood states and traits of non-clinical populations have some influence 
on the perception of emotional stimuli. This effect has been demonstrated for 
emotional words and faces.
3.1.3 Mood disorders and effects on emotion recognition
The idea that moods can influence perception of another’s emotional state has been 
explored further by examining clinical groups, such as people with mood disorders. It 
is disputed whether effects of mood disorders on emotion perception are mood- 
congruent, incongment, or simply universal. Most research concurs that mood
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disorders have some effect on emotion perception, except for a few research studies 
(Archer, Hay, & Young, 1992; Gessler, Cutting, Frith, & Weinman, 1989).
3.1.3a Depression
Depressed individuals are often reported as displaying dysfunctional interaction 
behaviours. It has been suggested that they may act inappropriately because they 
cannot use other peoples’ emotional cues to guide appropriate responses and 
behaviour.
Depression might have an incongment impact on emotion perception. For instance, a 
specific impairment in fear and anger facial emotion recognition was found in 
adolescents and children (Lenti, Giacobbe, & Pegna, 2000). A further difficulty in 
perceiving negative emotions has been reported by Ekman and his colleagues (1969, 
cited in Persad & Polivy, 1993), who found that depressed individuals were more 
likely to label sad faces as happy.
By contrast, Mandai and Battacharya (1985) revealed that depressed patients have an 
increased sensitivity to sad emotional expressions and a bias to use the label ‘sad’ for 
other emotions. In accordance with this, depressed individuals judge all emotional 
and neutral faces less positively than control participants (Levkovitz, Lamy, 
Ternochiano, Treves, & Fennig, 2003). In other words, a mildly happy face would be 
perceived as more neutral, and negative expressions would appear more negative than 
intended to the depressed patient. Furthermore, in comparison to healthy individuals, 
depressed participants are slower to respond to happy faces (Suslow, Junghanns, & 
Arolt, 2001). Rubinow and Post (1992) found that depressed participants were 
significantly impaired in recognising facial happiness and sadness, but not verbal 
affect.
Depressed patients are more likely to remember sad faces and have a greater tendency 
to forget the happy faces in comparison to neutral faces, according to research by 
Ridout and colleagues (2003). This was the opposite pattern to the control 
participants. Thus, there may be a mood-congruent bias for emotional memory.
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Some studies have concluded that depressed participants demonstrate a general deficit 
in recognising facial expressions of emotion. In other words, impairment in 
recognising emotions is shown, but it is not specific to certain emotions; all emotions 
are affected universally. Indeed, Feinberg (1986) reported a general deficit in 
emotion perception by depressed participants. Moreover, Persad and Polivy (1993) 
drew similar conclusions by comparing clinically depressed psychiatric patients with 
non-depressed psychiatric patients. They also compared a non-clinical group of 
depressed students with non-depressed students. They found that both clinical and 
non-clinical depressed groups showed a generalised deficit in their perception of 
facial emotions in others. Despite this, there was no apparent pattern in terms of a 
specific emotion deficit.
Generally speaking, depression seems to be associated with an impairment in facial 
emotion recognition (Gur, Ei*win, Zwil, Heimberg, & Kraemer, 1992). Nevertheless, 
it is yet to be established whether the processing of specific emotions may be 
impaired as a consequence of depression. Nor is it clear whether there is a 
depression-related deficit in other forms of emotion perception, such as vocal or 
gestural emotion recognition. In spite of this, the bulk of the research seems to be 
indicative of a mood-congruent effect of diagnosed depression.
3.1.3b Anxiety disorders
Perception of another’s emotional state is affected in anxiety-related clinical 
disorders, including generalized anxiety disorder (Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995; 
Mogg et al., 2000) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Foa & McNally, 1986). These 
disorders have been associated with attentional biases to negative stimuli.
Both non-clinical groups with high levels of anxiety and patients with clinically- 
diagnosed anxiety disorders exhibit a bias towards interpreting ambiguous stimuli in a 
more threatening context than in the corresponding neutral context (Eysenck, Mogg, 
May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Eysenck et ah, 1987; Mathews, Richards, & 
Eysenck, 1989). Mogg and collaborators (2000) revealed a bias in selective attention 
to threatening faces. Anxious participants directed their gaze more frequently and 
more quickly towards threatening faces than sad or happy faces, in comparison to
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control participants. Thus, the bias shown by patients suffering from anxiety 
disorders is not just related to word stimuli, but faces as well.
3.1.3c Siimmaty
It has been observed that mood disorders have an impact on emotion perception, and 
indeed, more transient states, such as induced moods also have an influence. This 
emphasises that internal affective state plays a central role in our understanding and 
interpretation of our emotional environment.
3.1.4 Mood and dynamic gestural emotion
3.1.4a Aims
The purpose of this study is to explore whether emotion recognition varies in a 
systematic way in relation to the moods of a non-clinical population. Rather than 
using facial stimuli, however, or examining interpretation of ambiguous words, which 
are widely-used methods in established research circles, emotions conveyed by body 
movements will be employed. The relationship between moods and recognition of 
emotional body movements has not yet been explored.
3.1.4b Predictions
Research seems to indicate that negative moods increase sensitivity to negative 
stimuli. Consequently, it is predicted that negative moods will enhance sensitivity to 
negative body movements and positive moods will affect interpretation of positive 
body movements.
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3.2 M ethod
3.2.1 Participants
From an original population sample of 248 students (75 males, 173 females) attending 
the University of St Andrews, tlu*ee groups of 62 participants (186 in total) were 
selected to take part in this study as part of their practical classes.
These three groups were selected on the basis of their Positive and Negative 
Affectivity Schedule (PANAS) scores (Johnston, Wright, & Weinman, 1995), which 
is related to their trait affectivity -  that is, their disposition to experience positive and 
negative moods. See Appendix 1 for the PANAS.
The control mood group had PANAS scores within the normal and average range for 
both the positive and negative affectivity scales. Their mean age was 18.92 years (s.d. 
3.98). Eighteen were male. The positive mood group had high scores on the positive 
affectivity scale in relation to low scores on the negative affectivity scale. Their mean 
age was 19.15 (s.d. 2.60). Twenty-two were male. A negative mood group included 
participants with high negative affectivity in comparison to other participants. Their 
mean age was 18.82 (s.d. 1.60). Sixteen were male. These three groups did not differ 
in terms of age, F(2, i85) = 0.202, jp>0.35. Figure 3.1 shows the groups’ positive and 
negative affectivity scores.
Mood: PANAS
40
30
1 20 
%I 10
0  positive affectivity 
□  negative affectivity
iWlNgli
positive (M+) mid-range (IViC) 
Mood group
I
negative (M-)
Figure 3.1: P ANAS scores fo r  the three different m ood groups.
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Positive affectivity scores for each group differed significantly, F^ 2,\s5) = 126.71, 
p<0.001. Negative affectivity also differed significantly between groups, F(2. iss) = 
238.29, ^<0.001. Games-Howell post-hoc tests (equal variances not assumed) 
revealed that the positive mood group had higher positive affectivity scores than the 
negative mood group (p<0.05) and the control group (/?<0.05). The negative mood 
group had significantly higher negative affectivity scores in comparison to the 
positive mood group (p<0.05) and the control group (p>0.05).
While positive affectivity in the negative mood group is comparable to that of the 
control group, the contrast of their negative affectivity scores with those of other 
groups is more important in assessing moods, since clinically depressed participants 
also have this pattern in PANAS scores (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
3.2.2 Stimuli
3.2.2a Gestural emotion recognition tests
See Section 2.2.3 for a full description of the full-light and point-light movies used in 
this study.
3.2.3 Procedure
The gesture displays were given in group format, as participants were divided 
randomly into 6  groups for practical purposes. Each group was tested separately.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Full-light gestures
The mean emotion recognition rates for these thi ee groups of participants for the full- 
light gestures are shown in Figure 3.2.
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Mood: full-light gestures
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□  Positive m ood group
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Figure 3.2: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  full-light emotional gestures by participants with positive 
and negative moods and the control group.
The bars represent standard error. * p<0.05
A 3x5 mixed design ANOVA (between-subjects factor: mood group - positive, 
negative, and control; within-subjects factor: emotion - anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness accuracy rates) revealed a main effect of emotion, F(4,732) = 59.44, p<0.001.
1 his means that the relative ease of recognition differs per emotion. This was 
qualified by a significant group by emotion interaction F(hj22) ~ 2.36,/?<0.05. Groups 
differ in the recognition of particular emotions. The effect of group was not 
significant, F(2.i83) = 1.24, p=0.291. This means that overall, the three groups do not 
differ in their recognition of emotions.
Variance was not significantly different between emotions (as calculated by Levene's 
1 est for Equality of Variance), thus Tukeys HSD test was used to explore the 
interaction. The control group differed significantly from both the positive and 
negative mood groups in their recognition accuracy rates for disgust (p<0.05 for each 
comparison). There was a trend for significance in differences between the positive 
and negative mood groups for the recognition of happiness (p=0.058). No other 
emotion recognition accuracy rates differed, /7>0.40.
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3.3.2 Point-light gestures
The raw scores for recognition accuracy of the point-light gestures are shown in 
Figure 3.3.
Mood: point-light gestures
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□  Negative m ood group
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Figure 3.3: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  point-light emotional gestures by participants with positive 
and negative moods, and the control group.
The bars represent standard error. * /7<0.05
A 5x3 mixed-design ANOVA revealed that there is a significant main effect of point- 
light emotion, F(4,732) = 67.49, /2<0 .0 0 1 . This is supported by a significant group by 
point-light emotion interaction, F(8.732> = 2.22, /7<0.05. There is not a significant 
group difference overall, however, F(2.m) = 0.05,/7=0.95.
Equal variance can be assumed for the different groups and their point-light movie 
recognition rates (/?>0.05). Thus, Tukeys HSD was used to explore the interaction. 
No differences between the positive mood group and the negative group can be 
reported (/7>0.05). fhe control group differed significantly from the positive mood 
group for happiness recognition (/7<0.05).
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3.3.3 Confusion error analysis
To understand what processes may underlie the behavioural response differences by 
the two mood groups, confusion matrices were created to explore where each group 
made errors. Tables 3.1-3.3 show the pattern of responses by each mood group in the 
full-light gesture task - correct and mistaken responses are included. The data are 
presented as percentages.
Table 3 .1: Confusion matrix fo r  the positive m ood group fo r  their responses to fu ll-ligh t gestures.
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived 
by the 
positive 
mood group
Anger 76.3 1.6 6.3 13.7 1.3 99.2 22.9
Disgust 9.2 56.6 10.7 4.2 4.5 85.2 28.6
Fear 4.7 9.0 76.9 0.5 12.4 103.5 2&6
Happiness 7.4 7.9 1.6 80.3 1.5 98.7 18.4
Sadness 2.4 24.9 4.5 1.3 80.3 113.4 33.1
Total depictions 100 100 100 100 100
Incorrect labels (misses) 23.7 43.4 23.1 19.7 19.7
Table 3.2: Confusion matrix fo r  the negative mood group fo r  their responses to full-light gestures.
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived 
by the negative 
mood group
Anger 78.4 L 1.7 4.2 18.2 1.1 103.6 25.2
Disgust 8.4 56.6 13.6 2.9 4.5 86.0 29.4
Fear 5.6 9.9 74.8 1.6 11.0 102.9 28.1
Happiness 6.6 6.4 2.4 74.5 1.6 91.5 17.0
Sadness 1.0 25.4 5.0 2.8 81.8 116.0 34.2
Total depictions 100 100 100 100 100
incorrect labels (misses) 21.6 43.4 25.2 25.5 18.2
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Table 3.3: Confusion matrix fo r  the m ood control groitp fo r  their responses to fu ll-ligh t gestures.
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived by the 
control 
mood 
group
Anger 77.5 2.8 6.1 15.9 1.2 103.5 26.0
Disgust 8.4 65.9 11.6 2.6 4.9 93.4 27.5
Fear 4.9 7.5 77.9 0.8 12.5 103.6 25.7
Happiness 8.0 4.1 1.5 79.4 2.1 95.1 15.7
Sadness 1.2 19.7 2.9 1.3 79.3 104.4 25.1
Total depictions 100 100 100 100 100
Incorrect labels (misses) 22.5 34.1 22.1 20,6 20.7
Responses when disgust and happiness were represented were compared, a mixed 
design ANOVAs did not reveal any significant differences between the groups in their 
mistaken responses (misses) when other emotions were depicted, y;>O.L
A 3x4 mixed-design ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections investigated the 
emotions that each of the groups confused with disgust. The between-subjects factor 
was group (positive, negative, control). The within subjects factor was emotion (the 
percentage of incorrect responses for each non-disgust emotional label when disgust 
stimuli were presented). The ANOVA compared responses of the three mood groups, 
in terms of the number of times anger, fear, happiness, and sadness are incorrectly 
used when disgust is depicted.
The analysis revealed that there was a main effect of emotion, F(i.94. 353,51) = 119.93, 
p<0.001. The interaction between groups and incorrect emotional responses was not 
significant, F(3.s9, 353.51) 1.29, p=0.270. The between-groups comparison was
significant, F(2,i83) ^ 3.67, p<0.05. This reflects differences between the groups in 
their accuracy rates for disgust, reported earlier. Due to the number of levels per 
factor, and the interest in specific emotions, independent-samples t-tests were carried 
out (see Section 2.3). These indicated that the negative mood group showed a trend to 
describe disgust clips as ‘sadness’ (mean = 25.4%) more than the control group (mean 
-  19.7%), /(121) = 1.87, p=0.064. The positive mood group tended to be more likely 
to label disgusted gestures as ‘happiness’ (mean = 7.9%), in comparison to control 
participants (mean = 4.1%): /(108.28) = 1.96, p=0.053. For all other comparisons, 
/7>0.08.
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The labelling of happiness clips was explored in the same way. A significant effect of 
emotion was revealed, F(\m, 328.23) = 179.74, /7<0.001. The emotion by group 
interaction was not significant, F(3.6 i, 328.23) = 1.84, /2=0.128. A borderline group 
difference can be reported, perhaps driven by the larger number of misses for the 
negative group, F(2,ig3) = 1.84, p=0.066. The negative mood group was more likely 
than the positive mood group to label happiness representations as ‘anger’ (positive 
mood group mean = 13.7%, negative mood group mean = 18.2%), /(122) = -2.02, 
p<0.05. For all other comparison, jf2>0.08.
Overall, the groups did not differ in their frequency of incorrect label usage for any 
one emotion (false positives), as assessed by a 3x5 mixed-design ANOVA (between- 
subjects factor = group, within-subjects factor = total false positives for each 
emotion). There was a main effect of emotion, Fqa^ 620.17) = 53.42, y?<0.001. This 
may have been driven by the tendency of all groups to use the label ‘happiness’ less 
erroneously than other emotions. The group by emotion interaction was not 
significant, ^(6.82,620.1?) = 0.35, 928. There was no main effect of group, 7^ 2.183) =
0.41,^9=0.668.
In summaiy, the negative mood group had a propensity to describe disgusted gestures 
as resembling ‘sadness’. The positive mood group was more likely to label disgusted 
gestures as ‘happiness’ than the control group. By contrast, the negative mood group 
was more inclined than the positive mood group to label happy gestures as ‘angry’.
Confusion analysis for the point-light task was not performed as few significant 
differences were revealed between mood groups in their recognition rates on this task.
3.4 Discussion
Past research has shown that diagnosed mood disorders influence interpretation of 
emotional stimuli. In the present study, body movements conveying emotions were 
used to explore whether moods of a non-clinical population affect emotion
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recognition. Unexpectedly, negative and positive mood traits produced difficulties in 
disgust perception.
3.4.1 Mood congruent tindmgs
It was initially hypothesised that individuals with a negative disposition would be 
more likely to recognise the negative emotions from body movements, such as 
sadness or anger, than those with a positive disposition. The results indicate that 
people with positive mood dispositions tend to be more accurate at perceiving 
happiness than the negative mood group. They are also more likely to label disgust 
clips as happiness than the control group. Negative mood congruence seems to have a 
more covert effect on processing, since the negative mood group was more likely than 
the control group to describe the disgusted gestures as similar to sadness. Further 
mood-congruence was demonstrated, since the negative mood group tended to 
perceive happiness as resembling anger more than the positive mood group.
The PANAS provides a rare opportunity to measure positive trait affectivity. This 
could explain the presence of the current positive mood-congruence finding. Most 
mood scales only offer the prospect for measuring negative affect or something 
comparable. It is important to note that ‘negative affectivity’ is not a direct measure 
of sadness, but negative mood, which seems to be a combination of two lower-order 
factors, which represent ‘being upset’ and ‘being afraid’ (Killgore, 2000a). 
Consequently, negative affectivity essentially encompasses depressed mood and 
anxious mood. Therefore, given that happiness is more directly congruent with a 
positive emotional state than a specific negative emotion with a general negative 
emotional state, this may render happy expressions more amenable to influences on 
perception.
Another factor in explaining the present pattern of results in overall sensitivity levels 
may be related to motivation. Schwartz and colleagues (1991) argue that processing 
happiness may require less effort for participants in positive moods, since it is related 
to their own internal disposition, whereas participants with predominantly negative
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moods have more motivation to attend to the specifics of a task or situation and are 
adaptive in addressing problems. Therefore, people with negative moods are more 
likely to spontaneously engage in systematic processing (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; 
Park & Banaji, 2000).
3.4.2 Disgust perception
The control group were more accurate than both the positive and negative mood 
groups in the perception of disgusted body movements, and this was observed in both 
presentation conditions.
Generally, recognition of disgust from dynamic gestures is more difficult for all 
participants, regardless of their mood. This suggests that these stimuli are less distinct 
than other emotions represented by gestures. Indeed, De Meyer (1989) and Heberlein 
and colleagues (in press) suggest that gestural representations of disgust cannot be 
associated with any easily identifiable, natural body movement. Perhaps this general 
uncertainty in interpretation renders the disgust stimuli in the current study more 
susceptible than other gestures to the impact of moods.
The present results may be related to sampling, however. For instance, obsessive- 
compulsive disorder (OCD) and eating disorders have a high incidence within young 
populations in western societies (Gordon, 1990; Floek & Van Hoeken, 2003), and this 
may be the case in the population investigated in this study. The sample had a female 
majority as well. OCD, eating disorders, and the female sex are all associated with 
high disgust sensitivity (Davey, Buckland, Tantow, & Dallos, 1998; Druschel & 
Sherman, 1999; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Mancini, Gragnani, & D'Olimpio, 
2001; Quigley, Sherman, & Sherman, 1997; Sprengelmeyer, in preparation; Thorpe, 
Patel, & Simonds, 2003). Indeed, OCD and eating disorders have similar symptoms 
and phenomenology (Thiel, Broocks, Ohlmeier, Jacoby, & SchüBler, 1995). Cases 
with elevated disgust sensitivity have been linked to distuited disgust perception 
(Sprengelmeyer, Young, Pundt et al., 1997). This is indicative that difficulties in 
perceiving disgust may be related to disturbed sensitivity to disgusting stimuli.
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3.4.3 Methodological critique
The independence of the two subscales -  positive and negative affectivity -  and the 
validity of the PANAS has been confirmed by Watson and colleagues (1988), It 
might be advantageous to use two or more different mood assessment tools, however, 
to be confident that the results reflect specific moods.
In addition, the use of the gestural emotion task should be accompanied by a degree of 
caution, since it might be a relatively blunt instrument for assessing subtle differences 
in emotion perception abilities. Perhaps a more sensitive tool is required.
3.4.4 Conclusions
To fully understand the impact of moods on the interpretation of emotional stimuli, a 
more comprehensive range of tests should be applied, such as exploration of facial or 
vocal emotion perception. More transient moods could be examined, or different 
mood assessment methods could be employed, if extending this research.
Extrapolative inferences from this study within a clinical context are limited, since it 
is not known to what extent positive and negative affect might be related to clinical 
populations, such as those with depression or suffering from mania. Mood disposition 
does not necessarily equate with mood disorder. Additional research could examine 
the application of these findings in a wider context.
Until this work can be extended, however, it is apparent that mood traits, as measured 
by the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, do have an impact on the recognition of 
dynamic emotional gestures, particularly happiness and disgust. This impact is 
manifested not simply in absolute sensitivity levels, but in mis-labelling as well.
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4 MOOD EFFECTS ON VOCAL EMOTION RECOGNITION
Based on the results observed in the preceding study (see Chapter JJ and previous 
research (see Section 3,1), it is plausible that moods have an influence on emotion 
processing. The aim o f  this next experiment is to administer a measure o f mood 
state, rather than trait, and a vocal emotion recognition test, to examine whether 
conclusions from  the previous chapter can be generalised and applied to other 
populations.
4.1 Introduction
The previous study stresses the modulatory role that moods appear to play in the 
processing of emotions displayed by others. Previous literature and the preceding 
study have indicated that mood-congruent influences seem to occur in emotion 
perception. These effects are shown in recognition accuracy levels and frequency of 
use of particular emotional labels. The former experiment also revealed an 
unexpected relationship between mood and the responses concerning disgust stimuli. 
Consequently, a second study has been designed to explore whether such findings are 
generalisable.
Past research has established that mood influences the processing of facial expressions 
of emotion (Bradley et al., 1998; Bradley et al., 2000; Bradley et al., 1997; Killgore & 
Cupp, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg et al., 2000; Niedenthal et al., 2000). The 
preceding study bolstered this finding using gestural representations of emotion. 
Vocal representations of emotion do not appear to have been examined in a mood 
related context. Several researchers consider vocal expressions to be a fundamental 
method for conveying emotion. Consequently, in this experiment, perception of vocal 
emotion and its relationship to mood was investigated.
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, negative affectivity, as measured by the 
PANAS, is actually a combination of two factors that may represent depressed mood 
and anxious mood (Killgore, 2000a). It is of interest to separate these factors and 
explore whether one may be more likely to modify emotion recognition abilities. The 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was 
therefore employed in the current study to distinguish effects of anxiety and 
depression. The HADS differs from the PANAS, in that rather than just measuring 
negative affectivity, it is divided into two subscales assessing anxiety and depression. 
The HADS also does not measure positive mood characteristics, so the focus of this 
study was more on negative mood characteristics and their influence on emotion 
perception. Since much established research has focused solely on negative 
moods/traits, for the purpose of this study, their exploration was deemed sufficient to 
reveal any affected pattern of behaviour that may have occurred. This measure has 
been used in countless clinical studies and in a number of investigations examining 
healthy populations too. This questionnaire was employed in the current study.
It was predicted that mood-congruent patterns of behaviour would be revealed. These 
might be displayed in the form of recognition bias or labelling bias.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
One hundred and thirty-seven students from the University of St Andrews participated 
in this experiment. The number of participants in this study was smaller than that of 
the previous study, so the population was divided into two groups. The HADS is a 
continuous scale, differentiating between normal, mild, moderate, and severe mood 
disorders. Please see Appendix 1 for the HADS. Since a relatively healthy, non- 
clinical population was explored in this study, high scores on the HADS were not 
expected. Consequently, rather than designating the groups on the basis of the pre­
defined categories, they were allocated by dividing the whole sample into those with
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relatively high and low scores on the depression subscale, and relatively high and low 
scores on the anxiety subscale. There were 81 women and 56 men who participated 
in this study. Their age range was 18-24 years. The men had a mean age of 20.5 (s.d. 
2.20). The women had a mean age of 20.1 (s.d. 1.49). The mean age of the male 
participants and the mean age of female participants do not differ significantly [F(i.i36) 
= 2.26, /?=0.14].
The control dysphoria group had low HADS depression scores (0-3, mean 1.83). This 
group consisted of sixty-nine students, thirty-three of whom were male. The more 
dysphoric group had higher scores (>4, mean 5.47). This group comprised sixty-eight 
students, including twenty-three males.
For a second analysis, participants were divided into anxiety groups. The control 
anxiety group had comparatively low anxiety scores (0-7, mean 5.77). Sixty-nine 
students were in this group and thirty-seven of these were male. The relatively 
anxious group had sixty-eight students with anxiety scores >8. mean 10.6. Nineteen 
of these students were male.
Figure 4.1 shows the mean depression and anxiety scores for the four groups.
Mood: HADS
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Figure 4 .1 : HA DS scores per group.
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Between-subjects ANOVA revealed that the more dysphoric group had higher 
depression scores [F(i,i36) = 182.3, j9<0.001] and anxiety scores [F(i.i36) = 30.6, 
/7<0.001] than the control dysphoria group. The relatively anxious group had higher 
anxiety scores [F(ij36) = 191.6, p<0.001] and higher depression scores [Fq.isG) = 23.0, 
p<0.001] than the control anxiety group.
4.2.2 Stimuli and procedure
The computerised vocal emotion task (as described Section 2.2.2b) was given to the 
participants. This task was slightly modified due to time constraints: only eight 
vocalisations per emotion were presented, rather than ten. The eight were selected 
randomly. The participants listened to the sounds tlirough headphones.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Dysphoria groups (determined by depression scores)
The mean emotion recognition accuracy scores on the vocal emotion perception task 
for the two depression groups are shown in Figure 4.2.
A repeated-measures AN CO VA with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections was applied to 
the data to explore the differences in percentage accuracy of emotion recognition 
between the dysphoria groups, with anxiety scores entered as a covariate. There was 
no main effect of emotion portrayed on recognition accuracy, 69.494.39) = 1.10, 
p=0.358. Nor was there an interaction between anxiety scores and recognition 
accuracy scores for each emotion, F(3.69,494.39) = 0.3 1 3,^=0.869. There was no main 
effect of dysphoria group, F(ij34) = 1.46, p=0.23; but the emotion by dysphoria 
interaction was significant, F(3 69.494.39) = 3.72, p<0.01. The relationship between 
dysphoria group and emotion perception was explored further using MANCOVA. A
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significant difference between the two groups in disgust perception was demonstrated, 
F(|,i34}= 9.83,/7<0.005, but not for other emotions, all /?>0.28.
Mood: verbal voices
100%
Dcontrol dysphoria group 
Odysphorio group
2 75%Ic o 50%
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Figure 4.2: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  the control dysphoria group and the dysphoria group. 
The bars represent standard error. * /?<0.005
4.3.2 Anxiety groups (determined by anxiety scores)
An ANCOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections examined the differences in 
accuracy of emotion perception between anxiety groups, with depression scores 
entered as a covariate. This revealed that there was no main effect of emotion 
represented in accuracy scores, F(3.68,493.82) = 0.96, p=0.43. The anxiety by emotion 
interaction was not significant, F(3.6S.493.82) ^ 0.06, p=0.99. The difference between the 
anxiety groups bordered significance, F (ij34) = 3.71, p=0.056. The relatively anxious 
group were marginally worse than the control group in their perception of vocal 
emotion. There was a significant interaction between depression scores and emotion, 
F(3.69,493.82) = 4.03, p<0.005. Multivaiiate analysis using anxiety level as a between- 
subjects factor, and covarying depression raw scores, revealed no differences between 
anxiety and control groups for any specific emotion, all p>0.22.
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4.3.3 Confusion analysis for dysphoria groups
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 give the pattern responses for the control dysphoria group and the 
dysphoric mood group respectively. These data are presented as percentages. 
Analysis explored for differences between the two groups in their incorrect label 
usage for each emotion category and false positive use.
Table 4.1: Confusion matrix fo r  the control dysphoria group.
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived 
by the 
control 
dysphoria 
group
Anger 77.8 9.9 2.8 4.3 1.5 96.3 18.5
Disgust 16.1 72.0 3.3 6.6 9.6 107.6 35.6
Fear 1.6 3.8 75.7 8.6 3.1 92.8 17.1
Happiness 3.3 6.9 3.9 77.3 0.8 91.2 13.9
Sadness 1.2 8.4 14.3 3.3 85.0 112.2 27.2
Total depictions 100 100 100 100 100
Incorrect labels (misses) 22.2 28.0 24.3 22.7 15.0
Table 4.2: Confusion matrix fo r  the dysphoric group.
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived 
by the 
dysphoric group
Anger 78.3 11.5 1.0 4.1 1.4 96.3 18.0
Disgust 14.4 60.0 2.0 5.9 7.4 89.7 29.7
Fear 1.0 5.1 76.6 8.4 5.2 96.3 19.7
Happiness 4.9 10.5 3.7 78.9 1.6 99.6 20.7
Sadness 1.4 12.9 16.7 2.7 84.4 118.1 33.7
Total depictions 100 100 100 100 100Incorrect labels (misses) 21.7 40.0 23.4 21.1 15.6
Since disgust was the emotion that was most problematic for the dysphoric group, the 
incorrect responses (misses) for this emotion were explored. There was a significant 
effect of emotion, F(2.59, 349.90) 10.23, p<0.001. There was no significant interaction
between group and percentage of emotion responses, F(2.59. 349.90) = 0.93, p=0.428. 
There was a significant group effect, which could reflect poorer performance for 
disgust perception in the dysphoric group, F( 1,135) = 12.40, /7<0.005. Independent t- 
tests compared the two groups’ mean number of incorrect responses to each emotion
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category when disgust was vocalised (see Section 2.3 for rationale). Disgust was 
more commonly perceived as ‘sadness’ and ‘happiness’ by the dysphoric group in 
comparison to control participants: sadness label, /(-2.60) = 135,/?<0.02; happiness 
label, /(-2.25) = 102.86, p<0.05. There were no significant differences between the 
groups in their use o f ‘fear’ and ‘anger’ labels for the disgusted voices, y;>0.3.
The dysphoric group generally used the labels ‘happiness’ and ‘sadness’ falsely more 
than the control dysphoria group: happiness, /(135) = -2.29,p<0.05; sadness, /(135) = 
-2.15, p<0.05. This is likely to be related to their use of these labels for disgusted 
voices. The use of other emotion labels did not differ between the groups, all p>0.1.
Generally, the dysphoric group had a greater tendency than control participants to 
label disgusted voices as ‘sadness’ and ‘happiness’. Thus, type of labelling responses, 
as well as recognition accuracy of vocal disgust differentiates the two dysphoria 
groups. The dysphoria group confuse disgust with slightly different emotions when it 
was represented the vocal channel, in comparison to the gestural channel (see Chapter 
3). This could reflect a dissociation between the two channels in terms of the 
relationship between emotions communicated vocally or gesturally (please refer to 
Chapter 10 for further exploration of this dissociation).
4.4 Discussion
The results revealed that negative moods appear to have an effect on vocal emotion 
perception, regardless of participants’ levels of anxiety. This finding was specific to 
disgust. It is indicated that the lower the mood of the individual, the worse they are at 
recognising disgust. This result was also paralleled in the previous study (Chapter 3), 
which used emotional gesture displays and a different mood measure.
Explaining such a pattern is difficult. Eating disorders and obsessive-compulsive 
behaviours are related to an elevated sensitivity to disgust and disgusting stimuli, as 
established by previous research (see Section 3.4.2). As reported in the preceding
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study, since young populations often experience such disorders, the results may be 
influenced by the inclusion of participants displaying such behaviours and syndromes. 
It is possible that these problems are related to disturbed disgust perception. 
Furthermore, since it was indicated eaiiier that women are more easily disgusted, 
disparities in disgust perception may have their bases in an imbalance in numbers of 
males and females in each group. Subsequent work will analyse the groups in terms 
of gender to explore whether this disgust finding can be explained (see Chapter 6).
A further point of interest is that disgust is also the hardest emotion to identify from 
the voice, as well as from gestures (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 10). It does not seem 
to have a distinct vocal profile (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Van Bezooijen et al., 1983). 
Consequently, it is possible that moods may interfere in the interpretation of 
ambiguous stimuli. Certainly, if the confusion matrices are considered, it appears that 
the people with dysphoric moods were more likely to use the labels ‘happiness’ and 
‘sadness’ for disgust. Choosing these labels suggests that this group were responding 
arbitrarily to the disgusted voices. A consistent pattern of responding in one direction 
over another (i.e. persistently mislabelling the disgust voices as sadness) would be 
more indicative of an incorrect labelling strategy being employed by this group of 
individuals. This mis-labelling was not mood-congruent, which conflicts with the 
labelling patterns of the previous study.
It is particularly interesting that the anxiety subscale did not interact with any 
variables in terms of its effects on emotion perception. Previous research (Bradley et 
al., 1998; Bradley et al., 2000; Mogg & Bradley, 2002, in press; Mogg et ak, 1997; 
Mogg et al., 2000) has established a relationship between anxiety and a bias in 
attending toward negative stimuli. This heightened attention was not reflected in 
recognition accuracy for the current group; perhaps this was because none of the 
‘anxious’ individuals described in this study represented highly anxious people. All 
scores were within the normal-mild range. Future research using the vocal stimuli 
and either anxiety mood induction techniques, or with patients suffering from 
clinically diagnosed anxiety disorders could explore this further.
In summary, this and the former experiment (Chapter 3) have established that mood 
influences emotion perception in diverse ways. Interpretations of facial emotional
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displays are readily influenced by clinical moods. Here, such effects were found for 
vocal emotion representations in a non-clinical sample. Disgust processing was 
affected most notably, given that people in a dysphoric mood had difficulties in 
recognising its expression. As a consequence, monitoring participants’ mood states 
and traits should be stipulated in standard neuropsychological assessments aiming to 
explore emotion processing. It is currently ignored to a great extent. Underestimating 
the impact of individual differences on emotion perception is a limitation in much 
neuropsychological research.
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5  MOOD & EMOTION RECOGNITION -  INTERIM 
DISCUSSION
5.1 Summary of findings
Past research has shown that diagnosed mood disorders influence interpretation of 
emotional stimuli. In Chapters 3 and 4, body movements conveying emotions and 
emotional vocalisations were used to explore whether moods of a non-clinical 
population affect emotion recognition. People with positive mood traits were 
marginally better at recognising gestural happiness than the negative mood trait 
group. Negative and positive mood states and traits produced deficits in disgust 
perception in two modalities.
The results in Chapter 3 provided evidence that groups of people with negative and 
positive dispositions had difficulties perceiving gestural disgust in comparison to 
those without specific mood tendencies. Chapter 4 revealed that dysphoric mood 
affected perception of disgust represented by the voice, regardless of the paiticipanf s 
level of anxiety. The more depressed the mood of the individual, the worse they were 
at recognising disgust.
5.2 Disgust recognition difficulties
Recognition accuracy for gestural and vocal disgust is generally much lower than for 
other emotions. Thus, the more ambiguous or difficult an emotion is to interpret, the 
greater the tendency for mood to affect recognition. Disgust is not associated with a 
distinct natural body gesture (De Meijer, 1989; Heberlein et al., in press) or a distinct 
vocal profile (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Scherer, 1986; Van Bezooijen et al., 1983), 
unlike other ostensible basic emotions. The gestures represented here are more
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symbolic than natural, perhaps since disgust might be best communicated via the face. 
Consequently, people with a particulai* mood disposition might have found disgust 
harder to classify, as they may have been more confused by ambiguous stimuli.
Interestingly, Murray (2000) carried out a series of studies exploring facial emotion 
perception in clinically and non-clinically depressed individuals, and she found that 
both depressed groups were less sensitive to disgusted facial expressions than control 
groups. Depressed mood was assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck & 
Steer, 1987), and the state scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 
1983). This result complements the present research. Together, these studies suggest 
that depressed moods can be associated with impairments in the processing of disgust 
expressed in multiple communication channels.
5.3 Disgust deficit in clinical research -  a caveat
Given that the population analysed in Chapters 3 and 4 were mostly female, and they 
were a young, student population, in which OCD and eating disorders are typically 
prevalent (Gordon, 1990; Hoek & Van Hoeken, 2003), all of which are associated 
with high disgust sensitivity and perhaps, disturbed disgust perception, it is possible 
that the results obtained here could reflect sampling, and might not occur in other non- 
clinical populations sampled for negative moods.
A number of studies have highlighted disgust recognition impairments in clinical 
populations, such as Huntington’s disease patients (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; 
Sprengelmeyer, Young, Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997; Wang et al., 2003), in 
Huntington’s disease gene-carriers (Gray et al., 1997), in Obsessive-Compulsive 
populations (Sprengelmeyer, Young, Pundt et al., 1997), and in Parkinson’s disease 
patients (Kan et al., 2002; Sprengelmeyer et al., 2003). Please see Section 1.5.2d for 
more information. Generally, the authors of these papers argue that disgust facial 
perception may be related to basal ganglia functioning, since these regions tend to be 
compromised in the disorders described above. While the current studies did not
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explore facial emotion perception, if disgust is processed by an independent neural 
substrate, the findings reported in Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that disturbances in 
disgust processing might be related to depressed mood. This is in keeping with some 
clinical studies. For instance, Kan and co-workers (2002) examined Parkinson’s 
patients with very high depression scores. Seven of the participants were classed as 
depressed, five were borderline, and two were classed as normal. In Kan’s study, 
Parkinson’s patients were reported as having difficulties perceiving facial disgust in 
comparison to control participants. This might be attributed to their more depressed 
mood.
The mean Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) score for the unmedicated Parkinson’s 
patients in Sprengelmeyer and colleagues’ (2003) study was 13.6, out of 30. This 
score, according to Kendall and collaborators (1987), can be classed as dysphoric. 
Half of these patients were categorised as depressed (with a score of 17 or more). The 
medicated group had lower BDI scores, with a mean of 11.6. This is not significantly 
different, but the group with higher depression scores were distinctly worse at 
perceiving facial disgust.
None of the other Parkinson’s or Huntington’s disease studies, in which emotion 
perception has been explored, report measures of mood. Nevertheless, it should not 
be discounted that moods may be at the basis of difficulties in recognising disgust, 
especially as depression affects between one third and a half of patients suffering from 
PaiTinson’s disease (McDonald, Richard, & DeLong, 2003; Rojo et al., 2003), 
Huntington’s disease (Cranford, Thompson, & Snowden, 2001), and Obsessive- 
Compulsive Disorder (Overbeek, Schruers, Vermettern, & Griez, 2002). Not all 
studies report the same pattern in impairment in Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease 
(see Section 1.5.3d), and this may be attributed to variation in depression levels in 
these populations, since not all patients experience depression.
The above proposition is not in conflict with the idea that the basal ganglia and insula 
cortex are involved in disgust perception. For instance, depression has been 
associated with functional abnormalities in the anterior insula, and structural and 
functional abnormalities in the ventral striatum (Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 
2003b). Moods and disgust perception abilities may reflect the extent of neural
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changes to basal ganglia and insula cortex occurring in illnesses, like Huntington’s 
and Parkinson’s disease. The present research suggests that neuropsychological 
studies take into account that moods may play a role in the disgust processing.
5.4 Positive mood group inclusion -  a suggestion
Some mood-congruent findings, consistent with the literature, were discussed earlier. 
The negative mood group were more likely to interpret gestural portrayals of 
happiness as depictions of anger. They also perceived gestural disgust as resembling 
sadness. On the vocal task, the negative mood group used the label ‘sadness’ more 
than the control group. Individuals with different moods tested in these studies seem 
to exhibit differential responses to particular expressions, rather than being 
distinguished by their overall sensitivity to emotional expressions.
An implication of these studies is that participants’ moods should be appraised in 
neuropsychological assessments aiming to explore emotion processing. 
Underestimating the impact of individual differences on emotion perception is a 
caveat for neuropsychological research to date. Moreover, the divergence of the 
positive and negative mood groups from the control group demonstrated in 
Experiment 1 could indicate a danger in comparing only negative moods with a 
generic control group. Where no effect is reported when comparing a negative mood 
group and a control group, this may be due to the inclusion of people with high 
positive affectivity in the control group. Thus, where possible, positive moods should 
also be measured in future research.
5.5 Conclusions
In summary, the two present experiments have established that moods influence 
emotion perception in various ways. It has previously been demonstrated that
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interpretations of facial emotional displays are readily influenced by moods. Here, 
both vocal and gestural emotional representations were affected by moods. Thus, it 
seems that perception of emotion across modalities and modes of display is 
susceptible to individual differences in moods. Disgust processing was most notably 
affected, insofar as people with high positive affectivity scores and people with high 
negative affectivity scores had difficulty in recognising its expression. Further 
research could explore the influence of both mood states and traits on different forms 
of emotion perception, to ensure that the patterns observed in the present studies are 
replicated using different mood measures.
Neuropsychological and psychiatric research into emotion processing often highlights 
impairment in recognition accuracy for particular emotions. It is noticeable that the 
pattern of errors could be as important and even diagnostic. Indeed, the present 
results show that people with dysphoric mood often mislabel the emotion of disgust as 
sadness, across two modalities. It is a moot point as to whether this represents a 
problem with the emotion of disgust or sadness.
To conclude, the present study reveals that emotion perception across multiple 
modalities is affected by mood, particularly dysphoric mood. Emotion perception 
changes may be specific to disgust recognition, which is consistently confused with 
sadness. Disgust may be a defining feature of a disgust deficit. This is a novel 
finding that has key implications for emotion research.
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6SEX DIFFERENCES & VOCAL EMOTION RECOGNITION
Social stereotypes indicate that men and women show disparities in a number o f  
aspects o f  emotional functioning. There are widespread effects o f  sex on emotion 
processing; however, studies largely ignore the possible interaction between sex o f  
recipient and sex o f the person emitting the emotional expression. Hence, the 
purpose o f this chapter is to investigate the influence o f sex differences o f perceiver 
and emitter, and any relationship between the two, in perception o f vocal emotion.
6.1 Introduction
The notion that men and women may differ in terms of their abilities to perceive 
emotions is not a novel concept. Stereotypes across diverse and disparate cultures 
have long suggested that women are the more emotionally expressive and more 
emotionally aware sex (Eagly, 1994; Fischer & Manstead, 2000). Sex differences 
have been reported in a wide range of aspects relating to emotional functioning, from 
experiential to perceptive abilities. Such differences could result from biological 
differences between men and women. Alternatively, these differences could arise 
from social influences, which tend to advocate that men should be the stronger, more 
aggressive sex. It should be noted that male and female social interactions with others 
of the same or opposite sex differ in quantity and quality.
6.1.1 Rationale
There are various reasons for this exploration of sex effects on emotion perception. 
First, most neuropsychological researchers acknowledge that there is a possibility that 
sex may play a role in perceptive abilities, but they approach this idea by matching
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their participants by sex, or having the same number of males and females in groups 
that are the subject of comparative studies. Since emotion expression recognition 
tasks are widely used in neuropsychological assessments, it is crucial that any sex 
differences are established in order to further our understanding and interpretation of 
the data yielded by such tasks. As a consequence, this chapter aims to tackle this key 
concern. Most of the literature cited here has referred to the influence of sex on facial 
expression recognition. Moreover, few studies have explored the influence of sex on 
the decoding of vocal emotion specifically. Scherer and colleagues (2001) observed 
that women were marginally better than men at recognising vocal emotion. This topic 
is also of interest since Chapters 3, 4, and 5 raised the issue that sex differences may 
be manifest in the emotion perception results reported earlier. As a consequence, the 
influence of sex on vocal emotion recognition is examined in this chapter.
The first task of this chapter is to explore the results of the previous study in terms of 
sex differences of the participants. This is followed by an analysis in which sex of the 
actors who created the vocal stimuli is explored. Finally, a further investigation 
exploring whether sex of actor and sex of participant might inter-relate and influence 
emotion recognition will also be reported.
6.2 Sex of the observer: male versus female participants (participant- 
based exploration)
Much emotion recognition research bolsters the view that women are more sensitive 
to the display of emotion in others (Barrett, Lane, Sechrest, & Schwartz, 2000; Brody 
& Hall, 2000; Hall, 1978, 1984; Hall, Carter, & Horgan, 2000b; Hall & Matsunioto, 
2004; Kirouac & Doré, 1985; Ralunan, Wilson, & Abrahams, 2004; Rotter & Rotter, 
1988; Sogon & Doi, 1986; Thayer & Johnsen, 2000). In these studies, women 
consistently outperformed men in their detection of nonverbal emotional cues, from 
the face, voice, and body -  in terms of their speed and accuracy of response. The 
general findings of a female advantage for emotion processing occur regardless of 
sample size, age of the stimulus actor, age of participant, or stimulus duration.
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As referred to earlier, there are two potential explanations for these findings. The first 
is a sociocognitive view that skills such as emotion processing are based on 
experiences. Thus, learning is particularly important. The second view is 
neuropsychological, which suggests that female brains may be equipped differently to 
males for decoding emotions.
In terms of the sociocognitive stance, women’s enlianced ability in perceiving 
emotions may be attributed to sex differences in early social relationships. Young 
girls seem to have more intense, intimate, and mutual friendships, which may lead to a 
subsequent development in their awareness of others’ mental and emotional states 
(Clark & Reis, 1988; Hughes & Dunn, 1998). Even by the age of tlnee, sex 
disparities can be observed, with girls having more advanced ability than boys to 
interpret other people’s thoughts and intentions (Happé, 1995). Moreover, girls are 
apparently encouraged to discuss and participate more in the expression and 
perception of emotion (Brody, 1985). For a meta-analytic review of sex differences in 
facial emotion perception abilities in children fi*om birth through to adolescence, 
please refer to McClure (2000). This article describes differences in social and neural 
development between girls and boys.
A number of structuial differences in the brain exist between men and women, 
particularly structures implicated in emotion. For a review, see Good and colleagues 
(2001). Differences in neural responses to emotional stimuli between men and 
women have been reported. For instance, functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) reseai'ch and studies of visually-evoked potentials have shown that men 
displayed more extensive activity whilst viewing pleasant pictures than women 
(Kemp, Silberstein, Armstrong, & Nathan, 2004; Lang et al., 1998). Furthermore, this 
activity in males may be concentrated in the occipital cortex (Lane et al., 1999; Lane, 
Reiman, Bradley et al., 1997). Following presentation of emotion stimuli, females 
show more activation in basal ganglia overall, yet males show more specific activity 
in the striatum. Interestingly, women’s electrodermal responses to pleasant images 
are smaller than men’s (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). Thus, men and 
women diverge in their biological responses to emotional stimuli. McClure and 
collaborators (2004) reported that women showed greater relative amygdala activation
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than men inreponse to threat stimuli, yet these sex differences were not apparent in 
adolescents (aged 9-17). Sex differences in response to threat may, therefore, vary 
across development.
For more information regarding sex differences in neural activity to emotion stimuli, 
please refer to the meta-analysis study by Wager and colleagues (2003). With 
neuropsychological and imaging studies, however, it is not clear how structural or 
activation differences relate to behavioural disparities between men and women.
Not all research is conclusive of a female advantage for emotion processing. No sex 
differences have been reported in some studies (Killgore, 2000b; Maccoby & Jack 1 in, 
1974); a male superiority for interpreting emotion-congruent expressions has been 
obseiwed in another, whereby males inteipret emotional expressions more accurately 
that are similar to their own emotional state (Toner & Gates, 1985). Female 
difficulties in perceiving anger have also been reported (Rotter & Rotter, 1988; 
Wagner, MacDonald, & Manstead, 1986). Thus, it is not clear whether there are 
distinct sex differences in emotion processing, or whether other variables such as 
personality characteristics or type of stimuli could explain these inconsistencies.
6.2.1 Method
This is covered in detail in Chapter 4. There were 81 women and 56 men in total. 
They listened to eight representations of each vocal emotion of anger, disgust, fear, 
happiness, and sadness, and categorised each sound with one of the five labels.
6.2.2 Results
The raw scores for male versus female participants are shown in Figure 6.1. Data 
were submitted to a between-subjects ANOVA, with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections. 
Factors of interest were sex of participants (male, female), as the between-subjects
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variable, and recognition accuracy rates per emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness), as the within-subjects variable.
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Figure 6.1 : Recognition accuracy rates fo r  vocal emotion perception by men and women.
The bars represent standard error.
A significant effect of emotion was revealed, F (3 f,4.491.401 “  19.40, /7<0.001. There was 
no significant emotion by sex of perceiver interaction, F(2.m, 491 .40) = 0.13, p=0.973. 
There was, however, a trend for men achieving higher accuracy rates than women, 
(^1,135) ~ 3.43,/?=0.066.
6.2.3 Discussion
Despite no significant differences in male’s and female’s vocal emotion recognition 
abilities, there seems to be a trend indicative of a slightly greater accuracy in the 
ability of men to perceive vocal emotion.
This is inconsistent with the bulk of sex literature, perhaps because vocal stimuli were 
used in the present study. Given that the difference reported in this study is small, it 
may well be negligible and not warrant further discussion.
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It has been predicted on the basis of Chapters (3, 4, and 5), that men and women 
might differ significantly in their perception accuracy of disgust. As mentioned 
earlier, women have been reported to be more easily disgusted than men (Haidt et al., 
1994), and high disgust sensitivity has been related to disturbed disgust perception 
(Sprengelmeyer, Young, Pundt et al., 1997). In the analysis presented in this chapter, 
differences between males and females in disgust perception were not manifest by 
accuracy rates.
6.3 Sex of the expresser: male versus female actors (stimulus-based 
exploration)
The second analysis explores the influence of sex of the actors who convey the 
emotional vocalisations.
Many studies indicate superiority in females in their ability to express emotions 
facially (Biehl et al., 1997; Buck, 1979; Buck, Miller, & Caul, 1974; Gitter, Black, & 
Mostofsky, 1972; Kirouac & Doré, 1985), and gesturally (Brody & Hall, 2000).
By contrast, studies of expressions of specific emotions reveal a different pattern. 
Male happy and sad faces have been reported to be easier to recognise than female 
faces (Thompson, 1983). No general expresser sex differences have been observed in 
another study of portrayals of facial emotion (Wallbott, 1988), yet recognition of 
specific emotions did vary, dependent on the expresser’s sex. Women were markedly 
better at communicating fear and sadness, whereas men’s portrayals of anger were 
superior to those by women. According to a number of other studies, facial anger 
seems to be more readily communicated by men (Brody & Hall, 2000; Coats & 
Feldman, 1996). Furthermore, according to other research, men are more likely than 
women to show anger, regardless of the context, (Kelly & Hutson-Corneaux, 1999), 
which may be associated with the idea that women suppress socially unacceptable 
emotions, such as anger and disgust (Brody, 1985).
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In the face, the zygomatic muscle is involved in smiling. It is often activated 
involuntarily in moments of pleasure, or in response to pleasant stimuli, but also in the 
form of grimaces in response to feeling negative emotions or seeing/heaiing 
unpleasant stimuli. Schwartz and colleagues (1980) used electromyography (EMG) to 
measure involuntary activity in facial muscles in response to emotional imagery. In 
these circumstances, women generate greater facial EMG patterns than men. During 
the presentation of emotional images, women also show a greater concordance 
between zygomatic EMG activity and affective valence of the images displayed than 
men (Dimberg & Liindquist, 1990; Greenwald et al., 1989). These differences 
suggest that emotional expression in males and females may involve different 
response systems.
The sex of actors expressing vocal emotion and its effect on emotion perception has 
rarely been investigated. Scherer and colleagues (2001) reported a sex effect, and sex 
of actor by vocal emotion interaction. They do not discuss where this interaction 
might be based, since their study only employed four actors and they did not deem 
further analysis necessaiy. By contrast, in some other studies, the sex of the 
expresser’s voice was not reported to play a role in emotion perception (Brody & 
Hall, 2000; Hall, Carter, & Horgan, 2000a; Pell, 2002). Thus, it is apparent that 
investigations of the effect of sex of the expresser on the clarity of emotion portrayals 
are inconsistent and inconclusive.
The aim of the next part of this study is to examine the sex of the actor and its effect 
on vocal emotion perception, since it is not clear whether these factors may be related.
6.3.1 Method
This is covered in detail in Chapter 4. There were four male and four female actors, 
who each spoke one vocal phrase in the emotion categories of anger, disgust, fear, and 
sadness. For happiness, there were five female and three male vocalisations. To 
overcome this discrepancy, the mean recognition rate for all of the female and all of
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the male voices was calculated for each em otion. One hundred and thirty seven 
participants listened to these stimuli (see C hapter 4 for more information).
6.3.2 R esults
Mean scores were calculated for recognition accuracy o f  male versus female vocal 
emotion stimuli. These are shown in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  mate and female vocal representations o f  Jive different 
emotions.
*  /?<0.001
The data were subm itted to a w ithin-subjects ANOVA and a significant effect o f 
emotion was revealed, F,4.5 4 0* = 5.25, /?<0.001. Sex o f  voice also had an effect, F(i 136) 
= 25.12, /7<0 .0 0 1 , and this was qualified by a significant sex o f  voice by emotion 
interaction, 71 .50501  ) = 19.33,/?<0.001. Paired-sam ples t-tests were used to explore 
the source o f  this interaction and male representations o f  disgust were more accurately 
recognised than female representations, 136) = 6 .5 3 ,/;<0.001. For other emotions, 
there were no differences,/?>0.087.
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6.3.3 Discussion
111 the current set of stimuli, female portrayals of disgust are not as readily recognised 
as male portrayals of disgust. Pell (2002) reported a similar outcome, with facial 
expressions of disgust, but not vocal representations. This could be related to 
inhibition of socially unacceptable displays of emotion by women (Brody, 1985). It is 
also plausible that the women in this sample are simply worse actors. There is also a 
suggestion that male fear may be harder to interpret than female fear. These findings 
are unusual and will be discussed in more detail in the General Discussion (Section 
6.5).
6.4 Interactions between sex of observer and expresser of emotions
There is a paucity of research exploring whether the sex of the actor might influence 
the interpretation of emotions differently when observers are either male or female.
Beall (1995) presented emotional expression stimuli (visual and vocal combined) to 
groups of males and females. The participants were asked to rate the intensity of 
happiness or anger felt by the expresser. For same sex judgements (women 
perceiving women, men perceiving men), ratings of happiness intensity were much 
higher than across sexes (women perceiving men, men perceiving women). This 
study infers that there may be some sort of sex-influenced congruence in positive 
emotion perception. This sex congruence extends to emotion recognition studies.
Wagner and colleagues (1986) found that women were more accurate at recognising 
female facial emotion than male facial emotion. Moreover, according to Rotter and 
Rotter (1988), despite females being superior at interpretation of facial emotion 
generally, men were remarkably better than women in interpreting male facial 
expressions of anger. Erwin and colleagues (1992) described a male advantage for 
perceiving sadness represented by the face and this advantage was particularly 
enhanced for male faces.
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Although there is little research that has explored the interaction between sex of actor 
and sex of observer in emotion perception tasks, there seems to be an inclination 
towards greater sensitivity for sex-congruent stimuli. This means that men are more 
perceptive to emotional displays by other men and vice versa for women. Yet much 
of this research is limited to explorations of facial emotion.
The aim of the following study was to investigate the interaction of sex of expresser 
with sex of perceiver and emotion recognition accuracy for vocal displays.
6.4.1 Method
The method is described in Chapter 4. 81 females and 56 males were compared in 
their abilities to perceive male anger, female anger, male disgust, female disgust, male 
fear, female fear, male happiness, female happiness, male sadness, and female 
sadness. Each condition is represented by mean recognition accuracy for the all of the 
actors’ or all of the actresses’ depictions of each emotion.
6.4.2 Results
Mean recognition accuracy scores for each emotional display (male and female) by 
the two groups is presented in Figure 6.3.
The data were investigated using a multivariate statistical ANOVA. The between- 
subjects variable was sex of participant (male, female). The within-subjects variables 
were sex of voice (male, female) and emotion (recognition accuracy rates for anger, 
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness).
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Figure 6.3: Men and w om en’s differential recognition responses to male and fem ale vocal emotions.
** /?<0 .005 , * p < 0 .0 5
There was a main effect of emotion, F(3.45, 466.20) = 16.47, /><0.001. A marginal effect 
of sex of voice, F(i 135) = 3.77, /?=0.05, was again qualified by a significant emotion by 
sex of voice interaction, F(4,540) = 1 1.91,/?<0.001, which is compliant with the finding 
that male representations of disgust attain higher accuracy rates than female 
representations of this emotion. Sex of participant did not have a significant effect, 
^(1,135) = 2.41, p=0.123, nor did it interact with sex of voice, F(i 135) = 1.52,/?=0.220. 
This indicates that when sex of voice is taken into account, there is not significant 
difference between male and female participants in their overall emotion recognition 
abilities. Sex of participant and emotion did not interact, F(4,540) = 3.54, 466.20) = 
0.04, ^ =0.994. Of more interest here, a significant emotion by sex of voice by sex of 
participant interaction can be reported, F(4,s40)= 5.67,/7<0.001.
Post-hoc analysis revealed that the emotion by sex of voice by sex of participant 
interaction has its roots in fear perception. Recognition of male fear was significantly 
better for men than women, F(i 135) = 11.80, /?<0.005. There was a female advantage 
for the recognition of female fear, F(\,\3S) = 5.86, p<0.05. Men were also more
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accurate at perceiving female sadness, F( 1,135) = 4.17, p<0.05. Recognition for other 
emotions did not differ between the sexes,/?>0 .1 0 .
6.4.3 Discussion
This analysis suggests that men and women show sex-congruent patterns in their 
perception of fear. Specifically: participants were better at perceiving fear displayed 
by an actor of their own sex. Men also demonstrate a greater ability to perceive 
sadness exhibited by women. These results are anomalous with stereotypical views 
that women have greater expertise in decoding emotional displays, and that women 
should emit emotional expressions more clearly.
6.5 General discussion
While social stereotypes suggest that women are more emotionally expressive and 
more sensitive to emotions displayed in others, the current set of data indicates that 
neither of these conventional views is applicable to the population explored and the 
vocal emotion stimuli used in the current experiment. Observed results contrast with 
stereotypical patterns of data, i.e. males inhibit the expression and perception of most 
emotions, whereas females will only suppress the expression and attribution of 
socially unacceptable emotions (Brody, 1985).
When sex of voice is considered, there are no differences between men and women in 
their ability to detect subtle emotional nuances from vocalisations. It can be observed 
that disgust represented by male voices is more easily interpreted than disgust 
communicated by female voices. Furthermore, the present studies also show that sex 
of the actor and the sex of the perceiver interrelate and influence fear and sadness 
perception accuracy markedly. Men are more sensitive to fear displays by other men
106
than by women, and reciprocally, women are more sensitive to fear displays by other 
women than by men.
6.5,1 Sex of observer
The lack of female advantage for perceiving emotions in this current study may be 
related to the use of vocal stimuli. For instance, differences between men and women 
in their recognition accuracy of emotions represented by the auditory channel, might 
be attenuated in comparison to when the emotional representation is in the visual 
channel (Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979). Therefore, it is not 
clear whether the results reported here are representative and consistent with previous 
emotion research.
It had been proposed that findings reported in Chapters 3 and 4 (where an effect of 
mood on disgust interpretation has been reported), might have their roots in the 
greater prevalence of women in the populations that have been tested, and perhaps 
some associated disturbed disgust perception. The present study has not, however, 
highlighted any differences in vocal disgust perception between men and women. See 
Chapter 7 for an investigation of interactions between sex, mood and emotions.
6.5.2 Sex of actor
The analysis revealed few differences between men and women in their ability to 
communicate emotions. None of the actors in the vocal experiment were trained 
actors, nor were any of the phrases spoken spontaneously. It could be argued that the 
vocal phrases represent caricature-like sounds. The conditions in which the vocal 
recordings were made limit the extent to which the current findings and conclusions 
can be applied to a wider population and contrasted with past research.
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evertheless, the current results have shown that men’s expressions of disgust are 
recognised with relative ease in contrast with women’s in the current stimulus set. 
Perhaps differential disgust sensitivity levels between sexes are exhibited in their 
display or representation of this emotion. Women might believe their expressions are 
clearer than they actually are, because they are more sensitive to their disgusted 
internal state. Hence, they are too subtle at acting disgusted. A further explanation 
for this may relate to the aforementioned proposal by Brody (1985) that women are 
less likely to express socially unacceptable emotions. Thus, representations of disgust 
by women might not be familiar to observers.
6.5.3 Interactions between sex of observer and sex of actor
The eurrent pattern of results, which suggests a sex-congruent finding for fear 
perception, may be explained in terms of threat processing. Across development, 
females seem to be more sensitive to anger-related cues than males (Goos & 
Silverman, 2002; Hall, 1978; McClure et al., in press; McManis, Bradley, Berg, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). This sensitivity is manifest in recognition accuracy rates, 
physiological changes, neural activation, and reaction speeds to stimuli. As far as past 
research is concerned, however, there seems to be little evidence of any sex 
differenees in sensitivity to fearful stimuli. Yet the emotions of fear and anger are 
highly inter-related. This is not on the basis of their expressive, physiological, or 
experiential qualities, but because anger displays often provoke fear displays. As a 
consequence, any explanations for patterns in perceptive ability for one could be 
associated with the other.
There are two potential explanations for the sex-congruent pattern of fear recognition 
as observed in this study, which may be combined to provide a more reasonable 
account. The first is from a biological perspective. This would relate the discerned 
sex disparities to different perceptive capacities of men and women. The second, 
socio-cognitive, perspective proposes that emotion perception is a learned response, 
which improves with experience, and consequently, men and women may have
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different learned eapacities to display and perceive fear, as a product of different 
experiences of the emotion (Goos & Silverman, 2002).
Portrayals and experienee of aggression might differ significantly between men and 
women. This could explain the eurrent set of results from a socio-cognitive 
perspeetive. For instance, aggressive displays between women and between men are 
fairly common (Campbell, 1999). As in several species, cross-gender competition 
and conflict are rare in comparison. Thus, it can be argued that intra-gender 
aggressive encounters are more probable, and the implications of this are that intra­
gender displays of fear would also be more common than during interactions across 
sexes. If perceptive abilities are experience-reliant, then increased exposure to eertain 
displays will improve perception accuraey of that emotion. This could explain the 
sex-congruent pattern in the perception of fear.
In aceordance with this proposal, Goos and Silverman (2002) found that women 
recognised female facial anger better than their male counterparts. No significant 
differences were found for fear, although there was trend for women to have reduced 
accuracy at recognising male facial fear. Combined with the current results, there is a 
strong argument in favour of a sex-congruent element in the perception of threat- 
related emotions.
Since the voealisations presented in the current study are feigned renditions of 
responses to tlneatening situations, rather than true representations of fear, it is 
plausible that recognition of such vocalisations benefit from experienee such as play- 
fighting. This argument ultimately relies on the idea that men and women differ in 
their exhibition of fear responses, either in true or in simulated situations. Should a 
socio-cognitive explanation of sex differences be valid, then it would be expected that 
differences in soeial learning for boys and girls exist. Indeed, there is substantial 
developmental literature, which suggests that early experienees between boys and 
girls vary -  not just from peer interactions, but within parent-child interactions too 
(McClure, 2000; McClure et al., in press). As previously discussed, young girls and 
boys differ in their approaches and adult encouragement of emotional experiences and 
expression.
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It is surprising that sex-congruence for anger perception in the vocal domain is not 
replicated in the present data, especially given that it has been established in other 
research using visual stimuli (Goos & Silverman, 2002; Rotter & Rotter, 1988). 
Perhaps anger is carried more clearly and universally by the voice than by the face, 
regardless of sex of the communicator. As proposed in Chapter 10, this might reflect 
the evolutionary origins of each emotion; certain emotions might be displayed most 
conspicuously through particular channels, in order to best communicate that 
sentiment.
6.5.3a Mirror systems and emotional empathy
From an evolutionary frame of reference, it is possible that our ability to infer mental 
states of others might be rooted in the capacities of neural mechanisms, such as mirror 
neurons (please see Section 1.5.4 for more details). These are neurons that are 
activated in response to the performance of an action, and also when this action is 
viewed being executed by someone else. It is believed that these neurons may play a 
role in the interpretation of others’ intentions. This could involve matching another’s 
state onto our own corresponding neural representation patterns (Gallese & Goldman, 
1998), in order for us to assign a label to this state. There is emerging evidence for 
audio-visual properties of mirror neurons, thus they may be implicated in the 
interpretation of auditory cues as well (BaiTaclough, Xiao, Oram, & Perrett, 2003; 
Fadiga et al., 2002; Kohler et al., 2002).
Wicker and colleagues (2003) found that induced feelings of disgust activated the 
same neural mechanisms within the anterior insula, and anterior cingulate cortex, as 
observing facial expressions of disgust. This is an important study, as it demonstrates 
the existence of mirror systems, which are activated when perceiving emotions in 
others and when feeling that emotion oneself. Such mechanisms may have a role in 
emotion recognition. Since the activation of mirror neurons requires quite precise 
actions (Keysers et al., 2003) and these neurons are activated earlier by familiar 
stimuli (Grèzes et al., 2004), if men and women communicate the emotion of fear in 
subtly different ways, they may be better able to map expressions by someone of the 
same sex onto their own representation of that emotion. This could lead to a greater 
ability to identify that emotion. The proposal that activity of mirror neurons could
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explain the present results is reliant on the relation between animal and human neural 
systems, the speeificity of responses to subtly distinct actions by the mirror neurons, 
and imperatively, the differential communication of fear vocally by men and women. 
For more discussion regarding mirror neurons, please see Section 1.5.4.
6.5.4 Sadness
The observation that men are more sensitive to female sadness is unexpected. It is 
plausible that females do not recognise the sadness vocalisations in the current study 
simply because they are acted rather than natural representations of sadness, which 
would constitute more familiar vocalisations.
6.5.5 Summary and conclusion
In conclusion, the present data provide evidence for a sex-congruent influence on 
emotion perception accuracy. This effect is limited mainly to fear perception and may 
be derived from the combined effect of experience-dependent socialisation, and the 
ability to see one’s own emotions mirrored in the emotions of others. It is proposed Ij.that differential experiences of men and women contribute to this finding, since j
aggressive encounters between men and women are less common than same-sex !
confrontations. It is also suggested that men and women may vocalise fear by j
different means, and as a consequence, mirror neurons and familiarity may influence |
the perception of fear in same-sex voices. î
i
Within the current results, there is no female advantage for emotion recognition, j
which conflicts with established research. This may be explained because the stimuli I
employed were emotional vocalisations, rather than faces. !
The investigation did not reveal a female superiority for the display of vocal emotions i
either. Indeed, women were less accurate in representing vocal disgust than men. It i
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is postulated that this may reflect women’s disturbed disgust sensitivity. Otherwise, it 
may be a eonsequence of females’ suppression of socially unacceptable emotional 
displays. Only four actors of each sex represented these emotions, so any conelusions 
regarding the display of vocal emotions on the strength of this data should be 
questioned somewhat.
A caveat for emotion pereeption researchers on the basis of these current findings 
would be to ensure that sex of the stimuli is taken into account if presenting the 
stimuli to specific audiences. Underestimating the role sex may play in the processing 
of emotions could have consequences for this field of research.
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7 SEX DIFFERENCES, MOOD, & EMOTION RECOGNITION
Few studies have explored the interaction between sex o f participant^ sex o f actor, 
mood, and emotion recognition. The purpose o f this chapter is to combine analysis 
from  Chapters 4 and 6 in order to examine to what extent these three factors may 
interact.
7.1 Introduction
As proposed in Chapters 3 and 4, the influences of mood states and traits on the 
recognition of disgust might actually be mediated by sex differences in disgust 
perception. Despite the previous chapter (Chapter 6 ) revealing that women were no 
different to men in their recognition accuracy for disgust, it is still plausible that 
perhaps moods and sex of actor interact to have some influenee on disgust perception 
or on the perception of other emotions. Investigating this might allow further 
inteipretation of the findings of the earlier studies outlined in Chapters 3, 4, and 6 .
7.1.1 Summary of mood and emotion recognition
Chapters 3 and 4 summarise researeh studies that show the impact of mood on 
emotion perception. Previous research has generally shown that moods in non- 
clinical populations seem to have a congruent effect on emotion perception. Chapters 
3 and 4 highlighted differences in disgust perception between those with varying 
mood states and traits, such that people with positive and negative moods were 
significantly worse at recognising disgust from the voice in comparison to a control 
group, and those that were in negative moods had difficulties interpreting disgust from 
body movements. The studies also revealed that mood groups could be differentiated 
in terms of their incorrect emotion labelling choices, not just their overall sensitivity
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to emotional stimuli. Initially, it was suggested that the disgust impairment could be 
attributed the greater incidence of females in these groups. The analysis of sex 
differences in Chapter 6 indicates that the disgust finding is unlikely to be explained 
by the sex imbalance in the groups, unless there is some sort of interaetion between 
sex of actor, sex of participant, mood, and emotion perception.
In aecordance to the data presented in Chapters 3 and 4, Murray (1992) found that 
while those with lower depression scores had an emotion perception advantage, the 
participants with higher depression scores were also less accurate at recognising 
disgust than the others, but she examined sensitivity to facial expressions of emotion. 
This is of particular interest in this thesis, since disgust appears to be central to group 
differences in mood reported here (Chapters 3, 4, and 5).
7.1.2 Summary of sex differences and emotion recognition
Chapter 6 summarises key research exploring the influence of sex of participant or sex 
of the expresser on emotion perception. The study outlined in Chapter 6 
demonstrated an emotion by sex of participant by sex of stimulus actor interaction. 
Men were more accurate than women at perceiving fear vocalised by another man and 
women were superior to men in interpreting female fear vocalisations. There was also 
evidence for a male advantage in perceiving female sadness. These sex differences 
were unexpected. It is not clear whether such sex differences may be mediated by 
mood.
The present study seeks to explore the influence of sex of actor, sex of participant and 
mood of participant on vocal emotion perception.
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7.2 Method
7.2.1 Participants
The details of the dysphoria control group and the dysphoric group are summarised in 
Section 4.2.1.
7.2.2 Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli for this task are summarised in Section 6.4.1.
7.3 Results
The recognition accuracy scores for each emotion, represented by males or 
represented by females, were analysed using a mixed-design MANOVA, with 
dysphoria group (control, dysphoric group) and sex of participant (male, female) 
entered as between-subjeets variables'.
7.3.1 Anger
The analysis revealed no effect of participants’ sex on the recognition accuracy scores 
for either male or female anger, p>0.42 in both cases. Nor was there an effeet of 
dysphoria group on the results, /?>0.67 for both male anger and female anger. The sex 
of participant by dysphoria group interaction was not significant either, p>0.36 for 
both male and female anger.
A n overall A N O V A  (com paring all em otion s) w as a lso  carried out, revealing the sam e e ffec ts  as 
presented here. S ection s per em otion  w ere provided to enable sp ec ific  em otion s to be exam in ed  m ore 
c lo se ly .
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7.3.2 Disgust
Sex of participant did not have an effect on the perception of male or female disgust, 
/?>0.42 in both cases. Dysphoria groups did not differ in their recognition of male 
disgust, p>OA. By contrast, the dysphoric group found female disgust more difficult 
to interpret than the control group, = 8.93, p<0.005. The sex of participant by
dysphoria group interactions were not significant, p>0.30 for both male and female 
disgust.
7.3.3 Fear
There were significant differences between male and female participants’ recognition 
acciu*acy of male fear, F(U35) = 11.65, p<0.005, and female fear, F(U35) = 6.04, 
72<0.05. Men were more sensitive to male fear, and women were more sensitive to 
female fear (see Chapter 6). There was no effect of dysphoria group, ;7>0.53 in both 
cases. Sex of participant and dysphoria group did not interact for either male fear or 
female fear,p>0.10 for both.
7.3.4 Happiness
There was no influence of sex of participant on recognition accuracy of male or 
female happiness, p>0.10 for both. Dysphoria groups did not differ in recognition of 
female happiness, p>0.63. The dysphoric group were marginally better at interpreting 
male happiness than the control group, F(ij35) = 3.25, p=0.074. The interactions 
between sex of participant and dysphoria group were not significant, p > 0.47 for both 
male and female happiness.
7.3.5 Sadness
Sex of participant had no effect on the recognition of male sadness, p>0.36, but there 
was an effect on the recognition of female sadness, F(ij35) = 4.34, p<0.05, with men
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being more accurate in their recognition of these vocalisations. There was no 
influence of dysphoria group on these results, p>0.22 for both. The sex of participant 
by dysphoria group interaction was not significant, p>0.312 for both male and female 
sadness voices.
7.4 Discussion
The current analysis was designed to explore the relationship between recognition 
accuracy rates per emotion, mood, sex of actor, and sex of participant. The present 
results re-establish the findings outlined in Chapters 4 and 6. No interactions between 
emotion recognition accuracy, sex of participant, sex of actor, and mood, have been 
obseiwed.
7.4.1 Disgust and mood
Negative moods have an effect on the perception of disgust, as outlined in Chapters 3 
and 4. The present results reveal that this impact is limited to the perception of female 
disgust vocalisations, rather than male disgust vocalisations. In Chapter 5, it was 
proposed that the impairment in perceiving disgust by dysphoric groups might be 
related to the ambiguity of the stimuli. Female disgust stimuli have the lowest 
recognition accuracy rates of all the stimuli, even in the control group. Therefore, this 
bolsters the argument that negative moods have a greater tendency to affect the 
recognition of difficult stimuli.
7.4.2 Sadness and mood
In Chapter 6, it was reported that men are more sensitive to female vocalisations of 
sadness than women. The present study revealed that dysphoric mood had no
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influence on this result. It is plausible that females do not recognise the female 
sadness vocalisations in the current study simply because they are acted rather than 
spontaneous representations of sadness, which would be more familiar for 
interpretation.
7.4.3 Fear and sex-congruence
The sex-congruent effect for the perception of fear vocalisations reported in Chapter 
6, cannot be attributed to the presence of negative moods, as dysphoria group had no 
influence on the detection of fear. Moreover, dysphoria did not interact with sex of 
participant in the recognition of fear. For more discussion on this finding, please see 
Chapter 6.
7.4.4 Conclusions
In summary, the present study has re-established the findings of previous chapters 
(Chapters 4 and 6). The current results demonstrate that the influence of negative 
moods on disgust perception, outlined in Chapter 4, is rooted in the perception of 
female disgust representations. Female voices representing disgust are difficult to 
recognise and this difficulty is exacerbated in dysphoria. This adds weight to the 
argument that negative moods affect the interpretation of ambiguous or difficult 
stimuli. This speculation could be explored in future research studies.
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8AGEING & EMOTION RECOGNITION
A number o f studies have shown deterioration in emotion recognition with age. 
Some studies have revealed recognition deficits that are specific to one emotion; 
some have detected more general deficits. Most research has focused on facial 
expression perception alone. Consequently, this experiment explores emotional 
experience and emotion recognition across age groups from  faces, voices, and 
gestures.
8.1 Introduction
The efficiency of most neurophysiological systems declines throughout the life span. 
The brain itself experiences several changes in structure and chemistry during the 
normal ageing process. These changes are both qualitative and quantitative, and are 
associated with gradual deterioration in neurological functioning. The way in which 
these changes in neurological functioning affect distinct faculties such as emotion 
processing has yet to be investigated comprehensively. Age-related variations in 
emotion perception are regularly reported, both in research and anecdotally. 
Neurological compromise, or alternatively, socialisation differences associated with 
age could be at the basis of these changes, although it is not clear how neurological 
degeneration or social learning and competence may relate, since it is unclear 
precisely how emotion processing from multiple communication channels is affected 
across the life-span.
There have been a number of studies exploring the potential decline of social 
understanding in older adults. Some researchers propose that abilities on theory of 
mind tasks are superior in the elderly (Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998), others 
argue that ageing is related to a marked deterioration in such tasks (Maylor, Moulson, 
Muncer, & Taylor, 2002), whereas others suggest that there is a disturbance, but this
119
is independent of fluid abilities (that are related to greater mental effort, new or 
complex information) or crystallized abilities (involving a dependence on previous 
experience) (Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004b). Variations in emotion perception abilities 
with age would have an impact on social understanding and relationships, since 
emotion is the sine qua non of human social interaction behaviour. Thus, it is of 
critical relevance for age-focused research to examine whether emotion perception is 
stable or variable as humans age. Explorations of this ability could facilitate our 
understanding of changes in social functioning observed across the life span.
8.1.1 Two theories relating to emotion processing and age
The two key premises related to emotional processing predict differing patterns of 
change with age. The sociocognitive approach proposes that increased experience of 
social and emotional environments will lead to an enhancement or maintenance in 
emotion understanding or recognition (Blanchard-Fields, 1996; Gross, Carstensen, 
Tsai, Skorpen, & Hsu, 1997). In contrast, deterioration in emotion recognition and 
understanding, based on neural degeneration associated with age, would be predicted 
from a neuropsychological stance.
8.1.2 Age-related social cognition research
Older people have an accumulated experience of perceiving emotions across the life­
span and, consequently, their ease of recognition may be improved by this familiarity 
(Magai, 2001). Where younger adults depend on processing abilities, it is possible 
that their older counterparts will use preserved knowledge and experience to form 
more effective strategies when executing tests, like emotion recognition tasks 
(Shiniamura, Berry, Mangels, Rusting, & Jurica, 1995).
In other words, the sociocognitive view of the effects of biological senescence on 
emotion processing is that older people have had more experience, and therefore.
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practise in interpreting emotions, and consequently, will be better than younger people 
at this. While other skills may be lost with age, according to this perspective, emotion 
perception would be maintained, since frequency of use could render it less 
susceptible to age-related deterioration.
Older people are reported as experiencing fewer negative and more positive emotions 
in comparison to younger people (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; 
Lawton, 2001; Lawton, Kleban, Rajagopal, & Dean, 1992; Mroczek, 2001). If this is 
the case, then from sociocognitive view of emotion perception, older people should be 
better at recognising positive emotions than negative emotions, because these are 
more familiar. If familiarity is important, it is plausible that emotion recognition 
abilities are reliant on actors (portraying emotions) being of similar ages to the 
perceivers.
8.1.3 Age-related neuropsychological research
While the extent of age-related deterioration in regions of the brain is uncertain, the 
neuropsychological view of a decline in emotion perception has much support 
because there is considerable evidence implicating emotion processing-related 
structures in the neuropathology of ageing.
Ageing produces neuronal atrophy (cell deterioration) (Akiyama et al., 1997), and loss 
of synaptic branching (Adams, 1987). Cell shrinkage, dendritic regression, and 
reductions in synaptic density also occur as humans get older (Tisserand & Jolies, 
2003). Most studies have found a link between cerebral atrophy and cognitive 
impairments, yet emotion impairments have not been explored comprehensively in 
older populations.
The popular neuropsychological approach to brain and behaviour considers partially 
independent yet inter-linking pathways as the basis of functioning. Therefore, some 
structures or pathways may be more sensitive to ageing than others. The most 
prominent regions known to be affected preferentially by the effects of ageing include
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the striatum (Raz et al., 2003), prefrontal regions, and structures of the temporal lobe 
(see below).
A global decline in frontal lobe functioning, and in medial temporal lobe structures, 
such as the amygdala and hippocampus, instigated by ageing, is supported by several 
research studies (Daigneault & Braun, 1993; Driscoll et al., 2003; Hedden & Gabrieli, 
2004; Jack et al., 1998; Kaye et al., 1997; Moscovitch & Winocur, 1995; Mu, Xie, 
Wen, Weng, & Shuyun, 1999; Parkin & Java, 1999; Petit-Taboué, Landeau, Desson, 
Desgranges, & Baron, 1998; Raz, Rodrigue, Head, Kennedy, & Acker, 2004; Scahill 
et al., 2003; Smith et al., 1999). The dorsolateral prefrontal regions seem to be 
affected earlier and more substantially by ageing than ventromedial prefrontal regions 
(MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002; Rypma & D'Bsposito, 1999).
Furthermore, a considerable number of studies have implicated temporal and frontal 
structures in the processing of emotions (Adolphs & Tranel, 2003; Adolphs et al., 
1994; Adolphs et al., 1995; Adolphs et al., 1999; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Blair et al., 
1999; Broks et al., 1998; Calder, Young, Rowland et al., 1996; Homak, Rolls, & 
Wade, 1996; Keane, Calder, Hodges, & Young, 2002; Kolb & Taylor, 2000; Lavenu, 
Pasquier, Lebert, Petit, & Van der Linden, 1999; MacPherson et al., 2002; Morris, 
Friston et al., 1998; Morris et al., 1996; Morris, Scott et al., 1999; Scott et al., 1997; 
Wang et al., 2002). For further infomiation regarding the neuroscience of ageing, 
please see Hedden and Gabrieli (2004).
Thus, the association between structures that may be compromised by ageing, and 
their involvement in the processing of emotions, suggests that emotion perception 
disturbances in an older population should not be unexpected.
8.1.4 Emotion recognition and ageing -  importance and background to research
Adults are typically better than children at recognising emotion expressed by faces 
(DeSonneville et al., 2002). Nevertheless, most cross-sectional research suggests that 
there is a decline in emotion recognition abilities in later adulthood (Brosgole &
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Weisman, 1995; Malatesta, Izard, Culver, & Nicolich, 1987). Several studies propose 
that this decline is specific to negative emotions, particularly sadness, (Billings, 
Harrison, & Alden, 1993; Calder et al., 2003; MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 
submitted; McDowell, Harrison, & Demaree, 1994; Moreno, Borod, Welkowitz, & 
Alpert, 1993; Phillips & Allen, in press; Phillips, MacLean et al., 2002; Sullivan & 
Ruffman, 2004a). There are a few studies that observe preservation or even 
improvement in some emotion recognition skills with age (Calder et al., 2003; 
DeSonneville et al., 2002; Moreno et al., 1993).
A general facial emotion processing deficit in older women has been observed in 
comparison to younger and middle-aged women (Malatesta et al., 1987). In 
accordance, Brosgole and Weisman (1995) used vocal and facial affect, and music 
stimuli with three hundred and seventeen participants, ranging in age from 2 years and 
eleven months, to eighty-three years old. They found that mood recognition is best 
during puberty and that the youngest and very oldest participants had the most 
difficulties in inteipreting the emotional stimuli. This is one of only vei*y few 
experiments that have examined auditory emotion perception and age. Neither of 
these two studies explored specific emotions though.
Moreno and colleagues (1993) carried out an investigation using Ekman and Friesen’s 
(1976) photographs of basic facial expressions. These are described in Chapter 2. No 
overall difference for the recognition of emotion between three age groups (aged 21- 
39 years, 40 to 59 years, and 60-81 years) was reported in this study. Exploration of 
specific emotions revealed an interesting pattern though: while a greater ability to 
perceive happiness was observed in the two older groups, the older adults had 
difficulties recognising sadness, in comparison with the younger and middle-aged 
groups. A similar finding has been described by Billings and colleagues (1993) that 
younger women show a negative bias in perceiving emotions from the face, in 
contrast with older women.
McDowell and co-workers (1994) examined a hypothesis based on the right hemi- 
ageing theory: if the right hemisphere deteriorates with age, then elderly participants 
would show a decreased accuracy in perception of facial emotion. This concept was 
rooted in the idea that the right hemisphere is crucial in the neurobiology of facial
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emotion perception, especially that of negative emotions (Mandai & Singh, 1990; 
Sackeim & Gur, 1978; Suberi & McKeever, 1977). In the McDowell and co-workers’ 
study, photographs of facial expressions of emotion were presented either to the right 
visual field or the left visual field. Elderly people had more difficulties in recognising 
emotions than younger participants, but this was restricted to negative and neutral 
facial emotions. There were no real differences in recognition of emotion presented 
to different visual fields, so this was not consistent with a right hemi-ageing 
hypothesis. From the studies described thus far, a pattern of negative emotion 
perception decline across the life span has emerged.
Phillips and her colleagues (2002) also examined individual emotion perception and 
understanding. The tasks assessed a whole range of emotion perception skills, such as 
the ability to isolate and identify emotions from texts. They also explored the ability 
to identify which emotions combine to form secondary emotions. This task was a 
multiple choice task in which participants had to choose emotions that they thought 
combined to form a more complex emotion, such as awe. Ekman basic faces were 
used to test emotion recognition. There were two groups of participants. The first 
group were aged between 20 and 40 years old and the second group were aged 
between 60 and 80 years old. No significant overall findings for emotion perception 
differences between the groups were reported. But when individual emotions were 
examined, it was revealed that recognition of sadness and anger was impaired in the 
older age group.
Using Ekman basic faces and the Emotion Hexagon (Young et al., 1997), which is 
described in Chapter 2, Calder and co-workers (2003) compared the facial emotion 
recognition abilities of 18-30 year-olds and 50-70 year-olds. Increasing age was 
associated with a decline in accurate recognition of fear, and less so of anger and 
sadness. There also seemed to be a partial improvement in recognition of disgust as 
age increased. This was revealed on both facial expression recognition tasks. This 
provides further support for the conclusion that there is a decline in recognition of 
particular negative emotions in the elderly, perhaps relating to neural detrioration in 
the amygdala with age. Calder and colleagues suggested that the preservation of 
disgust recognition in the older population may have been related to relative 
resistance of the insula cortex to neural deterioration with age.
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Moreover, Sullivan and Ruffman (2004a) provided support for an age-related decline 
in facial and vocal emotion perception that is independent of other perceptual 
changes, and of alterations in processing speed, IQ, and other face processing 
abilities, hi recognising basic Ekman and Friesen emotional faces, older participants 
had lower accuracy scores for sadness and anger in comparison to younger 
participants. Whilst viewing one facial expression slowly morphing into another 
expression, the elderly group were slower to perceive the shift in expression than the 
younger group. In a second task, using the Emotion Hexagon, participants had to 
discriminate between two faces, by indicating which is more emotional. The elderly 
participants were impaired on this task, independent of any perceptual deficit; this was 
specific to anger, sadness, and to a lesser extent, fear.
In line with this, Phillips and Allen (in press) asked people of all ages to rate the 
intensity of facial expressions of anger, sadness, fear, and happiness. They reported 
that older participants perceived sad and happy facial and lexical expressions as being 
less intense than younger participants. MacPherson and colleagues (2002) found that 
older adults were impaired at emotional identification from faces. This difficulty was 
particularly enhanced for sadness. Furthermore, MacPherson, Phillips, and Della Sala 
(submitted) observed that older people had more difficulties and errors than a younger 
control group on a task that required them to indicate whether faces were displaying 
the same or different facial expressions. This was particularly true for matches that 
involved sadness. These studies emphasise that ageing is influential on the perception 
of negative emotions, particularly sadness.
There seems to be considerable research demonstrating recognition difficulties for 
negative emotions in older people. This is consistent with both the sociocognitive 
view of emotion processing, and the neuropsychological stance as well. For instance, 
if older groups are generally happier than their younger counterparts (Lawton, 2001; 
Lawton et al., 1992), then according to social cognition researchers, this would lead to 
decreased contact with negative emotions, both experientially, and perceptively, and 
thus, worse recognition of negative emotions would emerge. By contrast, 
neuropsychological research contends strongly for neural systems that are specialised 
for processing particular emotions (see Section 1.5,2 for more information). That is.
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each emotion may have a moderately independent neural pathway responsible for its 
processing. In light of the established research, it could be proposed that the neural 
pathways responsible for processing negative emotions are damaged somewhat during 
the ageing process, particularly regions involved in the perception of sadness.
Not all of the studies revealed the same pattern of impairments within emotion 
perception though, so it is not clear whether older people experience impairments in 
emotion processing, and whether this deficit would be general, or specific to 
particular emotions.
8.1.5 Brain, emotion, and ageing
Gunning-Dixon and colleagues (2003) used functional imaging to determine which 
neural mechanisms may be involved in emotion recognition and how the activity of 
these mechanisms may change with age. They used photographs of faces displaying 
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and also a neutral pose. Where younger 
people showed an activation of the amygdala and frontal regions in response to all 
emotional stimuli in a discrimination task, the older people showed a tendency for 
activity in left frontal regions chiefly. The authors did not differentiate specific 
emotional responses. This study provides empirical evidence for an age-related 
change in the cortical networks involved in the interpretation of emotions.
Despite inconsistencies in age and emotion explorations, there have been no known 
reports of robust, age-associated impairment in happiness, surprise, or disgust 
recognition. The amygdala has been implicated via neuropsychological and imaging 
studies in the processing of fear, anger, and sadness (Adolphs et al., 1995; Blair et al., 
1999; Phan et al., 2002), whereas disgust might be mediated by the basal ganglia or 
insula cortex (Phillips et al., 2004; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998; Sprengelmeyer et al., 
1996; Sprengelmeyer et al., 2003). Yet, the neural substrates for recognition of 
happiness and surprise are unclear. Ruffman and colleagues (submitted) have 
proposed a theory for amygdala-mediated decline in emotion perception. The 
deterioration in fear and sadness perception with age, observed in several studies, is
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consistent with an accelerated change in the amygdala as humans age. There have 
been comprehensive research explorations that report changes in the amygdala as 
humans get older. Mu and co-workers (1999) reported a reduction in the volume of 
the amygdala in older populations. In accordance, this is true for the temporal lobes 
as a whole (Coffey et al., 1992; Jack et al., 1998; Kaye et al., 1997; Petit-Taboué et 
al., 1998). Moreover, Gunning-Dixon and colleagues (2003) reported an attenuated 
response from the amygdala during emotion processing by elderly individuals.
8.1.6 Rationale
While recent studies have examined the recognition of specific emotions over the life 
span, most have been based on the assumption that facial expression recognition is a 
salient and representative component of emotional recognition. This is a precarious 
assumption, as difficulties in interpreting emotion fi*om one modality might not 
necessarily generalise to others. In everyday contexts, people use several cues to 
determine another’s emotional state. Therefore, it is of greater ecological validity to 
examine and compare emotion perception from different forms of expression 
portrayal, not just static facial expressions. The current study aimed to investigate the 
influence of ageing on emotion recognition fiom multiple communication channels: 
static faces, voices, and dynamic gestures. In turn, this enabled the exploration of the 
popular neuropsychological theory of emotion recognition, which proposes that 
specific emotions are processed by partially independent pathways in the brain. 
Emotions are believed to have evolved for distinct functional purposes and therefore, 
neural mechanisms underlying them should operate regardless of channel of 
emotional communication. Such a proposal leads to the hypothesis: if age impairs 
recognition of particular emotions, then these emotions should be difficult for older 
people to recognise, independent o f mode ofportrayal.
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8.1.7 Current study
In the present study, two measures of each type of emotional expression recognition 
were implemented to two different age groups (20-49 years, and 50+ years). Each 
task provides a detailed assessment of emotion recognition from one particular form 
of emotional expression. It was important to isolate these expressions in order to 
compare their ease of recognition. The following questions were addressed:
(i) does ageing have an effect on emotion recognition?
(ii) is recognition of emotions that are conveyed by different channels affected to the 
same degree by ageing?
(iii) is the pattern of recognition ability across component emotions similar for 
different modalities of expression?
8.2 Method
8.2.1 Participants
Sixty-eight participants volunteered to take part in this study. To maximise sample 
size, participants were split by age into 2 equal groups (though results were similar 
when participants were split into 3 groups and upper and lower age groups compared). 
Thirty-four of the participants were aged between 20 and 49 (mean age = 30.71 years, 
S.D. = 9.99). These 34 participants comprised the ‘Young’ group. Ten of the 
participants in this group were male. The mean estimated Full-scale IQ for this group 
equalled 118.56 (S.D.= 6.32). This was calculated using the National Adult Reading 
Test -  NART (Nelson & Willison, 1991). See Appendix 1 for the NART.
The second gioup of 34 participants were aged over 50 years (mean age = 62.12, S.D. 
= 6.69, range 50 -  80 years). This group is known as the ‘Older’ group. Again, there 
were 10 men in this group also. The mean IQ for this group equalled 118.42, (S.D. = 
5.87).
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A between-subjects ANOVA of the participants’ IQ scores produced no significant 
differences between the groups, F(i,6?) = 0.001, /?>0.97. Therefore, any differences 
revealed in the two groups’ scores should not be attributable to IQ differences. The 
participants’ years of education were also measured (younger participants = 17.97 
years, S.D. = 2.50; older group = 15.38 years, S.D. = 3.81). All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no known neurological damage.
8.2.2 Background tasks
An adapted version of Wolpe and Lang’s (1964) 75-item fear schedule was used to 
examine self-assessed sensitivity to fear. Haidt and colleagues’ (1994) 32-item 
disgust questionnaire measured sensitivity to disgusting stimuli. These tests are 
described in Appendix 1.
8.2.3 Gestural emotion recognition
The main aim of this set of stimuli was to examine the recognition of emotion by 
different age groups when expressed gesturally. As a result, the full-light and point- 
light gesture clips as described in Section 2.2.3 were presented to participants.
8.2.4 Vocal emotion recognition
The vocal emotion recognition tests were incorporated to compare the ease of 
recognition of emotion from different forms of expression (prosodic verbal and 
prosodic nonsense). The stimuli and procedures for these tasks are outlined in 
Chapter 2.
129
8.2.5 Facial emotion recognition
Facial expression recognition was also explored in this study. Facial expressions, as 
mentioned earlier, are the most commonly used forms of emotion stimuli. A range of 
studies (see Section 8.1.4) has reported an age-related deterioration in recognition 
accuracy of emotional faces, however. It is, therefore, important to use this medium, 
in addition to other channels of communication to explore emotion perception and 
ageing. Replication of previous results is imperative before conclusions can be 
drawn. The Ekman 60 and the Emotion Hexagon were implemented. The two tasks 
are described in Chapter 2.
8.2.6 Order
Participants were given the gesture tasks first, but the order of point-light and full- 
light conditions were varied across participants. The two vocal tasks followed (order 
was varied). These were followed by the Ekman 60 face task, then the Emotion 
Hexagon.
8.2.7 Statistical analysis
An overall ANOVA could not be carried out comparing emotion recognition across 
tasks and examining specific emotions because some tasks included surprise, while 
others did not. For all tasks, data were submitted to a mixed-design ANOVA (with 
Greenliouse-Geisser corrections where possible). The between-subjects factor was 
age group (young, old), and the within-subjects factor was recognition accuracy for 
each emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise if included in the 
task). If a significant or borderline interaction or group difference was revealed, then 
independent t-tests were administered, equal variances assumed where appropriate, in 
order to explore impairments in specific emotions. In some cases, performance for 
individual emotions was contrasted between groups when the emotion by group 
interaction was non-significant. The reasons for this are described in Section 2.3.
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8.3 Results
A description of the results from the various emotions tasks follows.
8.3.1 Background tests
Table 8.1 summarises the results of the two different age groups on the two emotional 
experience questionnaires.
Table 8.1: Means and Standard Deviations o f  the Overall Fear and Disgust Questionnaire Scores.
Age group Fear Questionnaire Overall score Disgust Questionnaire Overall score
20-49 years old Mean 105.00* 50.99
S.D. 36.98 15.74
50+ years old Mean 86.56* 57.29
S.D. 36.20 19.67
*Significant age group difference at/><0.05
A between-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the mean 
scores of both groups for the overall fear questionnaire score, F(i,67) = 4.32, ^<0.05. 
The younger participants report more sensitivity to fear eliciting situations than the 
older group. There was no significant group difference for the overall disgust scores, 
F(i,67) =2.10, /?=0,152. There was no significant interaction between disgust domain 
and age groups, f ( 5.6 i,364.52)= 1.57, />=0.142.
8.3.2 General emotion recognition
Figure 8.1 shows the mean recognition accuracy rates for the different tasks by each 
age group.
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Figure 8.1: The two age groups ’ recognition accuracy rates fo r each communication channel.
This figure reveals that mean recognition rates are above chance levels for all 
conditions. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that, generally, perceiving emotional faces 
produces higher accuracy rates than other conditions for both age groups (p<0.001 for 
each comparison).
8,3.3 Gestural emotion recognition tests
8,3.3a Full4ight gestures
Figure 8.2 summarises the performance results of each age group in the full-light 
gestures condition.
There was a significant effect of emotion portrayed on recognition accuracy rates, 
F^.is, 247.62) = 30.64; /7<0.001. There was also a main effect of age group, with older 
participants performing less well, F(i,66) = 20.71, p<0.001. This was qualified by a 
significant interaction between emotion and age group, F(3j 5, 247.62) = 2.72, /?<0.05. 
Older participants in comparison with their younger counterparts showed significantly 
worse recognition of happiness, ^(66) = 4.88, p<0.001, disgust, 7(66) = 2.73,/?<0.01, 
anger, 7(66) = 2.42, /?<0.05, and sadness, 7(66) = 2.05, /?<0.05, but not fear, 7(66) = 
0.70,jt7>0.49.
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Figure 8.2: The two age groups ’ recognition accuracy rates fo r  the fu ll-ligh t em otional gesture test. 
***p< 0.00l ** p<O.Ol *p<0.05
83.3b Point-light gestures
Figure 8.3 summarises the results from each of the two age gi’oups in the point-light 
gestures condition.
Age: point-light gestures
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Figure 8.3: The two age groups ’ recognition accuracy rates fo r  the point-light em otional gesture test. 
*p<0.05
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A significant main effect of emotion portrayed was observed, F(3.76, 248.31) = 33.76, 
j!7<0.001. A significant main effect was recorded between the two age groups, with 
the younger group performing more accurately, F(i,66) = 7.81, p<0.01. There was no 
significant interaction between emotion and age group, F(s.76, 248.31) = 0.981,^=0.415. 
The older group were significantly less accurate at recognising fear, t(66) = 2.43, 
/?<0.05 and disgust, /(66) = 2.32, j!7<0.05. They showed a trend to be worse at 
perceiving happiness too, /(66) = 1.83,p=0.072, but not other emotions,^>0.21.
8.3.4 Vocal emotion recognition tests
8.3.4a Nonsense vocal emotion test
The summary data are shown in Figure 8.4 from the nonsense vocal emotion test.
H  N onsense ag e  20-49 j | 
□  N onsense ag e  50+ | I
Age: nonsense voices
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Figure 8.4: The two groups ’ recognition accuracy rates fo r  the nonsense vocal emotion test.
* p<0.05.
There was a significant main effect for emotion, F(4.6i, 304.07) = 47.25, /?<0.001. The 
performance of the older participants was worse than that of their younger 
counterparts, F(i,66) = 4.37, ^<0.05. A significant interaction was not revealed, F(4.6 i, 
304.07) = 1.12, jr?=0.351. T-tests revealed that it was only recognition of surprise that
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the two groups differed significantly for, /(66) = 2.30, /><0.05. Differences in 
happiness from these nonsense vocalisations showed a trend towards significance, 
t{65A2) = 1.84,/7=0.070. The older group were not significantly worse at perceiving 
other emotions: j9>0.25 for all.
8.3.4b Verbal vocal emotion test
The summary data from the verbal test of vocal emotion are shown in Figure 8.5.
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Figure 8.5: The two groups ‘ recognition accuracy rates fo r  the verbal vocal emotion test.
* j!?<0.05
There was a significant effect of emotion, F q j2, 245.45) = 5.29, j;<0.005. The main 
effect of age group neared significance, F(i,66) = 3.09, ;?=0.083. A significant 
interaction between age group and emotion was not revealed, F(^j2, 245.45) = 1.80, 
/?=0.135. Independent samples t-tests showed that it was only anger for which the 
older group were significantly worse at inteipreting than the younger group, 7(57.19) 
= 2.32, p<0.05, but not any other emotion, p>0.095.
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8.3.5 Facial emotion recognition tests
8,3.5a Ekman 60
Participants’ mean correct recognition rates for the Ekman 60 faces are portrayed in 
Figure 8.6.
Age: Ekman 60 faces 0  Ekman 60 age 20-49 
□  Ekman 60 age 50+
100% 1
23 75% -i
g 50%5
O 25% - 
&
0%  -
disgust fear happiness sadness surpriseanger
Emotion
Figure 8.6: The two age groups ’ recognition accuracy rates fo r  the Ekman 60 test o ffa c ia l expression 
recognition.
A significant main effect of emotion can be reported, F(s,53,232.85) = 33.96, jo<0.001.
No other effects reached statistical significance: emotion by age group interaction, 
F(3.53,232.85) = 0.16,p=0.945; effect of age group, F(i,66) = 0.01,^=0.938. It is 
important to note that ceiling levels in performance cannot explain the lack of 
differences in the two groups, except for happiness.
8.3.5b Emotion hexagon
The results from this experiment are summarised in Figure 8.7. There was a main 
effect of emotion, F ( 3 .6 9 ,  2 3 9 .9 5 )  = 11.77, /><0.001. There were no other significant 
effects recorded: emotion by age group interaction analysis, F ( 3 .6 9 ,  2 3 9 .9 5 )  = 1.11, 
/?=0.357; effect of age group,: F(i,66) = 0.44,72=0 .5 10.
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Figure 8.7: The two age g ro u p s’ recognition accuracy rates fo r  the Emotion Hexagon fa c ia l
expression test.
8.3.6 Summary of results
There are significant differences in response accuracy between age groups on both of 
the gesture tasks, and there is also a trend towards significant differences on the vocal 
tasks. No significant effect of age group was found on the facial emotion recognition 
tests. Analysis included in Appendix 4 demonstrates that when sex of participant was 
included as a factor when comparing age groups, the pattern of results resembles the 
results presented when sex was not included as a factor. The pattern of errors by the 
two groups are summarised in Tables I-X, Appendix 3. Older participants 
consistently confused happy gestures with anger, and disgusted gestures with sad 
more than younger participants in the full-light gesture task. In the point-light task, 
the young gioup described angry gestures as disgusted less often than the older group. 
In both gesture tasks, there were no particular emotions systematically confused with 
disgust. For both vocal tasks, there was no consistent pattern in confusions, nor did 
this differ between age groups.
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8.4 Discussion
This study was designed to explore changes in emotion perception observed across 
age groups. As an interesting aside, the results enable us to examine whether there is 
support for the notion that there are multi-modal mechanisms which process specific 
emotions that might be impacted by age. An age-related deterioration in the 
recognition accuracy for both full-light and point-light emotional gestures was 
indicated. Moreover, significant dissimilarities between the age groups in vocal 
emotion perception were revealed in one task and a trend towards an age effect was 
shown in the other vocal emotion task. Combined, this suggests that the ability to 
perceive emotions from gestures and voices declines somewhat across the life span. 
Changes in emotion processing abilities with age did not extend to the facial domain. 
The results demonstrate that the processing of emotions by older participants from 
multiple communication channels varies substantially across these different tasks, and 
on some of the most commonly used emotion processing tasks, older adults performed 
well above levels predicted on the basis of previous research.
8.4.1 Gestural emotion recognition
The results on the gesture tasks contrast with work by De Meijer (1989). He asked a 
large group of participants to examine emotional body movements and rate these 
movements on scales of one to four, in terms of their emotional content. He reported 
no systematic differences between the older and younger raters.
The greatest differences in recognition accuracy from gestural displays in the present 
study are for happiness and disgust. Happiness is consistently confused with anger 
and the older gioup makes this mistake more frequently in the full-light condition (see 
Tables I and II, Appendix 3). Perhaps aggressive gestural happiness displays, like 
crowing^, which are very symbolic, are less familiar to older participants.
 ^Crowing may be represented when the expresser’s sports team has just scored a goal and they shout 
‘come on’ and punch the air.
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Consequently, older people may be more susceptible to mistaking happiness for 
anger, and overall, this could depress their use of the term ‘happiness’.
Actors tended to represent disgust by miming wafting actions (to remove noxious 
odours) or faux vomiting actions. Such symbolic gestures may have become 
increasingly used by younger generations in the last few decades. It has been 
proposed that disgust may not have any conspicuous, natural body gestures (Coulson, 
2004; De Meijer, 1989; Heberlein et al., in press). Furthermore, many of the older 
participants tended to describe disgust as a feeling associated with moral disgust and 
anger, such as disgust at a murderer or paedophile, rather than a more animal/hygiene- 
related disgust (Rozin et al., 2000). Since the older group did not consistently label 
disgusted gestures with any other particular emotion, this is indicative that the disgust 
displays were not compliant with older participants’ concept of disgust or other 
emotions either. Thus, cohort and generational differences are an important 
consideration in the interpretation of this research.
Since age effects are revealed for gesture recognition tasks, this suggests that older 
individuals stmggle to identify the emotions from gesture stimuli. Perhaps ageing 
disturbs the neural underpinnings of gestural emotion perception. Alternatively, this 
outcome may denote generational differences in expression, rather than recognition 
abilities of gestural emotion, since emotion expression, and hence recognition may be 
influenced by society and culture.
8.4.2 Vocal emotion recognition
Recognition of vocal emotion also seems to decline with age -  although this effect is 
not as clear-cut as the age differences observed on the gesture tasks. Surprise from 
the nonsense voice task differentiates the two groups. Surprise may lack a distinct 
vocal profile (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Van Bezooijen et al., 1983).
Language-specific paralinguistic patterns may influence the decoding process of vocal 
emotion (Scherer et al., 2001). Since the nonsense word task was developed in 
Germany, prosody of typical German speech is varied in these vocalisations, and as
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all participants were British, they may have been unaccustomed to these speech 
patterns. In support of this idea, several researchers have reported that vocal emotion 
recognition, despite being universal, is improved when expression and recognition is 
by the same national, ethnic, or regional group (Albas, McCluskey, & Albas, 1976; 
Juslin & Laukka, 2003; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Moreover, in-group advantage is 
highest for happiness (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). Thus, one would predict an out- 
gi'oup disadvantage for happiness, which was found in the present study. The use of 
German stimuli may have rendered happiness perception vulnerable to age effects.
Due to widespread media exposure and ease of travel available to younger 
generations, it is proposed that younger people might be more familiar with emotional 
displays by people from other cultures than perhaps older people. This would result 
in a better interpretation of vocal emotions by the younger group, or in a resistance to 
cross-cultural vocal perception effects.
8.4.3 Facial emotion recognition
While consistent deficits in interpreting facial emotion have been reported by other 
studies in older populations, most specifically in the recognition of negative emotions, 
it comes as a surprise that the current study does not replicate this effect. Indeed, 
even when the population is divided further, by comparing the very oldest participants 
with the very youngest, there are still no signs of decline or improvement with age in 
facial emotion recognition.
The results from the Ekman 60 face perception task are not near ceiling or floor 
levels, except happiness, so general performance level cannot explain the lack of age 
group differences. Moreover, both face tasks have been used in previous studies that 
have detected an effect of age (Calder et al., 2003; MacPherson et al., 2002; Moreno 
et al., 1993; Phillips, MacLean et al., 2002). It is credible that cohort differences 
could be central to these findings. For instance, many research studies recruit 
participants through volunteer panels; however, the current sample were selected after 
approaching members of the local community, such that the older community were 
unusually active. This cohort effect, however, would not account for impairment in
140
the vocal or gestural tasks. It is also possible that there are no specific effects of 
ageing on emotion processing.
A parsimonious explanation for this finding might be that since a wide range of tasks 
all focusing on emotions were administered in this experiment, participants became 
highly sensitive to emotional displays. The order remained constant, and so 
participants always completed the facial recognition tasks after the gestural and vocal 
tasks. This could explain the results. In other words, the participants may have 
become primed towards emotion stimuli, and as such, facial expression discrimination 
improved across the board. Affective priming paradigms have been implemented 
within psychological research to show that prior emotional stimuli presentation can 
lead to heightened sensitivity to subsequent, and usually, congruent emotional stimuli. 
This sensitivity may be characterised by faster response speeds, increased 
categorisation accuracy and so on. For a detailed review of affective priming, please 
refer to Musch and Klauer (2003).
8.4.4 Potential impact of traits or states
As mentioned earlier, older individuals are reported to be happier and more in control 
of their emotions than younger individuals (Lawton, 2001; Lawton et al., 1992). 
Interestingly, the older people had a greater tendency than younger people to use the 
label ‘sadness’ on both of the gestural and both of the vocal tasks (see Tables I-VIII, 
Appendix 3). This could reflect overcompensation for their decreased experience of 
negative emotions: the older participants might have been impaired in their ability to 
recognise negative emotions, and thus, used the ‘sadness’ label as a generic negative 
label. This pattern contrasts with previous reports of a sadness recognition deficit in 
older people, however (Calder et al., 2003; Moreno et al., 1993; Phillips, MacLean et 
al., 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a). Furthermore, the younger group generally use 
the label ‘happiness’ more often on both of the gesture, and one of the vocal tasks, 
and also this group are more likely to accurately identify happy stimuli. This does not 
sit well with the demonstration in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, and past literature, that mood
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congruence may be displayed in emotion perception results (Niedenthal & Dalle, 
2001; Niedenthal et aL, 2000; Niedenthal et al., 1997; Niedenthal & Setteiiand, 1994).
Since social interactions are considered to elicit and expose people to emotions 
(Levenson & Gottman, 1983), a decline in social involvement, which is often 
associated with the elderly (Carstensen, 1987), may further inliibit abilities to 
accurately decode others’ emotional expressions. Thus, general deterioration in 
emotion recognition accuracy for voices and gestures, as observed in the current 
study, would be consistent with this. The social nature of emotion renders it a likely 
candidate for the deleterious effects of ageing.
8.4.5 Correspondence with the neuroscience literature
There is no clear pattern of emotion perception decline in older adults across or within 
modalities. For instance, an emotion may be selectively disrupted in a given task (e.g. 
full-light gestural sadness), but this disproportionate decline in performance is not 
replicated in other tasks within that modality or in any other communication channel. 
From a neuropsychological point of view, this suggests that ageing does not affect 
neural mechanisms that process specific emotions. Task specificity in recognition 
impairments could indicate that separable neural substrates may be responsible for 
processing emotions in each task. Such an arrangement is possible given that 
biological systems have evolved under constraints so neural systems may not show 
the simplest organisation. This is not, however, a parsimonious account of emotion 
perception or the impact of ageing.
This brings under scrutiny the view that each emotion has an associated neural 
circuitry, independent of other emotion circuitry. For instance, it has been proposed 
that perception of fear and disgust are subseiwed by discrete neural substrates, with 
the amygdala associated with general fear processing, and the basal ganglia and 
anterior insula are related to disgust processing (Calder et al., 2001). See Section
1.5.2 for further details. If support for these concepts were to be provided by the 
present results, the decline in performance for the perception of a specific emotion
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shown on one emotion task by a group would be expected to extend to other tasks 
depicting the same emotion, involving a variety of forms of expression. Some 
recognition studies using vocal and facial depiction of emotions have reported 
common deficits (Adolphs et aL, 2003; Calder, Keane, Manes et al., 2000; Scott et al., 
1997; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999) but most other studies 
test only one modality. As a consequence, the current findings challenge the 
generalisation of the conclusions of selectivity of emotional impact in studies that 
have examined only one channel of communication (see Section 1.5.2 for a fuller 
account).
At this point in the thesis, it is worth briefly describing research that is less consistent 
with a theory of selective neural mechanisms for distinct emotions. Speculation is 
derived from a wide range of imaging and neuropsychological studies (see Section 
1.5.3). For example, activity of the amygdala changes in response to the presentation 
of sadness, happiness, anger, as well as fear-related stimuli (Blair et al., 1999; Breiter 
et al., 1996; Monis, Friston et al., 1998; Sander et al., 2003; Sander & Scheich, 2001; 
Whalen et al., 1998; Winston et al., 2003).
Neuropsychological research often does not provide evidence for clear dissociations 
in emotion processing either. While fear may be the most severely disrupted emotion, 
patients with amygdala damage appear to be impaired in interpreting anger, disgust, 
and also sadness and surprise to some extent (Adolphs et al., 1994; Adolphs et al., 
1995; Anderson & Phelps, 1998; Broks et al., 1998; Calder, Young, Rowland et al., 
1996; Rapcsak et al., 2000).
Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease have their pathology rooted in basal ganglia 
dysfunction, which seems to be related to deficits in disgust processing (Gray et al., 
1997; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Sprengelmeyer et al., 2003; Sprengelmeyer, Young, 
Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997); however, most negative emotions are interpreted with 
difficulty by this population (Milders et al., 2003; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996). There 
is also evidence for a marked impairment in fear processing in Parkinson’s sufferers 
(Sprengelmeyer et al., 2003). Please refer to Section 1.5.3 for more information.
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Furthermore, Kan and collaborators (2002) revealed that Parkinson’s disease patients 
were significantly worse than healthy participants in their perception of fear and 
disgust facial expressions, but deficits did not extend to prosodic or written stimuli. 
This dissociation indicates that the neural substrates implicated in emotion processing 
may not be the same for a specific emotion expressed in different channels.
The clearest case for modularity is the anterior insula cortex involvement in 
processing of disgust (Adolphs et al., 2003; Calder, Keane, Manes et al., 2000). The 
basal ganglia and insula cortex are more involved in processing of facial disgust 
(Phillips, Young et al., 1998; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998), but the basal ganglia also 
respond to the presentations of happy-related stimuli (Phan et al., 2002). Moreover, 
not all studies find insula activity to facial disgust (Heining, 2003), and some studies 
find anterior insula activity evoked by emotions other than disgust (Morris, Scott et 
al., 1999). So perhaps the strongest claim for emotion selectivity which can be made 
is that the insula cortex is disproportionately but not exclusively involved in the 
processing of disgust.
It seems that the primary criteria for a particular brain region to be a modular system, 
processing exclusively one emotion, are not clearly met in the literature. On the basis 
of established literature, it is plausible that particular neural regions may be 
disproportionately involved in the processing of specific emotions. With respect to 
ageing particularly, however, one cannot conclude that there is deterioration of 
emotion specific modules of processing. Ageing impacts particular brain systems -  
but it has diffuse effects; so ageing is perhaps not the ideal basis for revealing multi­
modal selective disturbance in emotion recognition.
An alternative neuropsychological explanation of the current results concerns the fact 
that the facial tasks, used in this and the great majority of other studies, are 
behaviourally dissociable from gestural and vocal tasks, since they involved static 
representations of emotion. Both gesture and vocal tasks can be considered dynamic, 
and subsequently, it is plausible that the neural mechanisms involved in the 
processing of dynamic information deteriorate faster with age.
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Given the association between temporal and frontal regions with ageing, it is of 
interest that the right temporal lobe and the prefrontal cortex have been implicated in 
prosody perception (Mitchell, Elliott, Barry, Cmttenden, & Woodruff, 2003; 
Wildgruber, Pihan, Ackermann, Erb, & Grodd, 2002). Furthermore, human 
neuroimaging experiments have demonstrated activation of regions within the 
superior temporal sulcus in response to hearing human vocal information (Belin et aL, 
2004; Belin et aL, 2000; Gervais et aL, 2004), seeing speech (Calvert & Campbell, 
2003), viewing body movements (Allison et aL, 2000; Bonda et aL, 1996; Grossman 
et aL, 2000; Howard et aL, 1996; Puce & Perrett, 2003), and perhaps even to actions 
and intentions infened from stories (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). The superior 
temporal sulcus has strong connections with the amygdala (Aggleton, Burton, & 
Passingham, 1980). Since structures of the temporal lobe have been implicated in the 
neuropathology of ageing, this region may be a candidate where degeneration disrupts 
processing of dynamic signals, and hence, degeneration disrupts recognition of 
gestural and vocal emotion.
This proposal may go some way towards explaining the current findings, but it is 
unclear why other studies have produced facial emotion perception results that are 
inconsistent with the present study.
8.4.6 Alternative explanations
Patients suffering from dysphasia and anomia suffer a drastic decay in the 
comprehension and generation of more unusual semantic categories, but regular and 
well-practised abilities were relatively preserved (Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & 
Funnell, 1992). A ‘first-in, last-out’ principle was proposed as a consequence of such 
research. Thus, for emotion processing, it is plausible that the easier the emotion is to 
perceive from a particular channel, the more likely perception from this channel will 
be maintained with age. Since the perception of cues from channels in which an 
emotion is least well expressed may not occur very often, comprehension may decline 
with disuse. Disuse, along with disease, are chief reasons for neurological 
deterioration associated with ageing (Zee, 1995).
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Some emotions may be better recognised from one channel as opposed to another, 
perhaps due to the way signalling systems have evolved for conveying those 
emotions. This might not always be through facial expressions, which work only in 
close proximity. Observers tend to be more receptive and attuned to information 
presented by the particular channel that is most relevant for communication of that 
emotion (Gibson, 1979). For instance, disgust may be better conveyed by the face 
than by body movements or voices, since, as reported earlier, disgust is believed to 
have evolved as a warning to prevent ingestion potentially noxious substances (Rozin 
et al., 2000) and oral cues should be best communicated via the face. See Chapter 10 
for more information.
8.4.7 Conclusions
In summary, there is no clearly defined pattern of emotion perception decline in older 
adults. In comparison with a younger group, older people were less accurate in 
recognising emotions from gestural cues (which involve body movements). This 
deterioration is worse for disgust and happiness; however, recognition for the younger 
participants was worst for these emotions too. The older group tend to be less accurate 
in perceiving vocal emotions. The present study has demonstrated that there is, at 
least, one population group in which facial emotion recognition abilities are not 
impacted by age. It is possible that ageing effects on emotion perception reflect 
cognitive loss of those recognition skills that are less defined in early adulthood. 
Alternatively, it is posited that each emotion may be communicated most easily 
through one or two particular channels, faces for proximate communication and 
gestures and voices for distal communication. This may determine which emotional 
expressions are least affected by any decline in ageing.
The lack of consistency in the present results provides an argument against the 
concept of neural specificity for emotion processing. Since no age-related deficits for 
particular emotions were revealed that extend across communication channels, this 
might indicate that distinct neural mechanisms for emotion processing do not exist or
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are not affected by ageing. The results raise questions concerning the methods used to 
explore dissociable emotion perception mechanisms and their interpretation.
Substantial replication will enable discussion of such findings in the context of the 
differential effects of ageing. Extensive research will need to explore these ideas 
further. In the meantime, it is suggested that researchers explore performance on 
several emotional tasks rather than restricting conclusions to one modality only.
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9 EMOTION RECOGNITION IN PARKINSON’S DISEASE
Existing research concerning the influence o f  Parkinson^s disease on emotion 
recognition abilities is inconsistent. This study will examine whether neural 
systems affected by Parkinson^s disease can be associated with changes in the 
recognition o f  emotions. In turn, the research will also investigate whether the 
processing o f  the same emotions portrayed in multiple communication channels is 
impaired. Moreover, since the primary symptom o f  deficit in Parkinson *s disease is 
motor control, a proposed relationship between expression and recognition in 
emotional communication suggests that Parkinson^s disease might 
disproportionately affect recognition o f  dynamic signals o f  emotions.
9.1 Parkinson’s disease: a background
9.1.1 Introduction to Parkinson’s disease
Parkinson’s disease or paralysis agitans is a progressive neurodegenerative motor 
control disorder (Hoehn & Yahr, 1967; Pearce, 1995), which affects around 120 000 
people in the United Kingdom. More men are diagnosed than women. Its onset is 
commonly late-middle age, typically sixty years or more. The most prominent of the 
disease’s physical symptoms is manifest initially as a pronounced tremor affecting 
the extremities: usually the hands, feet, chin, or lips. Stiffhess and slowness of 
movement, characterised in a shuffling walk and stooped posture, also develop. 
Consequently, patients have difficulty initiating and executing movements or turning. 
Voluntary movement is slow and has reduced amplitude. This slowed movement that 
is known as bradykinesia. Fine movements become problematic. This is resultant in 
a diminished number of spontaneous movements (hypokinesia). Bradykinesia is 
independent of rigidity. Rigidity is apparent when muscle tone increases: limbs are
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resistant to passive movements. This can start in the neck and shoulders, and is more 
prominent there than the arms and legs. Abnormal posture or gait is adopted due to 
the rigidity. Balance can be difficult. Of more relevance to the present study, blank 
facial expressions and a soft, hoarse voice with a lack of inflection are also some of 
the early symptoms. For more information regarding physical symptoms and their 
onset, please refer to Hoehn and Yahr (1967).
Parkinson’s disease is also associated with psychiatric problems. Depression can 
occur at any stage of the disease, it may even precede the motor symptoms. 
Depression affects one third to half of all Parkinson’s sufferers (McDonald et al., 
2003; Pearce, 1995; Rojo et al., 2003). Depression has been associated with 
neuroanatomical degeneration rather than a reaction to psychosocial stress and 
disability, which is often a cause of depression. As with other debilitating disorders, 
Parkinson’s disease takes its toll on confidence and can result in a form of social 
phobia or anxiety disorder (Heinrichs, Hoffman, & Hofmann, 2001; Marsh, 2000; 
Richard, Schiffer, & Kurlan, 1996). Psychosis can also occur with Parkinson’s 
disease. Roughly 30% of Parkinson’s patients eventually develop dementia (Mohr, 
Mendis, & Grimes, 1995). This is most likely to occur in older Parkinson’s disease 
patients (Hughes et al., 2000).
Milder cognitive deficits than those observed in dementia are sometimes present in 
Parkinson’s disease, often much later in life, when such conditions are generally more 
rife in a typical population too. Memory is usually affected in older Parkinson’s 
individuals (Litvan, 1999). Executive dysfunction, reasoning, problem-solving and 
visuo-spatial impairments are regularly recorded (Mohr et al., 1995). Selective 
attention and strategy are likely to be affected. Cognitive deficits associated with both 
Parkinson’s disease and normal ageing, however, seem to be modulated by dopamine 
levels in the brain (Kaasinen & Rinne, 2002).
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9.1.2 Pathological features
Parkinson’s disease is associated with basal ganglia dysfunction. Early pathology is 
characterised by progressive degeneration of cell bodies and loss of pigmented 
dopaminergic neurons, which project to the striatal complex (putamen and caudate 
nucleus) from the substantia nigra in the midbrain (Greenfield, Adams, & Duchen, 
1992). This region is known as the nigrostriatal tract. A deficiency in dopamine in 
the striatum, especially of the putamen follows. When around 60% of nigral neurons 
are lost and there is roughly an 80% depletion of striatal dopamine, the motor 
symptoms of Parkinson’s disease symptoms begin to emerge. Dopamine loss is also 
recorded in the global pallidus and the hypothalamus, although these are not 
considered to be the cause of the main Parkinson’s disease symptoms. It should be 
noted, however, that dopamine levels in the brain, particularly in the basal ganglia, do 
decline with normal ageing (Carlsson & Winblad, 1976). For more information 
regarding the neurophysiological changes observed in Parkinson’s disease and the 
functional architecture of basal ganglia circuits, please refer to Valls-Solé and 
Valldeoriola (2002), Kaasinen and Rinne (2002), Alexander and Crutcher (1990), and 
Parent and Hazrati (1995). Dysfunction and deterioration of the amygdala complex 
(Harding, Stimson, Henderson, & Halliday, 2002; Mattila, Rinne, Helenius, & Roytta, 
1999; Ouchi et al., 1999) and the orbitofrontal cortex (Freedman, 1990; Ouchi et al.,
1999) have also been associated with Parkinson’s disease.
9.2 Introduction to the study
9.2.1 Emotion processing in Parkinson’s disease
The orbitofrontal cortex (Blair et al., 1999; Homak et al., 1996), amygdala, and basal 
ganglia have been associated with emotion processing, particularly from facial 
expressions (see Section 1.5.2). The dopaminergic system has also been implicated in 
anger perception (Lawrence, Calder, McGowan, & Grasby, 2002). Atypical emotion
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processing might accompany Parkinson’s, since this illness has an impact on these 
neural regions. Scott and colleagues (1984) reported that Parkinson’s patients, in 
comparison to control participants, had considerable difficulties matching emotional 
prosodic phrases to emotional faces depicted in cartoons -  whether this reflected a 
problem in vocal emotion perception or facial emotion perception was unclear. The 
present study seeks to relate disturbed emotion perception abilities to dysfunction 
associated with Parkinson’s disease.
9.2.1a Facial expressions o f  emotion
A reduced ability to express posed and spontaneous facial emotion is observed in 
Parkinson’s disease (Borod et al., 1990; Gelb, Oliver, & Gilman, 1999; Jacobs et al., 
1995; Katsikitis & Pilowsky, 1991; Madeley, Ellis, & Mindham, 1995; Simons, 
Ellgring, & Pasqualini, 2003; Smith, Smith, & Ellgring, 1996). This difficulty 
(known as hypomimia) is one of the diagnostic criteria outlined by the Hoehn and 
Yahr scale (1967), and may be based on Parkinson’s disease patients’ movement 
difficulties, or alternatively, it may reflect a more general emotional impairment.
9.2.1b Facial emotion recognition
Dewick and colleagues (1991) reported that emotional memory for familiar and 
unfamiliar faces is affected by Parkinson’s disease, but not facial emotion perception. 
Furthermore, Madeley and colleagues (1995), despite reporting a deficit in expressing 
facial emotion, did not find that Parkinson’s disease patients were impaired in 
comprehending facial expressions of others. In accordance, Adolphs and colleagues 
(1998) also reported that Parkinson’s disease patients did not demonstrate a deficit in 
emotion perception. Adolphs and colleagues’ study can be criticised for the fact that 
medication and illness duration were not controlled. Medication may alleviate 
difficulties in emotion processing.
In contrast. Blonder and colleagues (1989) and Jacobs and collaborators (1995) have 
reported that people suffering from Parkinson’s disease have general deficits 
recognising facial expressions of emotion, in comparison to healthy control
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participants. Dujardin and co-workers (2004) also obseiwed a general deficit for 
rating the intensity of emotions depicted in facial expressions.
Some studies have identified specific emotions which are particularly difficult for 
Parkinson’s disease patients to interpret from facial cues. Kan and colleagues (2002) 
observed that Parkinson’s disease was associated with a significant impairment in 
recognising facial fear and disgust.
Sprengelmeyer and colleagues (2003) also found that unmedicated Parkinson’s 
patients had particular difficulties in recognising facial disgust, and to a lesser degree 
facial expressions of anger, in comparison to control participants and medicated 
Parkinson’s patients. Consequently, Sprengelmeyer and his collaborators argued that 
brain regions, such as the ‘limbic loop’ structures, which are modulated by 
dopaminergic neurons, are involved in the processing of disgust. They also noted that 
Parkinson’s patients, whether medicated or not, showed a significant deficit in 
recognising fear from faces, in contrast with control participants. This may reflect an 
exacerbation of task difficulty in the patients, such that normal participants also found 
fear problematic to interpret from facial stimuli. This research concurs with Kan and 
colleagues’ aforementioned study.
9.2.1c Vocal emotion expression and recognition
Prosody refers to features of speech such as emphasis or stress on particular syllables, 
differences in tempo or timing, and changes in pitch and intonation. Emotional 
dysprosody pertains to the inability to use these prosodic inflections or variations to 
convey emotion in speech. This is another clinical feature of Parkinson’s disease 
(Caekebeke, Jennekensschinkel, Vanderlinden, Buruma, & Roos, 1991; Darkins, 
Fromkin, & Benson, 1988; Hoehn & Yahr, 1967; Pell & Leonard, 2003; Scott & 
Caird, 1983). Emotional dysprosody, in the case of Parkinson’s, could be attributable 
to a motor deficit, independent of the patients’ mental or affective status (Critchley, 
1981), such as an akinesia-induced mechanical impairment of the vocal folds. 
Alternatively, as with facial expression difficulties, it could also represent a wider 
dysfunction of the neural substrates for emotion.
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Some studies report a reduced ability to recognise vocal emotions by Parkinson’s 
disease patients (Lloyd, 1999; Pell, 1996), which may be concurrent with a difficulty 
in expressing them (Blonder et al., 1989). This deficit in perception is independent of 
any acoustic processing problem (Breitenstein, Van Lancker, Daum, & Waters, 2001). 
A dissociation might exist between production and recognition of vocal emotion in 
Parkinson’s disease, in which production is affected but not recognition (Benke, 
Bosch, & Andree, 1998; Caekebeke et al., 1991; Darkins et al., 1988).
Subcortical brain structures implicated in Parkinson’s disease have been linked to 
prosodic expression and recognition deficits. For example, neuropsychological 
studies have revealed that the cingulate gyrus, which receives dopaminergic 
projections from the substantia nigra, may be involved in understanding prosody 
(Jurgens & Muller-Preuss, 1977; Jurgens & Von Cramon, 1982). The thalamus has 
been associated with the integration of expression and recognition of vocal 
information (Bell, 1968; Damasio, Damasio, Rizzo, Varney, & Gersh, 1982; Quaglieri 
& Celesia, 1977). Effective vocal expression has been linked to recruitment of the 
basal ganglia and anterior insula (Cancelliere & Kertesz, 1990; Starkstein, Federoff, 
Price, Leiguarda, & Robinson, 1994); by contrast, the premotor cortex is activated 
when Parkinson’s disease patients express themselves vocally (Liotti et al., 2003).
To summarise, dysprosody observed in Parkinson’s disease appears to encompass 
expressive, and potentially, receptive components of emotional processing. These 
difficulties have been associated with dysfunction of the basal ganglia, insula, and 
thalamus.
9.2. Id  A multi-component approach
A  few studies have examined emotion processing in Parkinson’s disease from a 
number of communication channels. Kan and colleagues (2002) observed that 
Parkinson’s sufferers exhibited impairments in recognising facial disgust and fear, but 
not in recognising emotion from vocal or written cues. This led the authors to 
conclude that the basal ganglia are important for processing visually presented 
emotions only. Moreover, Borod and collaborators (1990) compared and contrasted a 
number of clinical populations in their expression and recognition of emotion through
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facial and vocal channels. Facial and vocal expression abilities were impaired in 
Parkinson’s patients, in comparison to normal, control participants. The Parkinson’s 
group also showed a deficit in vocal emotion recognition. Facial expression 
recognition was within the normal range, however. This is contrary to research cited 
earlier.
Yip and co-workers (2003) reported that patients with bilateral Parkinson’s disease 
showed a general deficit in recognition and discrimination accuracy for both facial 
and vocal stimuli, in comparison to healthy individuals and patients suffering from 
right-sided Parkinson’s disease. Overall, fear processing was most impaired. The 
patients with unilateral Parkinson’s disease had impairments on both recognition 
tasks, and this was worst for disgust and sadness. The study did not explore each 
emotion in the different expression channels separately, so it is unclear whether the 
deficits are present for fear, disgust, and sadness recognition in both facial and vocal 
channels.
Research exploring emotional communication in Parkinson’s disease lacks 
consistency. The impact of Parkinson’s disease on emotional communication abilities 
therefore remains unresolved. Deficits may be confined to speech production, facial 
expression production, production of emotion in general; or they may be part of a 
more general impairment in emotion processing, encompassing emotion recognition 
abilities. Methodological issues could be the foundation for these discrepancies. 
Thus, this chapter seeks to resolve the conflict, and to establish whether a pattern of 
impairments, specific or general, does exist, using a comprehensive set of tests that 
involve emotional communication by faces, voices, and gestures.
9.2.2 Restricted biological motion and its perception
Perception and production of biological movement may share a common 
representational network and could explain receptive and expressive deficits in 
Parkinson’s disease. MiiTor neurons are activated when a participant executes an 
action, and during observation of that same action being performed by someone else
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(Rizzolatti et al., 2001). It has been proposed that a network of miiTor neurons, 
involving somatosensory cortices, may play a role in perceiving or inferring the 
mental states of others by mapping their expressions onto a mental representation of 
our own expressions (Adolphs et al., 2000; Heberlein et al., in press; Kohler et al.,
2002). This would aid recognition and interpretation of others’ intentions and 
feelings. See Section 1.5.4 for more information.
Being touched and seeing someone else being touched activate the somatosensory 
cortices (Keysers et al, 2004). Furthermore, seeing someone experience disgust and 
being exposed to a disgusting smell both activate the anterior insula (Wicker et a l,
2003). The anterior insula contains visceral somatosensory cortex and is heavily 
interconnected with the basal ganglia. These studies provide support for the role of 
mirror neurons in empathy and the perception of social states of others. Right 
somatosensory cortex is crucial for the processing of facial emotion, as shown from 
lesion analysis research (Adolphs et a l, 2000) and research using Positron Emission 
Tomography (Kilts, Egan, Gideon, Faber, & Hoffrnan, 1996). These researchers 
propose that recognising static facial emotion requires implicit imagery of the motor 
patterns of each facial expression, in order to match a static percept with these motor 
images.
In support of this premise, imagining actions, as well as executing and observing 
them, also activates mirror neurons in the premotor cortex (Decety & Chaminade, 
2003; Deiber et a l, 1998; Lotze et a l, 1999). Jeamierod (1994; 1995) and Decety 
(1996) suggest motor imagery involves conscious motor representations, which 
involve the same preparatory processes as actual movements; yet execution of such 
movements is suppressed. Consequently, execution and perception of actions may 
rely on intact mental imagery. Parkinson’s sufferers, while having problems in motor 
control, also have abnormal patterns of neural activation during generation of motor 
imagery (Filippi et a l, 2001; Thobois et a l, 2000). Moreover, activation is abnormal 
when Parkinson’s sufferers imagine and perform movements (Thobois et al, 2002). 
The translation of motor representations into motor actions is impaired in this 
population too (Yâgüez, Canavan, Lange, & Homberg, 1999). Performance on facial 
imagery tasks are impaired in Parkinson’s disease: patients are less accurate than 
control participants in imagining a target facial expression and answering questions
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about it (Jacobs et al., 1995). Possibly, Parkinson’s disease patients might have 
difficulty in recognising expressions because of problems associated with motor 
imagery and motor control.
Restrictions to body movement and postures in healthy individuals do not seem to 
influence action simulation for others (Fischer, 2003, in press). Sufferers from 
Mobius Syndrome, a congenital disorder that results in facial paralysis, can easily 
recognise facial expressions of emotion in others, despite their restricted ability to 
produce these expressions themselves (Calder, Keane, Cole, Campbell, & Young,
2000). The conditions leading to movement restriction in this disorder may involve 
peripheral motor neuron or nerve damage, rather than central control of movement 
production, unlike Parkinson’s disease. Thus, neural circuits for perception and 
production of biological motion maybe impaired in Parkinson’s disease.
9.2.3 Current study
A set of emotion perception tests was selected to explore emotion recognition in 
Parkinson’s disease. These tests include a static facial expression recognition task, a 
verbal vocal expression recognition task, and a full-light dynamic gesture expression 
recognition task.
9.3 Phase 1 method 
Ethical approval
This study was approved by the Lothian Research Ethics Committee, the Wellcome 
Tmst Clinical Research Facility, the Research and Development Management Tmst 
for Lothian, and also by the University of St Andrews, School of Psychology Ethics 
Committee.
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Facilities
Testing with patients took place in a consultation room within the Wellcome Trust 
Clinical Research Facility, Western General Hospital, Edinburgh. The Facility is 
designed for research purposes. Similar facilities were arranged for control 
participants at the University of St Andrews, or in their homes.
9.3.1 Participants
9,3.1a Parkinson ’ s  disease participants
Eight people (three male, five female), with a diagnosis of idiopathic Parkinson’s 
disease made by a neurologist, gave their informed consent to participate in the study. 
Participants were contacted initially by their consultant neurologist (please see 
Appendix 5).
All participants had been diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease between 1 and 5 years 
ago. Mean symptom severity was equivalent to Hoehn-Yahr 2, ranging fiom 1-3 
(Hoehn & Yahr, 1967). Severity of symptoms, as well as demographic information, 
background neuropsychological information, and medication details are given in 
Tables I and II in Appendix 6. None of the patients had dementia as determined by a 
neurologist’s assessment. None of the patients were currently suffering from any 
diagnosed clinical mood disorder. One patient, despite being classed as suffering 
moderate depression, according to her score on the Beck Depression Inventory, was 
not subsequently diagnosed with depression. The mean age of the participants was 
56.38 (s.d. 6.39). Mean Full-Scale IQ was 118.13 (s.d. 5.84), as calculated using the 
NART^ (Nelson & Willison, 1991).
Medication: Seven of the patients were receiving dopamine agonist medication.
Three of these patients were also receiving a levodopa/carbidopa combination. One 
patient was not taking any prescribed drugs. See Table II in Appendix 6.
NART is shown in Appendix 1
157
9,3.1b Control participants
The control group consisted of sixteen normal, healthy adults (six males, ten females) 
with no history of neurological or psychiatric illness. Control participants and 
Parkinson’s disease patients were matched (two control participants per patient) on 
age (control group, 57.38 ± 6.06; Parkinson’s disease group, 56.38 ± 6.39 years), 
years of education (control group, 15.25 ± 2.82; Parkinson’s disease group, 13.88 ± 
3.60), and IQ (control group, 118.31 ± 4.99; Parkinson’s disease group, 118.13 ± 
5.84). A between-subjects ANOVA revealed that there were no significant 
differences in these scores: age, F(i,23) = 0.140,/?=0.712; years of education, F(i,23) = 
1.057,^=0.315; IQ, F’(i,23) = 0.037,/?=0.849. All participants gave informed consent 
to participate in these research studies.
9.3.2 Background tasks
Tests were employed to examine the participants’ emotional experience of fear and 
disgust, in order to investigate whether this is within the normal range. An emotion 
definition test was also employed to ensure the participants had a basic concept of the 
meaning of each emotion
9.3.2 a Stimuli
Wolpe and Lang’s (1964) fear schedule and Haidt and colleagues’ (1994) disgust 
questionnaire were administered. Since Parkinson’s disease is often associated with 
depression, and negative moods have been associated with difficulties in perceiving 
disgust (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5), the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck & Steer, 
1987) was given to the Parkinson’s disease patients. Please see Appendix 1 for full 
versions of each of these questionnaires.
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9.3.2b Procedure
After the experimental tasks, participants were given the disgust questionnaire first, 
followed by the fear questionnaire, and the depression questionnaire. Participants 
could take as long as they wished to complete these questionnaires.
9.3.3 Experimental tasks
Due to time constraints, the likelihood of holding patients’ attention, and respecting 
their co-operation, only one test from each of the facial, gestural, and vocal categories 
was implemented to assess emotion perception. The full-light gesture task was 
administered, followed by the verbal vocal task. The Ekman 60 faces task was then 
employed. See Section 2.2 for more details. The full-light gesture task was chosen, 
since Grèzes and Decety (2001) reported that point-light stimuli did not seem to elicit 
personal mental representations of observed actions.
Participants were given the NART when they had completed half of the vocal task 
trials. This was decided on the basis of prior testing with these stimuli (Chapter 8), 
when it had been noted that the vocal task was quite frustrating and difficult for 
participants and they welcomed a break.
9.3.4 Analysis
For all experimental tasks, a mixed-design ANOVA was carried out, with 
Greenhouse-Geisser con ections where necessary. The between-subj ects factor was 
group (control, Parkinson’s disease), and the within-subjects factor was recognition 
accuracy for each emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise, 
where included). Significant interactions or near significant interactions or group 
differences were followed by independent t-tests (with equal variances assumed, 
where required). See Section 2.3 for more details.
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9.4 Results
one of the eight Parkinson’s disease patients showed severe signs of depression 
according to the Beck Depression Inventory (4 normal <4, 4 mild-moderate <17). All 
scores were within the normal to moderate range (0-20/63). There were no significant 
differences between the control and Parkinson’s disease groups on scores for the fear 
questionnaire, /(22) = 0.64, /?=0.528, or the disgust questionnaire, ^(22) = -0.93, 
p=0.363.
9.4.1 Experimental tasks
9.4.1a Gesture task
The recognition accuracy rates are summarised in Figure 9.1.
Parkinson's Phase 1: full-light gestures Ü P D  group 
□ C ontro l group
IIco
c
8
S.
100%
75% -
50%
25%
0%
anger disgust fear
Emotion
happiness sad n ess
Figure 9.1: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  full-light emotional gestures by the Parkinson’s patients 
and by the control group.
The results revealed a significant main effect of emotion, ^(4,88) = 5.66, jp<0.001. 
There was no significant difference between the two groups, F(i,22) = 0.03, /?=0.878. 
No significant interaction between emotion and group can be reported, F(4,8b) = 0.63, 
/?=0.640.
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9,4,1b Voice task
The results from the voice task are summarised in Figure 9.2.
Parkinson's Phase 1 : verbal vo ices Ü P D  group 
□ C ontro l group
100% 1
s
3  7 5 % -
%
g  50% -
c
g  25% - 
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0%  '
disgust fear happiness sa d n e ssanger
Emotion
Figure 9.2: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  the verbal voices by the P arkinson’s patients and the 
control group.
There was a significant effect of emotion, F(4,8g) = 6.67,/><0.001. The Parkinson’s 
patients were significantly less accurate on this task than the control group, F{\p2 ) = 
5.89,/?<0.05. There was no emotion by group interaction, F(4,88) = 0.24,/?=0.914.
9.4,1c Face Task
The mean recognition rates for the emotional faces are shown in Figure 9.3.
Parkinson's Phase 1: Ekman 60 faces g  PD group 
O Control group100%  -
rh+175%
50%
25% -
0%
d isgust fe a r happiness sa d n e s s  surp riseanger
Emotion
Figure 9.3: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  the Ekman 60 fa ces by the P arkinson’s patients and the 
control group.
* / 7<0.05
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There was a significant effect for emotion, F(5,uo)= 18.02, p<0.001. There was also 
an effect of group, F(i,22) = 11.89, j9<0.01. This was further qualified by a significant 
interaction between emotion and group, F(5,no) = 4.26, /><0.005. The patients were 
significantly worse than the control participants in interpreting facial fear, r(9.64) = - 
2.87,_p<0.05, and disgust, t(22) = -3.43,/?<0.05. For all other emotions,/>>0.15.
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show the pattern of responses made by the Parkinson’s group and 
the control group in the facial emotion task. By examining labelling use and false 
positives, it is possible that further understanding of the deficits described above may 
be achieved.
Table 9.1: The pattern o f  responses to fa c ia l expi’essions o f  emotion, made by the P arkinson‘s group
A ll numbers are mean percentages
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness Surprise
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived by theParkinson’sdiseasegroup
Anger 82.5 21.3 11.3 0.0 3.8 0.0 118.8 36.3
Disgust 10.0 76.3 8.8 0.0 8.8 1.2 105.0 28.7
Fear 2.5 2.5 45.0 0.0 8.8 11.3 70.0 25.0
Happiness 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.5 1.3 1.3 100.0 2.5
S adn ess 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 72.5 1.2 78.7 6.2
Surprise 5.0 0.0 30.0 2.5 5.0 85.0 127.5 42.5
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0incorrect labels (misses) 17.5 23.7 55.0 2.5 27.5 15.0
Table 9.2: The pattern o f  responses to fa c ia l expressions o f  emotion, made by the control group
A ll numbers are mean percentages
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness Surprise
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived 
by the 
control 
group
Anger 79.7 6.8 4.7 0.0 1.2 0.3 92.6 12.9
Disgust 10.6 90.6 5.0 0.0 10.3 0.9 117.3 26.7
Fear 4.1 1.5 70.6 0.3 4.7 9.4 90.6 20.0
Happiness 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.4 0.3 1.5 101.2 1.8
Sadn ess 2.9 1.2 1.5 0.0 80.3 0.0 85.9 5.6
Surprise 2.6 0.0 18.2 0.3 3.2 87.8 112.2 24.4
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Incorrect labels (misses) 20.3 9.4 29.4 0.6 19.7 12.2
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In order to compare false positive use, a mixed-design ANOVA was used. Group 
(Parkinson’s or control) was the between-subj ects factor, and number of times each 
emotional label was used incorrectly (false positives) was the within-subjects factor 
(anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise). To compare the responses for 
each emotion, a mixed-design ANOVA was administered. The between-subj ects 
factor was group and the within-subjects factor was emotion (the percentage of 
incorrect responses for each non-target emotional label, or miss, when target stimuli 
were presented). For instance, to explore the responses made to sad faces, the number 
of times each group responded with the labels of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and 
surprise when sad faces were represented would be compared. Independent-samples 
t-tests, with equal variances assumed where appropriate, followed significant 
interactions.
For false positive analysis, there was an effect of emotion, F(2.?8, ei.io) = 14.49, 
/?<0.001, and group, F(i,22) = 12.23, /?<0.005. This was qualified by a significant 
emotion by group interaction, F(2.?8, 61.10) = 2.68, p<0.05. Overall, the Parkinson’s 
group used ‘surprise’ to describe more facial stimuli than the control group, 7(22) = 
12.23, /><0.005. The Parkinson’s patients also used ‘anger’ more often to label the 
facial stimuli, 7(8.25) = 3.69,/><0.01. There were no significant differences between 
the two groups in their false positives for any other emotion,/?>0.19.
For the labelling of disgusted faces, there was a main effect of emotion, F(4,gg) = 
33.69, j9<0.001, a main effect of group, F(%,22) = 11.78, j9<0.005, and a significant 
group by emotion interaction, F(4,8g) = 9.11, /?<0.005. Post-hoc tests revealed that the 
Parkinson’s patients described the disgusted faces as ‘angry’ more often than control 
participants, 7(9.47) = 2.77, j9<0.05. There were no other differences in labelling of 
disgusted faces between the groups; for all other emotions/?>0.3.
The two groups also differed in their erroneous labelling of fearful faces. There was a 
main effect of emotion, F ( 2 . o 9 , 4 5 .9 9 )  = 19.93, /?<0.001. A significant group effect was 
also revealed, F(i,22) = 11.49, /?<0.005. The emotion by group interaction was not 
significant, F ( 2 . o 9 , 4 5 .9 9 )  = 1.61, jc>=0.211. Post-hoc tests explored the group difference, 
since fear is one of the key emotions of interest following differences in recognition 
accuracy scores. Generally, the Parkinson’s patients had a greater tendency to
163
describe the fearful faces as ‘surprised’, 7(22) = 1.84, p=0.01. There were no other 
differences in the labelling of fearful faces; for all other emotions /?>0.09.
For anger, happiness, sadness, and surprise, the two groups did not differ significantly 
on types of misses, (all p>Q.\6) and no significant interactions between the groups 
and emotion were demonstrated (all /?>0.088).
9.5 Discussion
The results fail to support the idea of a central impairment in the perception of a 
specific emotion. Parkinson’s patients tested in this experiment have an apparent 
impairment in recognising vocal and facial expressions of emotion in comparison to 
healthy control participants. Parkinson’s disease seems to affect most specifically the 
recognition of facial fear and disgust.
The results reveal a dissociation within the visual modality between processing of 
gestural and facial expressions emotion, since Parkinson’s disease patients exhibit 
significantly lower accuracy levels in comparison to healthy participants only for the 
face task. There are several issues raised by this. First, it is possible to question 
whether neural pathways involved in the processing of such visual stimuli are linked. 
These current results suggest that there is not a general neural mechanism that 
processes emotions across modalities, or one that processes purely visual emotion 
material. The tasks are behaviourally dissociable however, so it is possible that the 
processing of dynamic visual stimuli is unimpaired by Parkinson’s, but processing of 
static visual stimuli is compromised. The present study does not, therefore, provide 
support for the neuropsychological stance that partially independent pathways process 
each emotion, regardless of the communication channel in which it is presented. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the brain regions involved in the processing of only 
facial fear and disgust are disturbed in Parkinson’s disease.
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On the other hand, since facial displays of fear are also poorly recognised in the 
normal population in relation to other emotions, the observed deficits in Parkinson’s 
disease may reflect an exacerbation of difficulty observed in the normal population. 
That is, damage to particular brain regions in Parkinson’s disease might intensify the 
effects of difficulty already apparent in healthy individuals. This idea is bolstered by 
the studies of Rapcsak and co-workers (2000) and Milders and colleagues (2003), 
Both of these studies report that the recognition of fear is difficult in control 
participants and this is intensified in clinical participants. See Section 1.5.3b for more 
information. Such an argument might not, however, explain the deficit for perceiving 
facial disgust that is exhibited in Parkinson’s, since sadness recognition is 
characterised by lower accuracy levels than disgust in the control population.
The difficulties recognising facial fear might also be rooted in surprise perception, 
given that the facial expression test was the only task to include the expression of 
surprise. Surprise is regularly confused with fear, whereas, the reverse confusion is 
much less frequent (Calder et al., 2003; Rapcsak et al., 2000). For the present data 
set, Parkinson’s patients showed a significantly greater use of surprise as a false 
positive than the control group. The analysis of misses demonstrates that while 
confusing fear for surprise is common in healthy participants, this confusion tended to 
be elevated in Parkinson’s disease patients. As with established literature, the reverse 
confusion is rarely made. As recognition accuracy for fear decreases, the confusion 
between surprise and fear increases. Perhaps some sort of sensitivity increase in 
surprise perception occurs in Parkinson’s disease.
A disturbance in the perception of suiprise in Parkinson’s disease is supported by 
research carried out by Dujardin and colleagues (2004). Unmedicated Parkinson’s 
disease patients had to rate a series of facial expressions in terms of their emotional 
content. These faces were morphs of a neutral expression and the target emotion 
(anger, sadness, disgust) at either 30:70% or 70:30% proportions. For each face, 
participants had to indicate the intensity of component emotions (anger, disgust, fear, 
happiness, sadness, surprise, shame) contained in the face. The Parkinson’s patients 
were generally impaired in comparison to control participants. Most interestingly, 
Parkinson’s patients perceived more surprise within all emotional stimuli than the 
control group. This suggests that Parkinson’s disease patients are particularly
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sensitive to surprise or demonstrate a bias to respond with the surprise label. It is 
plausible therefore, that Parkinson’s disease disturbs surprise perception, but not 
necessarily fear perception. Consequently, the inclusion of surprise in the cunent 
facial task might have been instrumental in producing the differences between 
recognition of facial expressions and other emotion communication tasks.
As a result of the above speculation, in Phase 2 the Ekman 60 task was modified to 
exclude surprise, and therefore, include only 50 faces. This would also enable better 
comparison between the three emotion tasks, as all would contain the same five 
emotions. This new face test, along with the original gesture test and the original 
voices test, was then presented to another group of Parkinson’s patients in Phase 2. 
Once testing was underway, it became apparent that a within-subjects comparison was 
desirable. Seven of the Parkinson’s disease participants and fourteen of the control 
participants in Phase 2 were presented with both the Ekman 50 and the Ekman 60, and 
another facial task, with only the five emotions (excluding surprise). This was to 
allow an exploration of whether any changes in response patterns might be 
specifically attributed to the Ekman photos alone, or to the inclusion of surprise, or 
whether they are related to emotion perception as a whole. Should a fear deficit be 
manifest in Parkinson’s disease populations, the exclusion of surprise should have no 
bearing on perception difficulties with the emotion.
9.6 Phase 2 method
9.6.1 Participants
9.6.1a Parkinson’s disease participants
Twelve people (three female, nine male), with a diagnosis of idiopathic Parkinson’s 
disease, gave their infoimed consent to participate in the study. Recruitment followed 
the same means as Phase 1.
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All participants had been diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease between 1 and 5 years 
ago. Mean symptom severity was equivalent to Hoehn-Yahr 2, ranging from 1-2.5 
(Hoehn & Yahr, 1967). None of the patients had dementia as determined by a 
neurologist’s assessment. Severity of symptoms, as well as demographic information 
and background neuropsychological information are given in Table I in Appendix 6. 
The mean age of the participants was 63.1 years (s.d. 6.04). Mean Full-Scale IQ was 
115.17 (s.d. 8.17), as calculated using the NART.
None of the patients were currently suffering from any diagnosed clinical mood 
disorder, although one patient had suffered from a panic attack a few weeks prior to 
testing, which was related to anxiety as a result of her Parkinson’s symptoms. Ten of 
the Parkinson’s participants had low Beck Depression Inventory scores (Beck & 
Steer, 1987), experiencing normal variations in mood (score <10, out of a potential 
63). One patient was classed as having borderline clinical depression (score 17-20). 
This was still within the moderate mood disturbance category. He had not been 
diagnosed with clinical depression, however.
Phase 1 and Phase 2 participants differed in age, with the group examined in Phase 2 
being older, 7(18) = -2.38,/><0.05. Years of education, IQ, disease severity, gender, 
or depression scores were no different between the Parkinson’s groups,/»>0.1.
Two of the participants used hearing aids. Both sets of data have been removed from 
the vocal task, to prevent confounding the results.
Medication: Eight of the patients were receiving a dopamine agonist (see Table III, 
Appendix 6 for details). Three of the patients were receiving levodopa/carbidopa 
combination (two of which were also taking a form of dopamine agonist). Two 
patients were not taking any medication.
9.6.1b Control participants
This control group consisted of sixteen normal, healthy adults, 6 females and 10 
males, with no history of neurological or psychiatric illness. Control and Parkinson’s 
disease paificipants were matched on age (controls, 62.19 ± 6.15 years; Parkinson’s,
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63.08 ± 6.04 years), and education (controls, 15.88 ± 3.83 years; Parkinson’s, 13.17 ± 
4.65 years). Between-subj ects ANOVAs revealed that there were no significant 
differences in the scores for age and years of education (age, F(i,27) =0.15, /?=0.704; 
years of education, F(i,27) = 2.86, p=0.103), but the control participants achieved 
marginally higher Full-Scale IQ scores (controls, 119.88 ± 3.30; Parkinson’s, 115.17 
± 8.17), F(i,27) = 4.42,p<0.05. All participants gave informed consent to participate in 
this research study.
Control participants were within the normal range for their Beck Depression 
Inventory scores (mean 5.13, range 0-14). As a consequence, the two groups differed 
significantly in their depression scores, F(i,27) = 6.05, ^<0.05, but not for their 
depression classification, F(i,27) = 2.62,/?=0.117.
One male control participant did not complete the Ekman 60 faces task or the gestural 
task due to time constraints.
9.6.2 Tasks
The second phase of this study comprised of the same background and experimental 
tasks as the first phase. Two more face tasks were also presented. The Ekman 50 was 
identical to the Ekman 60, except it excluded surprise as a stimulus category and 
response choice (see Chapter 2 for more details). The other comprised ten younger 
actors, representing five emotions, and this task followed the same design and 
procedure as the Ekman 50. All tasks were computerised so that reaction times could 
be measured. The experimenter always pressed the buttons, in order to prevent 
movement difficulties influencing responses times. Ekman 50 was presented first, 
followed by the gesture task, vocal task, and then the alternative face task. The 
Ekman 60 task was given last, with the purpose of prolonging the time between the 
two Ekman face tasks. This design was to prevent order effects falsely boosting fear 
recognition rates in the Ekman 50 task.
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9.7 Results
Dopaminergic medication did not correlate with any emotion recognition measures.
9.7.1 Background questionnaires
Since these questionnaires were not altered between phases of this study, results for 
all Parkinson’s and all control participants were analysed together. Independent- 
samples t-tests revealed that the Parkinson’s group were more sensitive to fearful and 
uncomfortable situations than the control group, 7(50) = 2.03, /?<0.05. Interestingly, 
scores on the fear questionnaire correlate with scores on the Beck Depression Scale, R 
= 0.44, jr?<0.01. Overall, the two groups did not differ in their disgust sensitivity, 7(50) 
= -0.15,/7>0.8.
9.7.2 Ekman 60 faces task
Of the twelve Parkinson’s participants in Phase 2, only seven completed the Ekman 
60 (the within-subjects comparison condition for the face tasks). Their results are 
combined with participants from Phase 1"^ , and these are shown in Figure 9.4.
A main effect of emotion can be reported, F ( 3 .o 9 ,1 3 6 .0 1 )  = 25.60,/><0.001. There is also 
significant effect of group, F(i,44) = 18.39, /?<0.001. This is qualified by a significant 
interaction between emotion and group, F(3.o9, ne.oi) = 4.52, /><0.001. Post-hoc tests 
revealed that Parkinson’s patients had lower accuracy rates than control participants 
for fear, 7(44) = -3.90, j?<0.001, and also for disgust, 7(44) = -2.23, j9<0.01. For all 
other emotions, p>0.l6. These results follow the same pattern as Phase 1. As an 
aside, sensitivity levels for disgust on this task correlated with depression scores.^
NB. Parkinson’s N -15, Control N =31. j
 ^ All participants who completed the Beck Depression Inventory were combined, and analysis took i
place to explore the proposed relationship between disgust perception and dysphoria, as described in j
Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Correlations revealed that the more depressed participants were, the worse their j
recognition of disgust in the Ekman 60 task, R = -0.40, N = 30, p<0.Q5, and there was a trend for t
difficulty in perceiving disgust in the alternative faces task, R = -0.38, N = 30, p=0.07. No other i
emotions or tasks correlated with Beck Depression scores, p>0.12.
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Figure 9.4: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  emotion represented facia lly  in the Ekm an 60 task by 
P arkinson’s participants and the control group.
9.7.2a Ekman 60 faces Phase 2 participants only
The results from the Phase 2 participants^ only were also analysed. A significant 
effect of emotion was revealed in this task, F(2.93,58.53) = 16.31, /><0.001. No 
significant interaction between emotion and group can be reported, f (2.93,58.53) = 1.44, 
/?=0.241. There was an effect of group, F(i,20) = 6.251, j?<0.05. Post-hocs were 
carried out, since this task produced interesting results in Phase 1. The group 
difference is mainly due to a superiority by the control group to perceive fear 
accurately, ^(20) = -2.05, p=0.05. Accuracy rates for all other emotions were not 
significantly different for the two groups, /7>G.G86. While this phase did not produce 
such a significant difference between the Parkinson’s group and the control group as 
in Phase 1, this might be a consequence of order, as the participants completing 
Ekman 60 in Phase 2 had seen the Ekman fear faces in the Ekman 50 task earlier. The 
direction of the effects is the same for fear recognition: fear is less well recognised by 
the Parkinson’s group.
NB. Parkinson’s N==7, Control N=15.
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9.7.3 Gesture task
Since this task was not altered between Phase 1 and 2, all participants from each 
phase are grouped together for analysis^. The results are shown in Figure 9.5.
Parkinson's P hases 1 & 2: full-light gestu res
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Figure 9.5: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  emotion represented gesturally in the fu ll-ligh t dynamic 
task by P arkinson’s participants and the control group.
A main effect of emotion can be reported, F(4,i96) = 14.25, /7<0.001. There was no 
significant interaction between emotion and group, ^(4,196) = 0.63, 77=0.641. There 
were no differences between the control gi'oup and the Parkinson’s patients, F(i,49) = 
0.13,77=0.718.
9.7.4 Voice task
Participants from Phase 1 and 2 were combined for the analysis of the vocal task 
results^. These results are summarised in Figure 9.6.
 ^NB. Parkinson’s N=20, Control N=31.
 ^NB. Parkinson’s N=18, Control N=32.
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Parkinson's Phases 1 & 2: verbal voices
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Figure 9.6: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  emotion represented vocally in the verbal vocal task by 
P arkinson’s participants and the control group.
There was a significant effect of emotion, F(4,i92) = 16.36,/><0.001. The emotion by 
group interaction was not significant, F(4 ,i92>= 0.56,7?=0.690. The Parkinson’s group 
attained lower accuracy rates for this vocal task than control participants, F(i,48) = 
9.08,77<0.005.
9.7.5 Ekman 50 faces task
The results for all twelve Parkinson’s patients in Phase 2  ^ on the adapted version of 
the face task, from which surprised faces and the surprise response option were 
excluded, are shown in Figure 9.7. A significant effect of emotion emerged, F(4,io4> = 
12.40, 7?<0.001. The interaction between emotion and gioup was not significant, 
7^ (4,104) = 0.98,77=0 .4 2 0 . The groups did not differ in their accuracy rate on this task, 
F(i,26) = 1.27, 77=0 .2 5 9 . Despite no significant interaction, fear accuracy rates were 
explored, since this was the emotion of interest in this task (see Section 2.3 for further 
rationale). The two groups did not differ in their recognition accuracy for fearful 
faces in this task, t{26) = -1.05,77=0.305.
' NB. Parkinson’s N=12, Control N=16.
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Figure 9.7: Recognition accuracy rates fo r emotion represented facially in the Ekman 50 task by the 
Parkinson’s participants and control group.
9.7.6 Alternative facial expression recognition task
The results for this task^ ® are shown in Figure 9.8.
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Figure 9.8: Recognition accuracy rates for emotion represented facially in the alternative task by the 
Parkinson’s participants and control group.
NB, Parkinson’s N=7, Control N=16.
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A main effect of emotion was revealed for this task, F(4,g4) = 25.19, /><0.001. An 
emotion by group interaction was not significant, F(4,g4) = 1.36, /?=0.254. The groups 
did not differ in their recognition accuracy rates on this task, F(i,2i) = 1.27,^=0.272. 
Again, post-hoc analysis for fear was earned out, since this was the emotion of 
interest from the previous phase. Both groups achieved similar accuracy rates for the 
fearful faces, ^(21) = -0.75,^=0.459.
9.7.7 Within-subjects faces comparison
The results from the within-subjects comparison condition were compared. To 
reiterate, seven Parkinson’s patients and fifteen control participants completed both 
the Ekman 60 and the adapted version, the Ekman 50. The results from the two tasks 
are shown in Figure 9.9.
n  Parkinson's Ekman 50 j 
O  Parkinson's Ekman 60 
n  Controls Ekman 50 |
□ C ontro ls Ekman 60 |
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Figure 9.9: Recognition accuracy rates fo r the Ekman 50 and Ekman 60 tasks for only the Parkinson’s 
and control participants who completed both tasks.
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Before statistical comparison of the two tasks is reported, analysis of the Ekman 50 
results for just the seven clinical participants, who completed the within-subjects 
comparison, in comparison to control participants is presented.
There was a main effect of emotion, F(4,80) = 13.81, j[7<0.001. The interaction between 
emotion and group was not significant, F(4,80) = 2.30, j?=0.079. There was a 
borderline effect of group, F(i,20) = 4.00, /?=0.07. T-tests explored the differences 
between groups for specific emotions, since both the interaction and group effect were 
not clearly non-significant. The Parkinson’s group were worse at perceiving anger, 
^(20) = -2.10,/?<0.05, and disgust, ^(20) = -2.35,p<0.05. Fear and the other emotions 
were not significantly different between the two groups,/?>0.1.
To compare the differences between the Ekman 50 and Ekman 60 scores in Phase 2, a 
mixed-design ANOVA was carried out, with group (Parkinson’s or control) as the 
between-subj ects factor, and task (Ekman 60 versus Ekman 50), along with emotion 
(anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness) as a within-subjects factor, with percentage 
correct in each task being compared.
This analysis revealed no main effect of task, F(i,20) = 0.04, ^ =0.839. There was also 
no task by group interaction, F(i,20) = 0.00, /?=0.994. An effect of emotion, 
independent of task, was shown, F(4,go) = 23.31, ^ <0.001, reflecting different accuracy 
rates for the emotions. There was a significant group effect, F(i,20) = 5.92, p<0.05, 
with Parkinson’s patients being worse than control participants. A borderline emotion 
by group interaction was revealed, F(4,80) = 2.58, ^=0.056. A task by emotion 
interaction was also significant, Fçi.w, 42.20) = 8.10, ;?<0.005. This reflects different 
performance by all participants on emotions depending on response alternatives. This 
will be explored. The task by emotion by group interaction was not significant, F(2.n, 
4 2 .2 0 )  = 0.63, p=0.544. It is posited that this has occurred since the elimination of the 
surprise option elevated not just the Parkinson’s patients’ recognition rates for fear, 
but also those of the control group.
Paired-samples t-tests revealed a significantly higher recognition accuracy rate in the 
perception of fear in the Ekman 50 task than the Ekman 60 task, ^(21) = -2.98, ^ <0.01. 
Thus, inclusion of surprise decreases accuracy in recognition of fear for both control
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participants and Parkinson’s patients. There was also an increase in recognition 
accuracy rates for anger in the Ekman 60 task, ^(21) = 3.54, /><0.005; this may reflect 
an influence of order, since the Ekman 60 task was presented after the Ekman 50 task. 
Recognition of anger seems to benefit from repetition of tlie task.
Although a group effect was revealed in this analysis, it is not focused on, since it is 
neutral to the hypothesis that task design alterations improve recognition of fear. The 
clinical sample is small (N=7). Separate analysis presented earlier, with larger 
samples^ ^  revealed group differences on the Ekman 60 but not the Ekman 50. 
Furthermore, between-subj ects analysis with the whole population tested^^, revealed a 
task by emotion by group interaction [ F ( 3 . o 4 ,  1 3 3 ,6 0 )  = 2.52, /?<0.05]. This is more 
inkeeping with proposed hypotheses that Parkinson’s disease is not associated with a 
general facial emotion recognition impairment. In addition, when sex of participant 
was included as a factor in the analysis of group performances on these tasks, the 
results resemble those reported when sex was not included as a factor. Please see 
Appendix 7 for more information.
9 .7 .8  C o n fu s io n  a n a ly s is
Confusion analysis, as described in Section 9.4.1c, was applied to the data.
9.7.8a Faces tasks — Ekman 60 versus Ekman 50
Tables 9.3-9.6 summarise the responses of the participants from Phase 2, who 
completed both of these tasks. Misses, false positives, and accuracy rates are all 
included. All numbers are mean percentages.
" NB. Ekman 60 task: Parkinson’s N=8; Ekman 50 task: Parkinson’s N=12.
NB. Ekman 60 task: Parkinson’s N=8, Control N=16; Ekman 50 task: Parkinson’s N=12, Control 
N =16.
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Table 9.3: The pattern o f  responses to fa c ia l expressions o f  emotion, m ade by the Parkinson's group  
on the Ekman 60 task
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness Surprise
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived by the Parkinson’s group
Anger 78.6 6.0 7.1 0.0 2.9 1.4 96.0 17.4
D isgust 17.1 87.1 4.3 0.0 7.1 2.9 118.6 31.4
Fear 1.4 1.4 50.0 0.0 2.9 4.3 60.0 10.0
Happiness 0.0 0.0 1.4 98.6 0.0 2.9 102.9 4.3
S ad n ess 0.0 1.4 1.4 1.4 80.0 1.4 85.7 5.7
Surprise 2.9 4.0 35.7 0.0 7.1 87.1 136.9 49.7
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Incorrect labels (misses) 21.4 12.9 50.0 1.4 20.0 12.9
Table 9.4: The pattern o f  responses to fa c ia l expressions o f  emotion, made by the control group on the 
Ekman 60 task
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness Surprise
Total
label
use
False
positives
Anger 89.3 6.0 2.7 0.0 1.3 0.0 99.3 10.0
Perceived Disgust 2.7 91.3 2.0 0.0 6.0 0.7 102.7 11.3
by the Fear 3.3 0.0 71.3 0.0 3.3 9.3 87.3 16.0control
group Happiness 0.0 0.7 0.7 99.3 0.7 0.7 102.0 2.7S adn ess 2.7 2.0 2.0 0.0 86.7 0.0 93.3 6.7
Surprise 2.0 0.0 21.3 0.7 2.0 89.3 115.3 26.0
Totai depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Incorrect labels (misses) 10.7 8.7 28.7 0.7 13.3 10.7
Table 9.5: The pattern o f  responses to fa c ia l expressions o f  emotion, m ade by the P arkinson’s  group  
on the Ekman 50 task
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived 
by the 
Parkinson’s  
group
Anger 72.5 11.7 8.3 0.0 1.5 95.0 22.5
Disgust 13.3 85.0 10.8 0.0 8.5 118.3 33.3
Fear 9.2, 0.8 76.7 0.0 7.5 93.3 17.5
Happiness 0.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.8 102.5 2.5
S ad n ess 4.2 2.5 4.2 0.0 81.7 90.8 10.8
Totai depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Incorrect labels (misses) 27.5 15.0 23.3 0.0 18.3
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Table 9 .6: The pattern o f  responses to fa c ia l expressions o f  emotion, m ade by the control group on the 
Ekm an 50 task
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Anger 78.7 6.0 4.0 0.0 1.3 90.0 11.3
Perceived D isgust 8.0 92.0 6.7 0.0 7.3 114.0 22.0by thecontrol
group
Fear 10.7 0.0 86.7 0.0 8.7 106.0 19.3
Happiness 0.7 1.3 1.3 100.0 0.7 104.0 4.0
S ad n ess 2.0 0.7 1.3 0.0 82.0 86.0 4.0
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 21.3 8.0 13.3 0.0 18.0
9.7.8a (i) Ekman 60
When comparing false positives, there was a significant effect of emotion, F(5,ioo) = 
15.14, ^<0.001. There was a significant effect of group, F(i,20) = 5.75, /?<0.05. This 
was qualified by a significant interaction between group and emotion, F(5,ioo) = 3.40, 
/7<0.01. Post-hoc tests revealed that the Parkinson’s group were more likely to use the 
label ‘disgust’ incorrectly for faces in the Ekman 60, t(lQ) = 2.88, p<0.01, and they 
were also more likely to use the label ‘surprise’ incorrectly, 7(20) = 2.37,/?<0.05. The 
groups did not differ in their use of other emotional labels, j^>0.25.
When angry faces were shown, an interaction between the incorrect labels (misses) 
and group was revealed, F ( 2 . 5 2 , 5 0 .3 4 )  = 10.15, jo<0.001. No effect of group was shown, 
F’(i,20) = 3.27, p=0.086. There was a significant effect of emotion, F ( 2 . 5 2 , 5 0 .3 4 )  = 8.37, 
p<0.001. Post-hoc analysis revealed that the Parkinson’s group were more likely than 
control participants to label angry faces as ‘disgusted’, 7(7.64) = 3.23,/?<0.05. There 
were no other significant differences between groups in their misses,/?>0.1
When fear faces were shown, there was a significant effect of emotion, F(i.82, 36.41) = 
54.16, p<0.001. There was also a borderline group effect, F(i,2o) = 4.19, /?=0.054, and 
a significant interaction between emotion and group, F(i.g2,36.41) = 3.55,p<0.05. Post- 
hoc tests revealed that ‘surprise’ was more often used by the Parkinson’s group to 
label fearful faces, 7(20) = 2.18, /?<0.05. No other labels were used more by one 
group than another, ^ >0.098.
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o other differences or interactions between groups and emotion were revealed in the 
misses on this task,/?>0.18.
P. 7.8a (ii) Ekman 50
The Parkinson’s group and the control group did not differ significantly in their label 
use (misses or false positives) for any emotion in the Ekman 50: />>0.13 for all main 
effects and interactions.
9.7.8a (Hi) Comparison o f  confusions across face tasks and groups 
False positives were compared across the two Ekman face tasks and groups, with a 
2x2x5 mixed-design ANOVA, with task (Ekman 60, Ekman 50) and group 
(Parkinson’s, control) as independent variables, and the numbers of times each 
emotional label (emotion -  anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness) is used incorrectly 
in each task as the dependent variable. This revealed a borderline effect of task, ^(1,20) 
= 4.22,/?=0.053, no interaction of task and group, jF(i,20) = 0.87,/?=0.363, and effect of 
emotion, F(2.64, 56.79) = 15.91, /><0.001. An emotion by group interaction was revealed, 
F(2.64, 56.79) = 5.56, /?<0.005. The task by emotion interaction was not significant, 
F’(4,80) = 1.64, /?=0.184, nor was the task by emotion by group interaction, F(4,go) = 
0.61, /?=0.631. This non-significance may be because the exclusion of surprise in the 
Ekman 50 elevated not just the accuracy rate for fear of the Parkinson’s group, but 
also of the control group. There was a main effect of group, F(i,20)= 8.58,^<0.01.
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that the Parkinson’s group used the label ‘sadness’ 
more often in the Ekman 50 task than in the Ekman 60 task, 7(6) = -2.83,/><0.05. The 
controls, by contrast, tended to use the label ‘disgust’ more in the Ekman 50 task than 
the Ekman 60 task, 7(14) = -2.05, j?=0.06.
The mistaken responses when each emotion was represented were compared across 
tasks and groups. See Chapter 10 for further comparisons of control group results. 
The Parkinson’s group mistook disgust for ‘anger’ more in the Ekman 50 than in the 
Ekman 60 task, 7(6) = -2.49,j?<0.05. No other differences between the groups exist in 
their confusions, /?>0.15 for all interactions and between-subj ects effects. Since 
erroneous responses to fear between the two tasks for either group do not differ, this
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suggests that the low accuracy rates for fear perception are largely explained by 
surprise.
P .  7.8b Voices task
Tables 9.7 and 9.8 show the pattern of response by the Parkinson’s group and control 
group from both Phase 1 and Phase 2 combined. All numbers are mean percentages.
Table 9.7: The pattern o f  responses to vocal expressions o f  emotion, made by the P arkinson’s group  
on the verbal prosody task
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived by the Parkinson’ s group
Anger 69.4 13.9 4.4 7.8 1.1 96.7 27.2
D isgust 18.9 43.3 5.0 9.4 13.3 90.0 46.7
Fear 6.1 16.7 63.3 13.9 6.1 106.1 42.8
Happiness 2.8 10.0 6.7 61.1 2.2 82.8 21.7
S ad n ess 2.8 16.1 20.6 7.8 77.2 124.4 47.2
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 30.6 56.7 36.7 38.9 22.8
Table 9.8: The pattern o f  responses to vocal expressions o f  emotion, made by the control group on the 
verbal prosody task
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived 
by the 
control 
group
Anger 79.1 16.9 0.6 4.1 0.3 100.9 21.9
Disgust 13.1 60.9 3.4 5.9 10.3 93.8 32.8
Fear 1.3 6.9 75.6 10.0 5.3 99.1 23.4
Happiness 5.3 8.8 8.4 72.5 1.9 96.9 24.4
S ad n ess 1.3 6.6 11.9 7.5 82.2 109.4 27.2
Total depletions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 20.9 39.1 24.4 27.5 17.8
The use of false positives was explored for the vocal task. The Parkinson’s and the 
control group differed significantly in their false positive use, F(i,48) = 8.65, /?<0.01.
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There was a significant effect of emotion, F(4,i92) = 6.30, p<0.001. There was also a 
significant emotion by group interaction, F(4jg2) = 2.59, p<0.05. Post-hoc t-tests 
revealed that the Parkinson’s group were more likely to use the labels ‘sadness’, 7(48) 
= 2.1 A, p< 0.01, and ‘fear’, 7(48) = 3.90, j9<0 .0 0 1 , in the vocal task. The two groups 
do not differ in their use of other emotions, /?>0.089.
The label use for each emotion was examined. No effect of emotion was displayed 
when disgusted voices were heard, ^(3,144) = 2.13,^9=0.099, but was there an emotion 
by group interaction, F(3,h4) = 3.40, j9<0.05. There was a significant effect of group, 
F(i,48) = 8.99, /><0.005. Post-hoc tests showed that Parkinson’s group were more 
likely than the control group to perceive the disgusted voices as sounding ‘fearful’, 
7(48) = 3.17, p<0.005, and ‘sad’, 7(23.10) = 2.80, j9<0.05, but not other emotions, 
p>0.41.
There was a significant effect of emotion displayed when fearful voices were 
presented, F(2.38, 114.17) “  22.46, /?<0.001. There was also a significant effect of group, 
F(i,48) = 5.16, j9<0.05. This was qualified by a significant interaction, F(2.38, 114.17) = 
2.91, j9<0.05. The Parkinson’s gi'oup described fearful voices as sounding like 
‘sadness’, 7(48) = 2.44,p<0.05, and to a lesser extent ‘angry’, 7(18.60) = 1.85,^9=0.08, 
but not any other emotion, ^ >0.46.
There were no significant group differences in the label use for happy, angry, or sad 
voices, ^ >0.08, or significant emotion by group interactions, j9>0.17.
9 . 7.8c Gesture task
Analysis of false positives and misses on each task revealed no significant differences 
between the Parkinson’s group and the control group, j9>0.12.
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9.7.9 Response time analysis for the voices task
Since the Parkinson’s patients struggled with the vocal emotion recognition task in 
comparison to the control group, it was postulated that perhaps differences in 
sensitivity to stimuli might be reflected in reaction times.
As mentioned earlier, in Phase 2, experiments were designed in order to measure 
response times for participants. Reaction times were analysed using a 2x5 mixed- 
design ANOVA. The between-subj ects factor was group (Parkinson’s or control) and 
the within-subjects factor was mean reaction time for each emotional stimulus. There 
was an effect of emotion, F(4,gg) = 7.79, p<0.001. There were no differences between 
groups, F(4,88) = 0.83,^=0.511, or interaction between reaction times to each emotion 
and group, F(i,22) = 0.17,j9=0.682.
Correct responses only were examined in the second analysis. Again, reaction times 
for each emotion was submitted to a 2x5 mixed-design ANOVA. A significant effect 
of emotion was observed, F(i.59, 33.36) = 6.83,/><0.01. The two groups did not differ, 
F(i,21) = 0.27,^9=0.609, nor was there a significant interaction between response times 
for each emotion and group, F(i.59,33.36) = 0.13,/?=0.833.
9.8 Summary 1
The second phase of this study replicates difficulties in perceiving vocal emotion in 
the Parkinson’s population found in Phase 1. Again, the Parkinson’s patients 
achieved similar recognition accuracy scores as the control participants for the 
gestural emotion task. As with the previous phase, the Ekman 60 task, which 
included the emotion of surprise, the Parkinson’s group had problems recognising 
fear, consistently confusing this with surprise. By contrast, in the Ekman 50 test, 
which did not include suiprise as a response option or as a stimulus category, the 
Parkinson’s participants had no difficulties in perceiving fear when compared with the 
control group. Indeed, in the alternative face task (which also excluded suiprise).
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again, the Parkinson’s patients were not impaired in their perception of fear. The 
contrast between tasks is particularly profound, especially given that in the within- 
subjects condition all participants received the Ekman 60 task after the Ekman 50 
task, so any order effects would be expected to lead to an improvement in certain 
categories, but this was not the case.
9.9 General discussion
9.9.1 Difficulties in recognising vocal emotion
Much research has explored language-processing deficits in Parkinson’s disease. 
Such deficits, which include problems in understanding complex sentences when read 
or heard, are widespread (Angwin et al., 2004; Grossman et al., 2003) and may result 
from damage to basal ganglia circuits between Broca’s area and preffontal cortex 
(Lieberman et al., 1992). Often these problems are related to either a reduction in 
working memory resources, reduced information processing speed, or to deficits in 
selective attention. The results on the current vocal task might reflect these vaiiables. 
Parkinson’s patients were not slower to respond to the stimuli than control 
participants, so response times cannot account for the difficulties in vocal emotion 
perception. Perhaps there is a problem with interpreting prosody -  emotional and 
non-emotional -  in Parkinson’s disease. This argument conflicts with Kan and 
colleagues’ (2002) findings in which Parkinson’s patients had intact prosody 
perception and understanding from written descriptions, however.
The Parkinson’s group tended to use the labels ‘fear’ and ‘sadness’ for vocal stimuli 
more often than the control group. These labels were commonly used to label disgust.
IQ differed between groups in Phase 2 but not Phase 1, yet deficits were found in both 
test phases in the vocal task, therefore, it is unlikely that the higher IQ scores of the
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control participants in Phase 2 could account for the lower accuracy scores by 
Parkinson’s patients on the vocal emotion task.
9.9.2 Gestural emotion recognition preserved
If poor motor imagery is related to poor motor representations in the brain, then 
gestural interpretation should be difficult for Parkinson’s patients. Yet, the present 
study has revealed that the Parkinson’s participants had no problems in interpreting 
gestural emotions. One can ask why gestural representation is spared: Parkinson’s 
disease is chiefly characterised by degeneration in the substantia nigra but not 
cortex^^. Presently, there is no evidence for mirror neurons in subcortical regions; 
motor mirror system circuits involve cortical routes, via STS, parietal, premotor 
cortices etc., but not the substantia nigra, so this could explain the maintenance of 
gestural perception by the Parkinson’s patients.
The Parkinson’s population examined in the current study were all diagnosed within 
the past five years, and averaged stage 2 on the Hoehn and Yahr scale (1967). Since 
the disease is at an early stage in all participants, they may not yet experience 
problems with motor imagery. Alternatively, perhaps motor imagery and 
representations of movement are not as related as has been proposed.
Gallagher and Frith (2004) found that perception of expressive hand gestures 
(representing internal states) but not instrumental hand gestures (commands like 
‘come here’) activated regions around the STS, the amygdala, temporal pole, and 
anterior paracingulate cortex. Thus, perhaps the gestures in the present study were not 
processed in the same way that natural gestures are processed because of their 
symbolic nature.
Some cortical pathology does occur in Parkinson’s but tliis is relatively uncommon and does not 
appear to be a consequence o f the illness, since similar changes occur in age-matched controls 
(Jellinger, 1990).
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It is not clear whether a mirror system is compromised in the Parkinson’s population 
studied, but it can be concluded that Parkinson’s patients do not seem to have 
problems in the interpreting dynamic gestural representations of emotion in early 
stages of the illness.
9.9.3 Facial emotion recognition
9.9.3a A theoretical caveat
The present research demonstrates that the use of different facial tasks within the 
same population produces contrasting results. In the first phase of this study, a deficit 
for interpreting fear firom faces was observed, and this emotion seemed to be 
consistently perceived as surprise by all participants. This confusion was exacerbated 
in the Parkinson’s group. Consequently, the task was adapted to exclude surprise as a 
stimulus and response alternative. An alternative face task was also created using 
different actors; this did not include surprise. In the second phase of this study, the 
Parkinson’s patients had no significant difficulty in labelling fearful faces as fear in 
these two face tasks. All participants had difficulties perceiving fear in the Ekman 60 
task, and the Parkinson’s group were significantly worse than the control gi'oup, in 
both Phase 1 and Phase 2. A learning effect could explain why the group difference 
for fear perception in the Ekman 60 task in Phase 2 was not as distinct as in Phase 1 
(group difference for fear recognition in Phase 2, ^=0.05): in Phase 2, the Ekman 60 
was always given at the end of the experimental session and the Ekman 50 at the 
beginning. Since an impairment in fear perception was shown in the Ekman 60 task, 
this is particularly salient, as order effects generally lead to an improvement in 
emotion perception. Given that fear is recognised accurately in the two alternative 
face tasks, and in other modalities, it is therefore unlikely that the Parkinson’s patients 
examined have severe problems in the perception of fear.
As fear recognition deficits are commonly reported in neuropsychological research of 
people with amygdala damage, Parkinson’s disease, and Huntington’s disease 
(Adolphs et al., 1994; Adolphs et al., 1995; Adolphs et al., 1999; Calder, Young, 
Rowland et al., 1996; Kan et al., 2002; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Sprengelmeyer et
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al., 2003; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999; Sprengelmeyer, Young, Sprengelmeyer et al., 
1997; Wang et al., 2002; Yip et al., 2003), it is suggested that before accepting that 
the interpretation of fear is compromised in these populations, more tests that exclude 
the surprise option should be implemented. The deficits observed in these studies 
may be a consequence of the inclusion of surprise in the recognition task.
9.9.3b A problem with surprise
Parkinson’s patients seem to have elevated sensitivity or response bias for surprise. 
When this option is available to them, they are significantly more likely than control 
participants to use it to describe other emotional stimuli. This is not the first study to 
highlight a potential surprise processing dysfunction. Dujardin and colleagues (2004) 
reported that Parkinson’s patients perceived more surprise in emotional facial 
expressions than control participants. In Dujardin and colleagues’ study, fear was 
actually excluded as a stimulus and response scale, because the authors claimed that 
fear expressions are displayed in social situations less often than the other emotions of 
anger, disgust, and sadness. The authors speculated that perhaps Parkinson’s patients 
are more likely to encounter surprise in social interactions, as a consequence of the 
symptoms of their disease.
In the present study, in the Ekman 50 task, when fear faces were shown, all bar two 
participants (across both control and Parkinson’s) commented that a surprise label 
would be more apt than the five that were offered.
9.9.4 Neural explanations
A dissociation between emotion perception from visual cues and auditory cues has 
been demonstrated in the current research. The Parkinson’s gi'oup had difficulty in 
perceiving vocal emotion in contrast to control participants, and this did not extend to 
gestural cues. The neuropsychological theory of unified emotion mechanisms would 
suggest that any deficits observed in one task should extend to others, on account of 
independent neural substrates for the processing of specific emotions. This does not
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seem to be the case for the particular patient group studied here. The dissociation 
between the auditory and visual channels could indicate that perhaps separable neural 
pathways process emotions presented in separate modalities, and Parkinson’s disease 
affects the pathway involved in perception of vocal emotion more than pathways that 
subserve visual perception of emotion. This speculation, however, is questionable, 
since facial and gestural emotion perception abilities (which are both determined from 
visual tasks) are dissociable in the study of age (Chapter 8). Combined, these two 
studies suggest that emotions portrayed in different channels of communication (even 
within the same modality) might be processed by partially independent pathways.
9.9.5 Background tasks
The current study has demonstrated that Parkinson’s sufferers self-report more 
experiences of fear and discomfort. Variations in experience are not related to some 
dysfunction in fear processing. Generally, Parkinson’s patients are reported as 
becoming more irritable as the disease progresses. In the present study, scores 
reflecting high levels of discomfort and fear are correlated with elevated experience of 
depression. Thus, it is possible that this irritability has been tapped by the Wolpe and 
Lang (1964) scale.
The Parkinson’s patients studied here were also more depressed than control 
participants. This is not surprising, given the literature regarding the prevalence of 
depression in this population (McDonald et al., 2003; Pearce, 1995; Rojo et al., 2003). 
The patients in Phase 1 experienced higher levels of depression than those in Phase 2. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 report a relationship between depressed mood and impairments in 
recognising disgust represented by the voice and by body movements. The current 
research demonstrated a relationship between high depression scores and difficulties 
in perceiving disgust from faces in the Ekman 60. No correlation between depression 
scores and recognition accuracy of disgust from vocal or gestuiul cues were observed, 
so perhaps facial tasks are more sensitive to the impact of depression on disgust 
emotion perception. It would be of interest to investigate this idea further.
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It is important to note that there was no main effect of sex in any of the analyses 
(please see Appendix 7).
9.9.6 Conclusions
The present study has revealed an impairment in perceiving vocal emotion in 
Parkinson’s disease. An issue arises regarding whether difficulties in complex 
sentence and language processing often observed in Parkinson’s disease could explain 
these results, or whether there is an impairment specific to vocal emotion perception. 
Further research exploring the recognition of nonverbal vocal emotion (see Scott et al, 
1997), such as screaming, crying, laughing, retching, and roaring would address such 
a question.
Parkinson’s patients are comparable to control participants in their recognition 
accuracy for gestural and perhaps for facial emotion as well. This indicates that the 
neural regions affected by Parkinson’s disease might not be involved in the processing 
of visually portrayed emotion.
Finally, central to this research is the finding that deficits in facial fear perception may 
be falsely established from forced-choice face tasks as a consequence of the inclusion 
of surprise. The present study has confirmed that a fear deficit may be eliminated if 
the task is adapted slightly. This acts as a caution for neuropsychological 
investigations to consider the design of the tasks employed before concluding that 
deficits in facial emotion perception exist.
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10 THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CHANNELS OF 
EMOTIONAL COMMUNICATION
This thesis has been concerned with the perception o f  emotion from a number o f  
communication channels. Consequently, the aim o f  this chapter is to explore the 
differences in relationships between emotions expressed in each o f the 
communication channels.
10.1 Introduction
europsychological studies investigating the recognition of emotions have typically 
focused on a single parameter of emotion processing, such as facial emotion 
perception. This thesis has highlighted that by restricting research to the exploration 
of just one communication channel, studies are limiting the extent to which 
conclusions can be generalised. A myriad of cues, as well as facial expressions, 
enable inferences to be drawn about another’s emotional state. In everyday situations, 
people unwittingly express emotions in a variety of ways, nonverbally and verbally. 
Particular emotions may be more readily expressed in certain communication 
channels. To understand the relative contribution of different communication 
channels to our interpretation of each emotion, their ease of recognition and their 
confusability can be compared and contrasted.
10.2 Six versus five emotions -  exploration of the Ekman faces task
Chapter 9 proposes that the inclusion of surprise in the facial emotion task may 
disrupt or interfere with the distinction of fear, and that this might be exacerbated in 
clinical participants. As a consequence, it was suggested that researchers exercise 
caution when interpreting results of such facial emotion tasks. The present chapter
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seeks to explore differences in a normal population in their recognition accuracy for 
fear when surprise is included or excluded in a face task. Displayed fear is 
consistently confused with suiprise, yet the reverse confusion (surprise labelled as 
fear) is less common (Calder et al., 2003; Rapcsak et al., 2000). Surprise is short­
lived and lacks valence, which many researchers argue is evidence for it being a 
transient state that precedes other emotions (Ortony & Turner, 1990), namely fear or 
happiness -  the two emotions with which suiprise is most often confused. For 
instance, if someone jumps out from the shadows late at night, initially, surprise will 
be experienced, but this will quickly be followed by fear. Alternatively, if a long-lost 
friend arrives unexpectedly, surprise will be felt, but this will soon be followed by 
happiness. The consistent confusion with fear may result from surprise being viewed 
more often in social interactions than fear. Surprise does not, however, have a 
specific vocal profile (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Van Bezooijen et al., 1983), or distinct 
galvanic reflex (Patterson, 1930), or distinct physiological profile, unlike fear and the 
other basic emotions. Furthermore, fear is regarded as the most difficult emotion to 
perceive from the face. A considerable number of clinical studies have reported a 
deficit in fear processing from facial expressions. Thus, it is important to understand 
whether emotion perception difficulties seen in populations are genuine and not a 
consequence of a particular method of testing.
The first study of this chapter sought to compare and contrast recognition accuracy 
and confusion between emotions on the faces task with six or with five emotions. A 
between-subj ects comparison is presented first, followed by a within-subjects 
comparison.
10.2.1 Method 1 between-subjects
10.2.1a Participants
There were two groups of participants. The first group completed the faces task, 
which included surprise (Ekman 60). These participants were 20 volunteers from the 
St Andrews community. Their mean age was 42.25 years (s.d. = 3.14). Nine were 
male and 11 were female.
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The second group completed the faces task, which excluded surprise (Ekman 50). 
They were matched with the former group in terms of age and sex. These participants 
were 20 volunteers, attending the University of St Andrews part-time degree 
programme. Their mean age was 41.29 years (s.d. = 2.92). Nine were male and 11 
were female.
10,2Jb Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure for Ekman 60 and Ekman 50 are described in Chapter 2.
10.2.2 Results 1 between-subjects
10.2,2a Difficulty levels
The recognition accuracy for specific emotions in both of these tasks is summarised in 
Figure 10.1. This can be interpreted as a measure of difficulty.
Relationships; five vs six facial emotions between-subjects i l  Ekman 60 
O Ekman 50
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Figure 10.1: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  fa c ia l expressions with fiv e  or six alternative emotions -  
between-snbjects comparison.
** /?< 0 .05
A 2x5 mixed-design ANOVA explored the results. The between-subjects factor was 
task (Ekman 50 and Ekman 60) and the within-subjects factor was emotion
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(recognition accuracy rate for anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness). There was a 
main effect of emotion, F ( 2 . 8 2 , 1 0 7 .1 2 ) = 17.33, j7<0.001. Particular emotions were 
recognised with greater ease than others. The effect of task was not significant, F(i3 S) 
= 2.78, j9=0.104. This means that no task was easier than the other. There was a 
significant task by emotion interaction, however, 7 (^2.82,107.12) = 4.15, /?<0.005. 
Independent t-tests revealed higher levels of recognition accuracy for fear in the 
Ekman 50 task, /(25.83) = -3.38 /?<0.005. No other emotions differed between tasks, 
/?>0.1.
10.2.2b Confusion analysis
The responses for all of the stimuli for the two groups were placed into confusion 
matrices (Tables 10.1 and 10.2). These tables enable us to see whether the same 
emotions are confused when surprise is included in the task, or whether the pattern of 
errors changes. All numbers in the tables represent mean percentages.
Table 10.1: Confusion matrix show ing patterns o f  responses in the Ekman 60 task.
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness Surprise
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived 
on the 
Ekman 60 
task
Anger 81.0 7.5 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 90.0 9.0
Disgust 9.5 91.0 4.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 114.5 23.5
Fear 3.0 1.5 72.5 0.0 9.0 10.0 96.0 23.5
Happiness 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.0 0.0 1.5 100.5 1.5
Sadness 1.5 0.0 2.0 0.0 79.0 0.0 82.5 3.5
Surprise 5.0 0.0 20.5 1.0 1.5 88.5 116.5 28.0
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 19.0 9.0 27.5 1.0 21.0 11.5
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Table J 0.2: Confusion matrix show ing patterns o f  responses in the Ekman 50 task.
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived 
on the 
Ekman 50 
task
Anger 87.9 11.1 5.3 2.1 1.1 107.4 19.5
Disgust 4.7 88.4 4.7 0.0 7.9 105.8 17.4
Fear 5.3 0.5 88.4 0.0 6.8 101.1 12.6
Happiness 0.5 0.0 1.6 97.9 0.5 100.5 2.6
Sadness 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 83.7 85.3 1.6
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 12.1 11.6 11.6 2.1 16.3
Statistical analysis of the pattern of responses excluded surprise, since this was only 
included in one task. Differences in the total number of incorrect responses (false 
positives) made with each emotional label in the two tasks were explored using a 2x5 
mixed-design ANOVA. The between-subjects factor was task (Ekman 50 and Ekman 
60) and the within-subjects factor was emotion (the number of times anger, disgust, 
fear, happiness, sadness labels were used incorrectly). There was a main effect of 
emotion, F(2.43,92.21)= 13.13, p<0.001. No effect of task can be reported, F(i,38) = 0.40, 
/>=0.530. A task by emotion interaction bordered significance, F(2.43, 92.21) = 2.71, 
p=0.061. As a consequence of this trend for significance, t-tests explored whether 
there were specific emotional labels that were used more or less in one task than the 
other. These revealed that fear (as a label) was used incorrectly more often in the 
Ekman 60 task, 7(38) = -2.25, j9<0.05. This is of interest, as it suggests that lower 
accuracy for fear in this task is not due to a tendency to under-use the label of fear. 
No other false positive rates differed between the two groups, p>0.077.
The incorrect responses for particular depicted emotions were explored in more detail. 
If the inclusion of surprise does not confound distinctions for other emotions, no 
differences in labelling between the two tasks should be revealed by the subsequent 
analyses. 2x4 mixed-design ANOVAs were carried out, with task (Ekman 50 and 
Ekman 60) as the between-subjects variable, and emotion (all but the target emotion) 
as the within-subjects variable. For instance, in order to explore whether the two 
groups differ in their perception of fear depictions, the number of times participants in 
each group respond with the labels anger, disgust, happiness, and sadness when
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fearful faces are presented will be entered into the ANOVA. For all emotions, there 
were no significant group differences (p>0.32), and no significant group by emotion 
interactions (p>0.21).
This means that responses to the Ekman 50 and Ekman 60 task do not differ, except 
for the number of times fear is accurately recognised, and the number of times the 
label of fear is applied to other expression stimuli. This is important to note, as it 
suggests that the problems in fear recognition observed in the Ekman 60 task cannot 
be explained by confusions with any other emotion bar surprise, and this problem 
cannot be related to a failure to use the fear label. Fear is mislabelled as surprise 
when surprise is a legal response option.
10.2.3 Method 2 within-subjects
In order to explore Ekman 60 versus Ekman 50 thoroughly, a within-subjects design 
was employed as well.
10.2.3a Participants
Six women and nine men volunteered to take part in the present study. They had a 
mean age of 62.0 years (s.d. 5.89). While the data from these participants have been 
presented in Chapter 9, that chapter focused on group differences, whereas this one 
focuses on a comparison between performances on tasks.
10.2.3 b Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure are the same as in Section 10.2.1b, except all participants 
completed the Ekman 50 first. Then, an hour later they were given the Ekman 60. 
This sequence was chosen with the intention of preventing order effects falsely 
elevating difficulties in recognising fear in the Ekman 50 task.
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10.2.4 Results 2 within-subjects
10.2.4a Difficulty levels
The recognition accuracy for emotions in both of these tasks is summarised in Figure 
10.2 .
R elationships: five v s  six  facial em otions w ithin-subjects 11 Ekman 60 
D  Ekman 50
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Figure 10.2: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  fa c ia l expressions with fiv e  or six alternative emotions - 
within-subjects comparison.
* p < 0 .0 5
A 2x5 mixed-design ANOVA explored the results. This revealed a main effect of 
emotion, F(4,56) = 10.05, j9<0.001. There was no effect of task, F(ij4) = 0.04,/?=0.848. 
This means that neither the Ekman 50 nor the Ekman 60 was easier. The emotion by 
task interaction was significant, F(4,56) = 5.96,j9<0.05. Paired-samples t-tests revealed 
that fear was interpreted more readily in the Ekman 50 task, 7(14) = -2.43, /?<0.05. 
Anger attained higher accuracy rates in the Ekman 60, 7(14) = 2.42, /?<0.05. This 
might reflect an effect of order, since the Ekman 60 was presented after the Ekman 50 
and the same faces were presented in both. Recognition accuracy rates for all other 
emotions did not differ,/?>0.13.
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10.2,4b Confusion analysis
The pattern of responses for these tasks is presented in Tables 9.4 and 9.6 in the 
previous chapter.
Confusion analysis was performed on these results. Suiprise was excluded, as no 
comparison between the two tasks for this variable can be made. As before, 2x5 
mixed-design ANOVA was used to explore differences in false positive rate. The 
between-subjects factor is task (Ekman 50 and Ekman 60) and the within-subjects 
factor is emotion -  the number of times each emotional label is used incorrectly (for 
anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness). This revealed no differences between the 
two tasks in false positive rate, F(i,28) = 1.45, /?=0.239. There was an effect of 
emotion, F(3.22, 90.39) = 8.94, p<0.001, but no significant emotion by task interaction, 
F(3.22, 90.39) = 1.25, p=0.296.
Misses were explored when each emotion was represented, using a 2x4 mixed-design 
ANOVA, as before, with task as the between-subjects factor (Ekman 50 and Ekman 
60), and emotion as the within-subjects factor (all emotions except the target). 
Responses to anger were bordering significance: emotion, F(2.24,62.70) = 6.81,p<0.005; 
emotion by task, 7\2.24, 62.70) = 2.74, p=0.067; task, F(i,.28) = 9.50, p<0.005. Paired- 
samples t-tests explored this further, since the interaction was marginally significant. 
These revealed that during the Ekman 50 task, participants confused anger with fear 
more than in the Ekman 60 task: 7(28) = 2.49, p<0.05. There was a trend for 
participants to confuse anger with disgust in the Ekman 50 task as well, 7(28) = 1.97, 
p=0.058. This could reflect the higher accuracy rates for anger in the Ekman 60 task, 
which, as posited earlier, might be a consequence of the influence of order. No other 
mistaken responses differed between tasks, p>0.13.
10.2.5 Discussion
There are several states that are not considered emotions in themselves, yet involve 
prototypical facial expressions. For instance, Carroll and Russell (1996) found that 
providing a specific context or manipulating the choice of response alternatives led to
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facial expressions of anger^ "^  being labelled as determination. The facial action coding 
units of anger and determination may have some overlap (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). 
Thus, contextual cues are important when making distinctions between state and 
emotional facial expressions in a forced-choice task. The confusion between 
determination and anger resembles that between fear and surprise. It is often 
contended that surprise is more of a transitory state, preceding other emotions, as 
mentioned earlier. Perhaps states are less difficult to classify as a facial configuration 
rather than a specific emotion. This could explain the mislabelling of fear as surprise 
in the present study within the facial task. This provides an indication that inclusion 
of different response alternatives in such a task can substantially confound the results.
Healthy individuals have difficulties perceiving fear in the Ekman 60 task, and these 
are reduced when that task is altered by excluding surprise as a response alternative 
and stimulus category. Clinical participants exhibit impairments for fear in the task 
that includes surprise in comparison to a control group, but not when surprise is 
excluded (see Chapter 9). Therefore, it is possible that clinical participants who are 
only tested using the task that includes surprise will demonstrate impairments in 
perceiving facial fear that do not actually reflect problems in fear perception, but 
rather the task design or surprise perception. Forced-choice tasks have their 
disadvantages and the present study has highlighted one of these. Populations in 
which a facial fear recognition deficit is found should perhaps be re-examined using a 
facial task that excludes surprise as a choice of label. It is possible that difficulties in 
perceiving fear are just aggravated by the inclusion of this label.
10.3 A comparison of face, voice, and gesture perception
Much attention in emotion research has been drawn to the way in which emotions 
relate. Theories and models pioneered by Woodworth and Schlosberg (1954), and 
developed further by Russell (1980), support the concept that emotions can be
Depicted in pictures fiom Ekman and Friesen (1976) and Matsumoto and Ekman (1988)
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arranged in a space, defined by specific dimensions. The differences between each 
emotion are determined by the emotions’ positions in relation to these dimensions. 
Since emotions seem to have fundamentally distinct expressive, physiological, and 
experiential components, however, another school of thought proposes that emotion 
perception is categorical: that there are distinct perceptual shifts in recognising each 
emotion displayed by others. The demonstration that emotions may be selectively 
impaired (Adolphs et al., 1995; Calder, Young, Rowland et al., 1996; Lawrence et al., 
2002; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999) has bolstered this view 
that emotions are structured categorically and thus, each emotion has an independent 
neural substrate.
In order to understand the relationships between emotions, using more than one 
communication channel could be useful. For example, should emotions and their 
relationships to each other be defined by their position within emotional space, it 
would be predicted that regardless of the mode of presentation, particular emotions 
would be more readily confused with one another. It has already been demonstrated 
in Chapters 8 and 9 that recognition of particular chamiels of emotion are affected at 
different rates by certain circumstances (ageing and Parkinson’s disease); thus, it is 
predicted that relationships between emotions represented by different communication 
channels will differ in the normal population.
The second part of this chapter focuses on a within-subjects comparison of 
recognition accuracy rates for each emotion across three communication channels. 
Patterns of responses between each channel will also be explored.
10.3.1 Method
10,3,1a Participants
The same participants described in Section 9.6.1b took part in this study. Their details 
are summarised in Table 10.3.
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Table 10.3: Participant summary
Sex 6 females, 10 males
Mean age (years) 62.19 (s.d. 6.15)
Mean IQ 119.9 (s.d. 3.30)
Education (years) 15.88 (s.d. 3.83)
Beck Depression Scores range 0-14 (out of 63)
10.3.1b Stimuli and procedure
The Ekman 50 face task, the full-light movies, and the verbal vocal task outlined in 
Chapter 2 were used in this investigation. The participants completed the tasks in the 
above order.
10.3.1c Analysis
10.3.1c (i) Recognition accuracy scores and false positives 
All data will be submitted to 3x5 mixed-design ANOVAs, with task (facial, vocal, 
gestural) as the independent variable, and recognition rate, or false positive rate for 
each emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness) as the dependent variable. 
False positive rate refers to the number of times each emotional label is used 
incorrectly.
10.3.1c (ii) Misses
An ANOVA will be carried out for each emotion, in order to compare the misses 
between tasks, with task (facial, vocal, gestural) and the number of times each 
emotion is mistaken for the target emotion (four from anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness) as the within-subjects factors. For instance, when disgust is represented, the 
within-subjects factors will be task (facial, vocal, gestural) and emotion (anger, fear, 
happiness, sadness) -  that is, the number of times that emotion is labelled instead of 
disgust when disgust is represented.
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10.3.2 Results
10.3,2a Recognition accuracy rates
The participants’ recognition accuracy scores on each of the tasks are shown in Figure 
10.3.
Relationships: faces, v o ices, gestures
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Figure 10.3: Recognition accuracy rates fo r  the facial, vocal, and gestural tasks.
* ;?< 0 .05  *** /?< 0 .001
The recognition accuracy per emotion was compared across tasks. A main effect of 
emotion was revealed, F(4j 80) = 5.90, /?<0.01. There was a significant effect of task, 
F(2,45) = 12.30, /7<0.001. This was qualified by a significant emotion by task 
interaction, F(4jgo) = 8.81,p<0.001.
The vocal and gestural representations of disgust achieved lower accuracy rates than 
the facial representations of disgust: vocal, /(30) = -6.49,p<0.001; gestural, /(22.41) = 
5.51, /7<0.001. Happiness vocalisations were less readily interpreted than facial 
happiness portrayals, ^(18.43) = -6.66,/?<0.001. Facial happiness also attained higher 
accuracy rates than gestural happiness, /(21.68) = 5.52,/?<0.001. Moreover, gestural 
displays of happiness were more accurately recognised than vocal representations, 
/(30) = -2.23,/?<0.05. All other comparisons were not significant,/?>0.14.
200
In summary, faces best communicate disgust. Happiness is also easily interpreted 
from facial cues. The voice is not a good conveyor of happiness. Other emotions do 
not differ between communication channels in the present study.
10.3.2b Confusion analysis
In order to understand the relationships between emotions and modalities, the 
incorrect responses were compared across tasks. Tables 10.4-10.6 show the confusion 
for these tasks. Analysis was performed on the false positives and the misses when 
each emotion was represented. Overall misses were not examined, as these would 
reflect the differences in recognition accuracy rates.
Tables 10.4-10.6: Pattern o f  responses on the (10.4) vocal task, (10.5) fa c ia l task, and (10.6) gestural 
task.
10A Voices Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Anger 76.3 19.4 1.3 6.9 0.0 103.9 27.6
Perceived Disgust 14.5 58.1 4.6 7.6 11.1 95.8 37.8on the Fear 1.5 10.6 76.0 14.6 6.0 108.9 32.9vocal task Happiness 5.7 6.9 5.0 59.4 1.0 78.0 18.6
S adn ess 2.0 5.0 13.1 11.3 81.9 113.3 31.4
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Incorrect labels (misses) 23.7 41.9 24.0 40.6 18.1
10.5 Faces Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Anger 78.8 5.6 6.9 1.3 2.5 95.1 16.3
Perceived Disgust 8.1 92.5 6.3 0.0 7.5 114.4 21.9
on the Fear 10.6 0.0 84.4 0.0 8.1 103.1 18.7facial task Happiness 0.6 1.3 1.2 98.1 0.6 101.8 3.7
Sadn ess 1.9 0.6 1.2 0.6 81.3 85.6 4.3
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Incorrect labels (misses) 21.2 7.5 15.6 1.9 18.7
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10.6 Gestures Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Perceived 
on the 
gestural 
task
Anger 81.9 4.4 0.6 20.6 1.9 109.4 27.5
D isgust 8.7 56.9 11.9 1.3 3.1 81.9 25.0
Fear 1.3 8.1 83.1 0.6 12.5 105.6 22.5
H appiness 3.7 10.0 0.6 74.4 0.0 88.7 14.3
S ad n ess 4.4 20.6 3.8 3.1 82.5 114.4 31.9
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 18.1 43.1 16.9 25.6 17.5
Confusion analysis is summarised in the following sections.
10.3.2b (i) False positives 
The false positives between the three tasks were compared. There was a main effect 
of emotion, F(4,i80) = 5.97, /?<0.001. There was an effect of task, F(2,45) = 11.00, 
/7<0.001. This reflects the higher accuracy rates on the facial task in relation to the 
vocal and gestural tasks. No significant emotion by task interaction can be reported, 
F(4,180) = 1.42, /?=0.192. This suggests that number of times particular labels were 
used for vocal, facial, and gestural displays did not differ between tasks.
10.3.2b (ii) Responses when anger was represented 
There was a main effect of emotion, Fçije, 79.10) = 7.73, jo<0.005. Task did not have a 
significant effect, 7^2,45) = 0.43, p=0.655. There was a task by emotion interaction, 
7^ (1.76,79.10) == 3.29, ^ <0.05.
Participants mistook anger for fear on the facial task more than during the vocal task, 
/(18.99) = -3.79, jO<0.005. They also mistook anger for happiness in the vocal task 
more than the facial task, ?(18.50) = 2.60, /><0.05. Anger was also more regularly 
conflised with fear on the facial task than the gestural task, /(18.99) = 3.79, p<0.005. 
The responses did not differ for other emotional labels when anger was depicted in the 
vocal, facial, and gestural tasks, p>0.11.
Generally, anger representations are mistaken for fear, except when anger is expressed 
in the face. Angry voices are misread as happiness more often than angry faces.
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10.3.2b (ni) Responses when disgust was represented 
A  main effect of emotion was not revealed when disgust was represented, ^(3,135) =
1.31, jo=0.274. There was a significant effect of task, 7^ (2,45) = 20.04, /?<0.001, and this 
was qualified by a significant emotion by task interaction, 7 (^3,135)= 5.41,/><0.001.
Vocal disgust representations were more likely to be confused with all other emotions 
than facial disgust representations: anger, /(30) = 2.83, p<0.01; fear, ?( 15.00) = 3.60, 
/?<0.005; happiness, ^(18.84) = 2.24,/?<0.05; sadness, ^(19.58) = 2.57,/?<0.05. This 
reflects the significantly lower accuracy rate for vocal disgust. This is also paralleled 
in the gesture task, since disgusted gestures are more confused with all other 
emotions, except anger (p>0.6), in comparison to facial disgust: fear, 7(15.00) = -3.11, 
j9<0 .0 1 ; happiness, 7(16.46) = -2.21, /?<0.05; sadness, 7(15.60) = -4.48, /><0.001. 
Vocal disgust is mistaken for anger more than gestural disgust, 7(30) = 3.26,p<0.0Q5. 
By contrast, gestural disgust is more commonly mistaken for sadness than vocal 
disgust, 7(18.77) = -3.23, /?<0.005. All other comparisons across tasks were not 
significant, p>0.49.
Facial disgust is rarely confused with other emotions, whereas vocal and gestural 
representations of disgust are poorly recognised and confused with a range of 
emotions. The confusions over disgust depend on modality of portrayal, thus, 
participants confuse vocal disgust for anger more than gestural disgust, and gestural 
disgust is mistaken for sadness more than vocal disgust.
10.3.2b (iv) Responses when fear was represented 
There was a significant effect of emotion, F ( 2 . 5 i ,  1 1 2 .7 6 ) = 4.87, /7<0 .0 1 . Task did not 
have an effect, 7^2,45) -  118, /?=0.318. A significant interaction between task and 
emotion was observed, F ( 2 . 5 i ,  1 1 2 .7 6 ) =  5.85,p<0.001.
Happiness was more commonly used to label vocal representations of fear than facial 
fear, 7(23.06) = 2.09, /?<0.05, and gestural fear, 7(19.58) = 2.57, j9<0.05. Fearful 
vocalisations were also described as resembling sadness more than facial fear, 
7(16.78) = 3.29, j9<0,005, and gestural fear, 7(20.65) = 2.45, p<0.05. By contrast, 
gestural representations of fear were labelled as disgust more often than vocal fear.
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7(30) = -2.57, /?<0.05. There were no differences between responses to the gestural 
and facial fear depictions, or any other comparisons, j[7>0.088.
In summary, fear in the voice is confused with happiness and sadness. This was less 
true for facial and gestural expressions of fear. Fearful body movements are more 
likely to be mistaken for disgust in comparison to fearful vocalisations.
10.3.2b (v) Responses when happiness was represented 
Analysis of the responses to happiness representations revealed a main effect of 
emotion, F(2.37, io6.47) = 5.40,/?<0.005. A main effect of task, F(2,as) = 25.58, /?<0.001, 
and a significant emotion and task interaction, F(2.s7, 106.47) = 8.72, p<0.001, were 
revealed.
Differences in confusions for happiness between the tasks are expected due to the 
higher recognition accuracy rates for facial happiness. Indeed, happy vocalisations 
are consistently more confused with all other emotions, except anger (p>0.098), than 
facial happiness: disgust, 7(15.00) = 3.22, jc><0.01; fear, 7(15.00) = 6.82, /?<0.001; 
sadness, 7(15.83) = 2.80, /?<0.05. Furthermore, the vocal happiness is mistaken for 
disgust, 7(18.97) = 2.52, p<0.05, and fear, 7(17.86) = 6.22, /><0.001, more than 
gestural happiness. By contrast, gestural happiness is more commonly confused with 
anger than vocal happiness, 7(30) = -2.89, p<O.Ol. Moreover, participants generally 
mistook gestural happiness for anger more than facial happiness, 7(18,37) = -4.97, 
/7<0.001. All other comparisons were not significant,/?>0.06.
Facial happiness attains high accuracy levels, so in comparison to the vocal task, it is 
less confused with other emotions. Generally, happy vocalisations were mistaken for 
disgust and fear more than happy gestures and happy faces. Happy gestures are 
commonly described as angry in contrast with the other channels.
10.3.2b (vi) Responses when sadness was represented 
Analysis of the responses to sadness representations revealed a main effect of 
emotion, 7^ (2.! 1, 94.72) = 14.97, j9<0.001. The tasks were not significantly different, 
7^ (2,45) = 0.04, />=0.962. There was a significant task by emotion interaction, F(2.i 1,94.72) 
= 3.37, ^ <0.05.
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The responses to facial portrayals of sadness did not differ from responses to vocal or 
gestural sadness: vocal, all /7>0.10; gestural, all p>0.12. Participants confused sad 
vocalisations with disgust more than sad gestures, 7(23.00) = 2.19, /?<0.05. In 
contrast, the sad gestures were commonly mistaken for fear more than the 
vocalisations, 7(30) = -2.67, /?<0.05. All other comparisons were not significant, 
/>>0.083.
Gestural and vocal sadness were confused with the same emotions as facial sadness. 
Sad vocal cues were more often mistaken for disgust than sad gestures, which were 
readily misinterpreted as fear.
10,3.2c Multidimensional scaling
In order to visually demonstrate the differing relationships between emotions from the 
three channels, multidimensional scaling was carried out. The multidimensional 
scaling procedure enables a geometric representation of the relationships between 
different emotions. The PROXSCAL algoritlim was used. To obtain the input for 
this algorithm, the 5 by 5 confusion matrices Jfrom each of the emotion tasks were 
converted to distances, by subtracting the response rate from 100, then averaging 
these distances across the diagonal. This enables those emotions that are most 
confused with each other to have smaller distances from one another than those that 
are not easily confused. Multi-dimensional analysis by SPSS was then carried out on 
these new tables. See Kruskal and Wish (1978) and Pollick and colleagues (2001) for 
more information regarding this procedure. The results for the multidimensional 
scaling for each communication channel are displayed in Figures 10.4-10.6.
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Figures 10.4-10.6: Psychological space fo r  (10.4) gestural, (10.5) facia l, and (10.6) vocal basic emotions.
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10,3.2d Summary
The present results reveal that emotions are recognised with different levels of ease 
dependent on the presentation condition. For instance, facial representations seem to 
be particularly important for accurate communication of disgust. Faces best express 
happiness, and voices express happiness least well. Generally, for anger, fear, and 
sadness the presentation condition does not seem to differentiate the ease of 
interpretation to a great extent. By contrast, the pattern of responses does vary 
between the tasks. Table 10.7 summarises the differences between tasks.
It is important to note that lower accuracy rates for vocal disgust and happiness, and 
gestural happiness, in comparison to the facial channel may explain several of the 
differences in confusion summarised in Table 10.7.
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Table 10.7: Strength o f  confusions m ade in different channels o f  communication  
V o c  =  v o ic e s  F ac — faces G es =  gestures
* /7< 0 .05  **p<O.Ol ^p<0.005  " V < 0 -0 0 1
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness
Anger n.s. Voc>Fac** n.s. Ges>Voc*Ges>Fac** n.s.
Disgust n.s. Fac>Voc**FaOGes^
Ges>Voc* Voc>Fac**Voc>Ges* Voc>Ges*
Fear Fac>Voc^Fac>Ges^
Voc>Fac^
Ges>Fac**
n.s. Voc>Fac^
Voc>Ges** Ges>Voc*
Perceived
Happiness Voc>Fac* Voc>Fac*Ges>Fac*
Voc>Fac*
Voc>Ges*
Fac>Voc*^
Fac>Ges^
Ges>Voc*
Fac>Ges>Voc
n.s.
Sadness n.s.
Voc>Fac*
Ges>Fac**
Ges>Voc*
Ges>Voc>Fac
Voc>Fac^
Voc>Ges* Voc>Fac* n.s.
The results seem to indicate that anger representations tend to be confused with 
disgust across all modalities. Angry faces tend to be mistaken as fearful far more 
often than angry voices and angry gestures. Angry voices are also commonly 
confused with happy voices, a mistake that is not as regularly made in the facial task.
Fearful representations are interpreted as disgust across modalities, yet this occurs 
more often in the gesture task than in the vocal channel. Fearful voices are perceived 
as sad or happy, and these emotions are not as often confused in the two visual tasks.
Sad expressions are often confused with fearful expressions and this seems to occur 
more in the gestural task than the vocal task. Sadness is also interpreted as disgust, 
and this occurs more in the vocal task than the gestural task. Thus, it seems that 
channel of emotional representation does seem to influence the labelling responses for 
particular emotions. Emotions are not always confused with the same emotions 
across channels. This makes it particularly difficult to create a general model of 
emotion.
208
10.4 General discussion
The present research has demonstrated that the facial channel is not the most salient 
means of communication for all emotions. Indeed sadness, anger, and fear are just as 
readily communicated in the vocal and gestural channels as the facial channel. This 
indicates that studies examining the perception of emotion from purely the facial 
channel are not necessarily measuring recognition accuracy for cues which are the 
most accurate representations of that emotion.
The ease of recognition for happiness and disgust from the facial channel as opposed 
to other channels could reflect their phylogenetic origins. In other words, each 
emotion has evolved for some functional purpose, which determines the 
communication channel that emotion is best expressed in. For more information, 
please see Section 11.3.3b.
Furthermore, this study has revealed that the relationship between emotions depends 
on the communication channel in which they are expressed. The same emotions are 
not confused across modes of display. The results from the multidimensional scaling 
task contrast with other studies that have employed this or a similar technique with 
different modes of emotional expressions (Coulson, 2004; Green & Cliff, 1975; 
Russell, 1980); this could reflect different stimuli employed and/or different 
population groups.
Happiness is readily recognised from facial expressions; this may, in part, be because 
it is the only positive facial emotion of the group defined by Ekman and Friesen 
(1971). The lack of other positive emotions depicted by facial expressions seems to 
be confounded by the fact that positive emotions are carried universally by a smile. 
As a consequence, emotion research assumes that happiness/positive affect is one 
homogeneous category. Interestingly, Scott and Sauter (2004) have shown that this 
might not be the case, since numerous positive vocal emotions (achievement/triumph, 
amusement, contentment, sensual pleasure, relief) can be distinguished and 
recognised across populations and cultures. Thus, it seems that different 
communication channels are better equipped for conveying specific emotions, and
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that basic emotions might be divided further dependent on the mode of 
communication.
The present study fails to account for the interaction between several types of 
information being communicated. Such emotion tasks represent artificially simulated 
situations. Given that emotions are rarely expressed in isolation, it is difficult to 
extrapolate the relative contributions of each channel when they are not combined.
Despite this, the present study has provided evidence for dissimilarities between 
emotions represented in different channels of communication and this may reflect 
phylogeny. It is important to note that the face is not necessarily the best means to 
communicate particular emotions. Proximity may play a role in the development of 
emotional signals, since particular states might require to be communicated across 
distances, and facial cues are not ideal for this purpose.
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11 CONCLUSIONS
This closing chapter will review the experiments presented in this thesis and will 
discuss the findings in terms o f  their implications fo r methods employed and 
conclusions drawn in recent and future emotion research.
11.1 Introduction
Understanding the complexity of neural mechanisms involved in emotion processing 
is important for appreciating ho^v evolution may have shaped the brain for social 
communication. With the emergence of research indicating face specific neurons 
within the brain (Peirett, Rolls, & Caan, 1982; Perrett et al., 1984) and a dissociation 
between perception of emotion and identity from the face (Etcoff, 1984; Hasselmo et 
al., 1989; Tranel et al., 1988; Young et al., 1986), researchers have sought to identify 
whether a unified model can account for emotion processing. Extensive 
neuropsychological and imaging research (described in Section 1.5.2) contends 
strongly for neural systems that are specialised for processing specific emotions. Yet 
research is inconclusive regarding whether the same neural regions process facial 
emotion as vocal or gestural emotion. Conclusions from many emotion investigations 
cannot be generalised to wider populations, given that such studies often assume 
(perhaps incorrectly as demonstrated in Chapter 10) that the face is the most salient 
cue for communicating all emotions. The research outlined in this thesis has used 
different forms of emotional expression with clinical and non-clinical populations, in 
order to compare and contrast the processes that may be involved in emotion 
perception from different communication channels. Furthermore, neuropsychological 
research has neglected differences that may influence emotion processing abilities, 
such as mood, age, and sex. This has also been addressed in a series of studies.
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11.2 Synopsis of findings
The research described in this thesis has produced a number of intriguing findings in 
relation to the processing of emotions from multiple communication channels, and 
with regard to individual differences.
11.2.1 Difficulties in disgust recognition with mood
Chapter 3 indicated that people with positive mood traits and negative mood traits are 
less able to recognise disgust represented by body movements. In accordance. 
Chapter 4 suggests that negative mood states interfere in disgust processing fi*om 
vocal cues. It is of interest to note that supplementary analysis in Chapter 9 also 
suggests that depressed moods might lead to greater difficulties in perceiving disgust 
from faces. This finding corresponds with research carried out by Murray (2000), 
who also reported a deficit in disgusted face perception as a consequence of clinical 
and non-clinical depression (measured by the Beck Depression Inventory -BDI). The 
studies presented in this thesis suggest that negative moods can be associated with 
interpretative problems with disgust. A fundamental oversight of the present research, 
however, is that different mood measures (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule -  
PANAS - and Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale - HADS) and different 
emotional stimuli (gestures and voices) have been incorporated into each study, so the 
extent to which each may be related is unclear. While it is unlikely that dysphoria, as 
measured by the PANAS, only affects perception of gestural disgust, and dysphoria, 
as measured by the HADS, only has an influence on the recognition of disgust 
represented by vocalisations, and dysphoria, as measured by the BDI, only impacts on 
the interpretation of facial disgust, this cannot be ruled out as a possibility. Watson 
and colleagues (1988) demonstrated that the BDI correlates positively with the 
negative affect scale of the PANAS (0.6). In addition, the depression subscale of the 
HADS also correlates (0.6) with the BDI (Beck, Guth, Steer, & Ball, 1997). This 
suggests that measures of dysphoria, calculated using these three scales, are related.
212
The basis for impairment in disgust processing in dysphoria is not established. 
Initially, it had been posited that moods impact on the interpretation of the least 
discrete or least readily identifiable stimuli, since vocal and gestural disgust are the 
most difficult emotions to classify by all participants. Yet the potential association 
between dysphoria and facial disgust perception suggests that this may not be the 
case, since disgust is relatively well-recognised in comparison to other emotions from 
the face. Indeed, this indicates that the problem may be more specific to disgust 
processing in itself, which, in turn, could be used as an argument for specificity of 
neural regions underlying the perception of disgust. Direct implications of these 
findings for clinical research will be discussed in Section 11.3.1.
Symptoms of dysphoria are not explicably related to disgust or dysfunctional 
experiences in disgust perception. This emotion, regardless of channel, was more 
confused with sadness by dysphoric groups than non-dysphoric participants. Thus, it 
is plausible that people with negative moods have a bias to respond with the label 
sadness, and this represents a disturbance in the processing of sadness, rather than 
disgust. Indeed, clinical and non-clinical research have often suggested that people 
with depressed moods are more likely to perceive or remember sadness, in contrast to 
other emotions (Mandai & Bhattacharya, 1985; Niedenthal et al., 2000; Ridout et al., 
2003). According to Woodworth and Schlosberg’s (1954) model of emotional space, 
disgust and sadness are more closely related to each other than other emotions. Sad 
faces can be perceived as disgusted when context is manipulated (Carroll & Russell, 
1996). So, perchance, dysphoric mood may enhance the confusion between these two 
emotions.
The idea that elevated disgust sensitivity is at the root of this perceptual disturbance 
should not be discarded, however. Recognition for expressions of disgust may be 
related to implicit understanding of the concept of disgust (Rozin et al., 2000). So, 
perhaps people who experience disgust more often than others, have an atypical 
understanding of this emotion, and this is reflected in a difficulty in perceiving disgust 
from nonverbal cues (for more information, see Sprengelmeyer and colleagues, 1997). 
Future extensions of the present work may consider including a measure for disgust 
sensitivity, as well as testing the impact of moods (using one unified measure) on the 
perception of facial, vocal, and gestural emotion.
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11.2.2 Sex-congruent recognition of fear
The influence of sex is often investigated in emotion research, but studies have rarely 
explored the relationship between sex of actors and sex of perceivers. Sex-congruent 
findings for the perception of vocal fear were reported in Chapter 6. It was indicated 
that men interpreted male renditions of fear more readily than women did, and women 
perceived female fear more readily than men. Social learning and different 
experiences of men and women might account for this disparity. For instance, men 
tend to fight -  playfully and seriously -  with other men, and women are more inclined 
to fight with women. Male-female fights are much rarer (Goos & Silverman, 2002). 
Since aggressive situations, like fights, often lead to fearful responses, men should be 
more familiar with observing other men feeling fearful, and women should be more 
exposed to other women experiencing fear. Familiarity and experience are predicted 
to enhance recognition of such cues, according to sociocognitive research (Blanchard- 
Fields, 1996). Therefore, considering this approach, men should be better at 
interpreting male fear, and women should be better at recognising female fear.
Additionally, neural systems associated with mirroring may well be involved in the 
perception of these vocal cues. Executing, observing, and imagining particular 
gestures all activate the same neural regions (see Section 1.5.4 for more information), 
and this has led researchers to suggest that in order to interpret social cues of others, 
we may map their movements/gestures onto mental representations, which enables us 
to simulate how they may be acting/feeling. Familiarity has been shown to hasten 
neural processing and interpretation of movements (Grèzes et al., 2004), thus, 
familiarity with emotional expressions might improve their recognition. Should men 
and women express fear in fundamentally different ways, then perhaps mirror neurons 
are involved in the sex-congruent advantage in perception of vocal fear.
A combination of these two approaches could best account for the present pattern of 
responses.
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11.2.3 Gestural and vocal emotion recognition disturbed with ageing
In order to explore the relationship between different channels of emotional 
communication, recognition accuracy was assessed on a number of emotion tasks in 
two age groups, as described in Chapter 8. Research exploring ageing populations 
and emotion perception has been inconsistent. The present results revealed that there 
was no clear pattern of impainnents across modalities or across channels of 
communication. Most emotional gestures in full-light and point-light conditions were 
more challenging for older participants to interpret than a younger group, with the 
exception of full-light dynamic fear. Generally, the older participants also had 
difficulties in recognising vocal emotion -  both nonsense and, to a lesser extent, 
verbal. By contrast, there were no differences between the two age groups in their 
perception of facial emotion.
This task specificity might reflect the existence of independent neural substrates for 
the processing of particular emotions represented by different modalities and task 
conditions. Alternatively, there may be separable pathways for the processing of 
dynamic emotional information that are impacted by ageing. Thus, age could impact 
most deleteriously on neural systems underlying vocal and gestural processing of 
emotion. Alternatively, emotion processing from voices and gestures tends to be 
more difficult than from faces (see Chapter 10), so it is plausible that ageing disturbs 
recognition for stimuli that are most challenging to interpret.
If each emotion was processed by a specialised neural substrate, regardless of 
modality of presented, then any difficulties in the interpretation of a particular 
emotion should have been observed in all tasks. By contrast, if  there were one 
integrated mechanism for the processing of emotion, which is affected by ageing, then 
recognition accuracy levels on all tasks should be affected to the same degree. 
Neither of these stances was substantiated by the present data.
Older people are frequently reported to have disturbed recognition accuracy for 
sadness (Calder et al., 2003; MacPherson et al., submitted; Moreno et al., 1993; 
Phillips & Allen, in press; Phillips, MacLean et al., 2002). Difficulties in perceiving
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sadness have been attributed to the view that older individuals involved in 
psychological testing are happier than younger people (Lawton, 2001; Lawton et al., 
1992), and are less familiar with sad expressions. Perhaps disturbed sadness 
perception was reflected in the present research in older people’s over-use of the label 
sadness to describe negative stimuli which are not readily identifiable (please see 
Appendix 3). This does not account for the inconsistencies between the results for 
facial emotion tasks with ageing populations in different studies.
With respect to the present data and the population group explored, ageing does not 
seem to impact on emotion-specific modules within the brain that are supra-modal in 
nature. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the neurological deterioration 
associated with ageing is not selective in nature, nor is such deterioration likely to 
occur at the same rate or even be universal for all older people, therefore conclusions 
regarding neural specificity are limited from such a study.
11.2.4 Vocal emotion recognition and Parkinson’s disease
Other than characteristic movement difficulties, Parkinson’s disease is typified by a .
lack of facial and vocal emotional expression. Research on mirror systems suggests I
that neural control of expressive actions is related to the perception and imagination of |
such actions. See Section 1.5.4 for more information. Researchers propose that |
interpretation of others’ actions, and intentions involve multi-modal minor systems, j
mapping of such gestures onto our own mental representations of these movements. jISince motor and emotional expression and mental imagery is reduced in Parkinson’s |
disease. Chapter 9 comprises a study exploring emotion perception from dynamic and I
still charmels in Parkinson’s patients. i
Contrary to predictions, emotions conveyed by body movements were recognised î
with ease by the Parkinson’s patients, yet perception of all vocal emotions was !
idisturbed in this group in comparison to control participants. A series of ;i
comprehensive tasks suggest that recognition of emotions represented by the face is
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also unimpaired. This suggests that Parkinson’s disease does not impact minor 
systems. This will be discussed further in Section 11,3.2.
That the Parkinson’s group find the vocal emotion recognition task particularly 
problematic could imply that neural substrates for processing vocal emotion are 
disturbed by Parkinson’s. Alternatively, this could reflect a more central impairment 
in sentence and language processing, which is often observed in Parkinson’s disease 
(Grossman et al., 1991; Lieberman, Friedman, & Feldman, 1990). Two positions try 
to account for this general language difficulty: some associate the impairment with a 
grammatical deficit (Lieberman et al., 1992); others attribute the problem to limited 
cognitive resources involving ffontal-striatal-thalamic loop (Grossman et al., 2003; 
Grossman et al., 2002; Lee, Grossman, Morris, Stem, & Hurtig, 2003). Regardless of 
how the sentence comprehension deficit arises, fundamentally, this impairment could 
explain the lower accuracy rates attained by the Parkinson’s group on the vocal 
emotion task, in comparison to control participants. To test if the problem is specific 
to prosody, Parkinson’s patients’ abilities at interpreting nonverbal vocal emotion 
stimuli, such as screams, laughter, and so on, could be examined in conjunction with 
the verbal prosody task.
When surprise was included as a response choice and stimulus in a facial task, the 
Parkinson’s group used the surprise label more than the control group, particularly for 
mislabelling fearful faces. Control participants also make this mistake regularly 
though. Another study has associated Parkinson’s disease with an elevated sensitivity 
or perhaps response bias to perceiving surprise (Dujardin et al., 2004). This indicates 
that the processing and experience of surprise may be dysfunctional in Parkinson’s 
disease. Parkinson’s disease might influence neural systems specialised for the 
processing of surprise. Alternatively, since fear is much less commonly displayed in 
social interactions, perhaps illness-related experiences have rendered Parkinson’s 
patients more susceptible to observing surprise in social situations than control 
participants. Future research could address this problem by presenting an emotion 
perception task in which target emotions are morphed with surprise at different 
proportions and participants are asked to indicate to what extent surprise and the 
target emotion are incorporated in each image.
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11.3 Im plications for emotion research
Combined, the conclusions drawn from the studies in this thesis suggest that various 
aspects of neuropsychological emotion research need to be addressed. The findings 
have a bearing on theories of neural organisation of emotion, and further 
understanding is provided for the structure and relationship between emotions.
11.3.1 Caveats for emotion perception research
The initial mood study revealed that both negative and positive moods have an effect 
on emotion recognition rates. Thus, the importance of monitoring both negative and 
positive affectivity should be stressed. Studies that have shown little or no influence 
of mood on perceptual abilities may well reflect the grouping of people with positive 
moods in a generic control gi'oup. Moods are rarely monitored in perception research, 
and it is worth considering the impact they may have on other perceptual abilities.
Difficulties in disgust perception have often been attributed to basal ganglia 
dysfunction in illnesses such as Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease (Gray et al., 
1997; Kan et al., 2002; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Sprengelmeyer et al., 2003; 
Sprengelmeyer, Young, Pundt et al., 1997; Wang et al., 2003; Yip et al., 2003). 
Further analysis of some of these studies suggests that emotions other than disgust are 
impaired in these populations (Milders et al., 2003). While basal ganglia are highly 
inter-connected with the insula cortex, imaging research (Heining, 2003; Heining et 
al., 2003; Phillips, Young et al., 1998; Phillips et al., 1997; Sprengelmeyer et al., 
1998) and convincing neuropsychological case studies of two patients with insula 
cortex damage (Adolphs et al., 2003; Calder, Keane, Manes et al., 2000), seem to 
suggest that the insula cortex is a more credible candidate for a neural system 
selectively processing disgust. For instance, disgust deficits observed in studies of 
Huntington’s disease and Parkinson’s disease might be indicative of the mutual 
connections between the insula and basal ganglia. Alternatively, it could reflect 
incidence of depression in particular disorders. The present research seems to signify 
that dysphoric moods diminish the ability to interpret disgusted faces, voices, and
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gestures correctly -  thus, this should be taken into account when carrying out 
neuropsychological research. Disgusted gestures and voices were confused with 
sadness (analysis was not carried out on confusions for disgusted faces by participants 
in Chapter 9, although sadness and anger are typically used for disgusted faces by 
these participants).
Future research should monitor mood levels in Huntington’s and Parkinson’s 
populations, as variations in moods and correlations between dysphoria and disgust 
recognition levels could explain inconsistencies in research looking at these groups. 
Dysphoria may be a defining feature of a disgust deficit.
A major caveat for neuropsychological research in the design of emotion tasks has 
been highlighted. The Parkinson’s disease study in Chapter 9 demonstrated that 
apparent deficits in recognition of facial fear disappeared when the task was adapted 
to exclude expressions of surprise. This was the case for both the Parkinson’s patients 
and the control population. If a problem in the recognition of the emotion of fear did 
exist, then such a change to the design should not improve recognition accuracy 
levels. It seems a response pattern developed whereby participants consistently 
mistook fear for surprise, and given the relationship and similarities between the two 
facial states, this is perhaps to be anticipated. Inclusion of surprise could falsely 
generate impairments in fear recognition in patient populations. Consequently, when 
recognition of facial fear is reported to be impaired in certain populations, it is 
imperative that researchers scrutinize the design of their task before suggesting that 
these populations have a deficit specific to fear recognition.
11.3.2 Implications for the neural organisation of emotion processing
Neuropsychological research is based on the premise that to understand how the brain 
functions, we need to observe which faculties are disrupted when particular neural 
regions are damaged. A complication with this notion is that brain damage is rarely 
selective, and it can be difficult to understand which neural regions relate to which 
function, and which involve neural overlap. The research in tliis thesis has facilitated
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discussion regarding the particular neural regions responsible for processing emotion 
from multiple communication channels.
Emotion perception involves interpreting cues from a number of channels, including 
facial expressions, vocal expression, body movements, postures, vocal content, and so 
on. Yet much neuropsychological and imaging research exploring emotion 
processing has been restricted to studies of facial emotion. The study in Chapter 10 
has shown that the face does not best convey certain emotions. Thus, emotions 
communicated by the face do not represent ‘emotion’ as a whole construct. Some 
neuropsychological and imaging research studies have also examined perception of 
vocal emotion, yet studies that have explored both vocal and facial emotion are 
largely inconsistent (see Section 1.5.3). Some researchers posit that emotions have 
evolved for some functional purpose, such as detection of threat, which would not 
operate only in one modality; therefore, neural regions would process specific 
emotions, regardless of the presentation form of the emotional expression.
An ideal way to test this idea is to examine the emotion perception abilities (from a 
number of channels) of populations with signs of neurological deterioration to centres 
thought to play a role in emotion processing. Dopaminergic systems and regions of 
the striatum have been implicated in anger (Lawrence et al., 2002) and disgust 
processing respectively (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Sprengelmeyer, Young, 
Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997). Both neural systems are affected in Parkinson’s disease. 
The exploration of emotion recognition in Parkinson’s patients, described in Chapter 
9, suggests that the mode of presentation is important in terms of the recognition 
accuracy rates for specific emotions. This indicates that Parkinson’s disease might 
have a bearing on independent neural mechanisms that underlie perception of 
emotions represented in particular modalities. Furthermore, research examining the 
impact of ageing on emotion recognition indicates that even within modalities, a 
consistent pattern of impairments does not exist (Chapter 8). Ageing and Parkinson’s 
disease, therefore, do not impact on systems processing specific emotions or all 
emotions. For instance, anger recognition from faces, point-light gestures, nonsense 
vocalisations was unaffected by ageing, whereas anger recognition from the full-light 
gestures and the verbal vocalisations was impacted. Also, fear recognition was 
disturbed by Parkinson’s disease in the verbal emotion task, but not in the full-light
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gestural or the facial tasks (excluding surprise). Both ageing and Parkinson’s disease 
are not characterised by selective neural disruption, however, and so it is plausible 
that degeneration of peripheral systems involved in perception may explain the 
present results.
As discussed earlier, there is converging imaging and neuropsychological evidence 
for a neural system responsible for processing disgust, from many sensory inputs, 
particularly, those of smell, touch, taste, and vision (Adolphs et al., 2003; Calder et 
al., 2003; Heining, 2003; Heining et al., 2003; Phillips et al., 2000; Phillips et al., 
2004; Phillips, Young et al., 1998; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998; Wicker et al., 2003). 
The findings from these studies provide a cogent argument for a role of the insula 
cortex in the perception and experience of this emotion. The research in this thesis 
corresponds with this proposal, since it indicates an association between dysphoria 
and the perception of disgust from multiple channels.
In addition, the implications of the present research for understanding mirror systems 
are unclear. This clinical study emphasises that intact motor control is not vital for 
the perception of emotion depicted by movements. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that motor control is not disturbed at a cortical level in Parkinson’s disease, which 
suggests that cortical mirror systems are also intact in this illness.
11.3.3 The relationships between channels of communication 
11.3.3a The structure o f  emotions
The clinical and non-clinical studies exploring multi-channel emotion perception that 
are described in this thesis demonstrate that emotions are recognised less easily 
through certain channels of communication than others. For instance, in a normal, 
healthy population, happiness is recognised with comparative ease from facial 
displays, yet gestural and vocal happiness are more challenging to interpret. Disgust 
representations have this pattern too. Should emotion, as a whole, be structured in 
one unifying model, or with specific modules per emotion, it would be hypothesised 
that emotions might be recognised at the same relative rate across different modalities.
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This is not the case. Dissociations of performance between modalities enlighten our 
understanding of the organisation of emotions.
Two main theories contest how emotions are structured: dimensional and categorical 
accounts of emotion. Should emotions be part of a general space, specific dimensions 
would define the differences between them. The dimensional approach to emotions 
attempts to provide a comprehensive explanation for the relationships between 
emotions. The analysis of errors in the present research has revealed that the 
emotions that are most commonly confused differ depending on the channel of 
communication. This suggests that the circumplex model (Russell, 1980; Woodworth 
& Schlosberg, 1954), which has emerged from dimensional accounts of emotion, is 
dissimilar for facial, vocal, and gestural emotion.
Indeed, many of the dimensional models have been derived from studies comparing 
similarity between facial expressions of emotion (Cliff & Young, 1968; Green & 
Cliff, 1975; Royal & Hays, 1959; Shepard, 1962) or emotional labels (Bush, 1973; 
Neufeld, 1975; Russell, 1978; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977). Some studies 
endeavouring to build a model on the basis of vocal emotion research have outlined 
similar models to those derived from facial emotion, but there have been some 
anomalies, such as grief being regarded as more pleasant than indifference (Davitz, 
1964; Dawes & Kramer, 1966; Green & Cliff, 1975; Smets, 1967). Consequently, 
dimensional models of vocal emotion have not been sufficiently determined.
Since emotional expressions seem to have fundamentally distinct responses and 
different functional purposes, another school of thought proposes that emotions are 
categorical: that there are distinct perceptual shifts in recognising each emotion. This 
stance is often associated with arguments for distinct neural mechanisms for each 
emotion. This view, as mentioned in Section 11.3.2, is not wholly supported by the 
present research.
The categorical account of emotions has been supported behaviourally by the work of 
Calder and colleagues (1996) and Etcoff and Magee (1992), as described in Section
1.2.2, whereby there is a specific stage, a specific combination of two morphed 
emotions, when the observers conclude that a face no longer represents one emotion.
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but the other. Should emotion perception be dimensional, the perceived change from 
one emotion to another should be a gradual process.
Whether vocal emotions or gestural emotions would involve the same shift in 
perception is yet to be substantiated. Morphing vocal and gestural emotion would be 
much more difficult than morphing a static percept, yet there is considerable scope for 
manipulating voices along a continuum. DeGelder and Vroomen (2000) created vocal 
morphs from happiness to fear in a research study exploring the influences of facial 
emotion on the recognition of vocal emotion and vice versa. If this technique could 
be developed further, and voices morphed between all emotion combinations, it might 
be possible to examine whether categorical shifts in vocal emotion interpretation 
exist.
Interestingly, Scott and Sauter (2004) suggested that an array of positive emotions, 
other than the generic ‘happiness’ exist, but these are distinguished in modalities other 
than the face, since all positive emotions are carried by smiles facially. Positive 
emotions conveyed by voices include achievement/triumph, amusement, contentment, 
sensual pleasure, and relief. All can be distinguished with relative ease across 
different cultural populations. This indicates that perhaps basic emotions may differ 
between modalities, which further indicates independence of the neural underpimiings 
for vocal and facial emotion at least.
In summary, the dimensional account for the structure of emotions is challenged by 
the present research on confusions and difficulty levels. The categorical explanation 
for the structure of emotions only applies to facial emotion, at present. Future work 
could examine whether this model can be extended to vocal or gestural emotion as 
well.
11.3.3b Disparities between channels o f  communications
This thesis has shown that certain emotions are better interpreted from particular 
channels of communication. The face may not be the most reliable cue to a person’s 
emotional state. Evolutionary constraints and the functional purpose of each emotion 
may determine that specific emotions might be displayed most clearly through
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particular channels of communication. For instance, disgust is postulated to have 
evolved as a rejection response to bad tastes, to protect oneself and act as a warning to 
one’s offspring from ingesting potentially poisonous stimuli (Rozin et ah, 2000), If 
this were the case, disgust would not necessarily need to be conveyed across 
distances. Facial expressions are the most apparent means to communicate warnings 
within a short distance. Furthermore, disgust does not appear to be associated with 
any easily decipherable natural body gestures (Coulson, 2004; De Meijer, 1989; 
Heberlein et ah, in press; Walk & Homan, 1984). This emotion is also associated 
with physical repulsion and nausea; retching makes a strong sound itself, so 
vocalisations might be hindered. Compliant with the current findings, disgust does 
not appear to have a consistent and distinct vocal profile (Banse & Scherer, 1996; 
Scherer, 1986; Van Bezooijen et ah, 1983). Moreover, happiness is thought to 
represent camaraderie, so again this emotion would be best expressed in close 
proximity. Therefore, facial expressions would be an ideal means for communicating 
this sentiment.
The channels through which certain emotions are least well represented are also those 
in which recognition accuracy is most affected by mood (disgusted gestures and 
voices) and ageing. This supports the idea of a ‘first-in, last-out’ hypothesis, as 
proposed in Chapter 8, which states that regular, well-practised abilities will be 
relatively preserved, despite neural degeneration or disturbance.
This proposal might also be closely linked to theories that task difficulty is 
exacerbated in populations experiencing some form of neurological deterioration 
(Rapcsak et al., 2000). Moreover, as outlined in Chapters 9 and 10, task difficulty can 
be enhanced by methodological manipulations: the design of the facial task dictated 
where difficulties in perception abilities would lie, and these difficulties were 
exacerbated in a patient group.
11.3,3c Surprise -  a caution
The omission of surprise in the facial emotion task was contentious. The Ekman 60 
has been used in multiple research studies cross-culturally and across the decades and 
highlighting a potential flaw in its design could have considerable repercussions.
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According to Ekman (1999), the key characteristics that determine a basic emotion are 
distinctive universal signals (facial, vocal, gestural, and so on), emotion-specific 
physiology, automatic appraisal mechanisms, universal antecedent events. It is 
particularly interesting then, that surprise lacks specific autonomic nervous system 
activity (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983) and a discrete vocal signal (Murray & 
Amott, 1993). The inclusion of surprise in a list of basic emotions has always been 
contentious (Ortony & Turner, 1990). For instance, surprise lacks valence -  it can be 
described as neither positive nor negative, unlike other emotions. It is a more 
transient state that precedes other emotions, such as happiness or fear, which it is 
often confused with. Moreover, in the creation of emotional tasks, surprise is often 
left out and the five basic emotions, as used in the present research, are focused on 
instead. It was noted in Ekman and colleagues (1969) cross-cultural research that fear 
was consistently confused with surprise, yet they still concluded that fear and surprise 
were distinct emotions.
While it is not possible on the basis of the present data to provide an irreproachable 
argument against the inclusion of surprise under the basic emotion umbrella term, it 
must be emphasised that the use of surprise in tests of facial expression recognition 
can be misleading, and may result in the emergence of a spurious impairment in the 
perception of fear.
11.3.4 Evaluation of the confusion analysis technique
An unusual statistical method for exploring emotion perception has been presented in 
this thesis. Most reseaich studies examine absolute sensitivity levels, or participants 
are asked to rate emotional expressions on a number of scales. Many studies have 
discussed which emotions are consistently confused with others, particularly those 
studies that have developed the dimensional account of emotions. Yet few studies 
have completed analysis on confusions, except multidimensional scaling, which is a 
modelling function, rather than an exploration of statistical differences between 
groups.
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The methods used to examine confusions are straightforward, and easy to apply. 
Exploration of responses is central to understanding where and why deficits occur. 
For instance, a particular population might achieve high accuracy rates for one 
emotion of five. This may be a vestige of a tendency to use that emotional label for 
most stimuli, in which case, researchers examining accuracy rates might conclude that 
this population have a deficit in perceiving all emotions except one, whereas 
confusion analysis would suggest that the population might have a problem with only 
one emotion instead.
In the present research, statistical evidence for a tendency to use the label surprise for 
facial representations of fear was presented, which was the fundamental to the 
rationale to drop surprise from the facial emotion task.
Incorporating an analysis of confusion into emotion research could be particularly 
enlightening and important for understanding the nature of emotional impairments.
11.4 Directions for future research
A number of questions have been raised by the present studies, not least regarding the 
methods employed in emotion research. Dissociations between results attained when 
testing emotion recognition using different channels of communication have been 
demonstrated. Generally, the primary conclusion of the research in this thesis is that 
multiple channels of communication should be incorporated into studies of ‘emotion’ 
per se, since the results of facial emotion tasks do not reflect emotion as a whole, and 
should not be generalised to other channels of communication. A complex pattern of 
neural organisation is consistent with these results. The findings support the stance 
that there are several overlapping systems for specific emotions represented in 
discrete communication chamiels. The mood and sex studies presented in this thesis 
also highlight the importance of measuring such characteristics in neuropsychological 
studies of emotion perception. Furthermore, the task design should be closely
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contemplated before neuropsychological assessment occurs, since the inclusion of 
misleading labels can give rise to the emergence of impairments that do not 
necessarily exist in other circumstances. Therefore, a number of suggestions for 
future research to incorporate have been presented.
11.5 Final note
A series of cautions for neuropsychological research have emerged, regarding 
variables to control for and to take into consideration. While the structure of 
emotions, both conceptually and neurologically, is still unclear, the present research 
provides a more complete but complex picture regarding the relationships between 
emotion and modalities. An effective method for understanding emotion perception 
difficulties has been presented and this has the potential to address underlying issues 
in emotion perception research.
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRES
1.1 National Adult Reading Test (Nelson & Willison, 1991)
The National Adult Reading Test has been established as a useful estimate of IQ in normal participants 
and of pre-morbid intellectual functioning in clinical patients. It comprises a set o f 50 words, which 
violate common rules of phoneme production.
Instructions
This is a control task that assesses reading abilities.
Please read aloud the words on the list that will be given to you. You should be warned that there may 
be many words that you will not recognise, in fact, most people don’t know them, so just have a guess 
at these.
You will have 10 practice words to start with.
Remember you are free to withdraw at any time.
Do you have any questions?
CHORD SUPERFLUOUS
ACHE SIMILE
DEPOT BANAL
AISLE QUADRUPED
BOUQUET CELLIST
PSALM FAÇADE
CAPON ZEALOT
DENY DRACHM
NAUSEA AEON
DEBT PLACEBO
COURTEOUS ABSTEMIOUS
RAREFY DÉTENTE
EQUIVOCAL IDYLL
NAÏVE PUERPERAL
CATACOMB AVER
GAOLED GAUCHE
THYME TOPIARY
HEIR LEVIATHAN
RADIX BEATIFY
ASSIGNATS PRELATE
HIATUS SIDEREAL
SUBTLE DEMESNE
PROCREATE SYNCOPE
GIST LABILE
GOUGE CAMPANILE
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1.2 Fear questionnaire (Wolpe & Lang, 1964)
For the Wolpe and Lang fear schedule, participants had to indicate to what extent (on a five-point 
scale) they would feel uncomfortable or fearful in particular situations. These situations were very 
varied in the form and extent of discomfort or fear they were expected to elicit. This test provided an 
idea o f the participants’ general experience fear.
Instructions:
This questionnaire describes things and situations which may elicit feelings of fear or discomfort. 
Please indicate (using the 0 to 4 scale provided) how much these items make you feel fearful or 
uncomfortable.
not at ail average very much so
0 1 2 3 4
01. Noise o f a vacuum cleaner 0 1 2 3 4
02. Open wounds 0 1 2 3 4
03. Being alone 0 1 2 3 4
04. Being in a scary place 0 1 2 3 4
05. Loud voices 0 1 2 3 4
06. Corpses 0 1 2 3 4
07. Giving a public speech 0 1 2 3 4
08. Crossing a street 0 1 2 3 4
09. Mentally ill people 0 1 2 3 4
10. Falling 0 1 2 3 4
11. Cars 0 1 2 3 4
12. Being teased 0 1 2 3 4
13. Dentists 0 1 2 3 4
14. Thunder 0 1 2 3 4
15. Sirens 0 1 2 3 4
16. Failure 0 1 2 3 4
17. Entering a room with people in it 0 1 2 3 4
18. Looking down from a tower 0 1 2 3 4
19. Crippled people 0 1 2 3 4
20. Worms 0 1 2 3 4
21. Monsters 0 1 2 3 4
22. Being injected 0 1 2 3 4
23. Bats 0 1 2 3 4
24. Travelling
By train 0 1 2 3 4
By bus 0 1 2 3 4
By car 0 1 2 3 4
25. Being angry 0 1 2 3 4
26. Figures o f authority 0 1 2 3 4
27. Flying insects (flies, wasps, dragonflies) 0 1 2 3 4
28. Seeing another person being injected 0 1 2 3 4
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29. Sudden noise 0 2 3 4
30. Dull weather 0 2 3 4
31. Crowds 0 2 3 4
32. Open spaces 0 2 3 4
33. Cats 0 2 3 4
34. Seeing someone being bullied 0 2 3 4
35. Threatening-looking people 0 2 3 4
36. Birds 0 2 3 4
37. Deep water 0 2 3 4
38. Being watched while working 0 2 3 4
39. Dead animals 0 2 3 4
40. Weapons 0 2 3 4
41. Dirt 0 2 3 4
42. Crawling insects 0 2 3 4
43. Witnessing a fight 0 2 3 4
44. Ugly people 0 2 3 4
45. Fire 0 2 3 4
46. Sick people 0 2 3 4
47. Dogs 0 2 3 4
48. Being criticised 0 2 3 4
49. Spooky shadows 0 2 3 4
50. Being in a lift 0 2 3 4
51. Witnessing a surgical operation 0 2 3 4
52. Angi-y people 0 2 3 4
53. Mice 0 2 3 4
54. Blood
Human 0 2 3 4
Animal 0 2 3 4
55. Being separated from friends 0 2 3 4
56. N anow  rooms and places 0 2 3 4
57. Waiting for surgery 0 2 3 4
58. Being rejected by others 0 2 3 4
59. Planes 0 2 3 4
60. Smell o f  the hospital 0 2 3 4
61. Not being valued/appreciated 0 2 3 4
62. Harmless snakes 0 2 3 4
63. Graveyards 0 2 3 4
64. Being ignored 0 2 3 4
65. Darkness 0 2 3 4
66. Cardiac dysrhythmia 0 2 3 4
67. Naked people
Men 0 2 3 4
Women 0 2 3 4
68. Lightning 0 2 3 4
69. Doctors 0 2 3 4
70. Making mistakes 0 2 3 4
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1.3 Disgust questionnaire (Haidt et al., 1994)
The disgust questionnaire includes a series of 32 questions assessing how sensitive people are to 
experiencing disgust. This involves a set of tiue/false questions and questions describing disgusting 
situations from eight different categories (food, animals, body products, sex, body envelope violations, 
death, hygiene, and magical thinking) that participants have to indicate the extent to which they would 
find them disgusting or not. Magical thinking is a domain that cuts across the other seven domains of 
disgust elicitors via similarity and contagion. Participants filled out their responses on the 
questionnaires.
Instructions
Section A: In this section you are required to respond to the questions by indicating whether the 
following statements are true or false. Please circle/mark the appropriate response to indicate your 
choice.
True □ False □
True □ False □
True □ False □
True □ False □
True □ False □
True □ False □
Tme □ False G
1. I might be willing to try eating monkey meat, under some circumstances.
2 . It bothers me to see someone in a restaurant eating messy food with his fingers.
3. It would bother me to see a rat run across my path in a park.
4. Seeing a cockroach in someone else’s house doesn’t bother me,
5. It bothers me to hear someone clear a throat full o f mucus.
6. If I see someone vomit, it makes me feel sick.
7. I think homosexual activities are immoral.
8. I think it is immoral for people to seek sexual pleasure from animals.
True □ False □
9. It would bother me to be in a science class, and to see a human hand preserved in a jar.
True □ False □
10. It would not upset me at all to watch a person with a glass eye take the eye out o f the socket.
True □ False □
11. It would bother me tremendously to touch a dead body.
True □ False □
12. I would go out o f my way to avoid walking tlirough a graveyard.
True □ False □
13. I never let any part o f my body touch the toilet seat in public restrooms.
True D False Lj
14. I probably would not go to my favourite restaurant if  I found out that the cook had a cold.
Tme □ False G
15. Even if  I was hungry, I would not drink a bowl of my favourite soup if  it had been stirred by a used 
but thoroughly washed flyswatter.
Tme □ False □
16. It would bother me to sleep in a nice hotel room if  I knew that a man had died o f a heart attack in 
that room the night before.
Tme n False G
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Section B: In this section you are required to respond to the items by indicating how disgusting you  
fin d  them: not disgusting, slishtly disgusting, or very disgusting.
1. You see someone put ketchup on vanilla ice cream, and eat it.
Not disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
2. You are about to drink a glass o f  milk when you smell that it has gone off.
N ot disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
3. You see maggots on a piece o f  meat in an outdoor rubbish bin.
N ot disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
4. You are walking barefoot on concrete, and you step on a worm.
N ot disgusting 0  Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
5. You see a bowel movement left unflushed in a public toilet.
Not disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
6. While you are walking through a tunnel under a railroad track, you smell urine.
N ot disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
7. You hear about an adult woman who has sex with her father.
N ot disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
8. You hear about a 3 0 year-old man who seeks sexual relationships with 8 0 year-old women.
Not disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
9. You see someone accidentally stick a fishing hook through his finger.
Not disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
10. You see a man with his intestines exposed after an accident.
Not disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
11. Your friend's pet cat dies, and you have to pick up the dead body with you bare hands.
N ot disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
12. You accidentally touch the ashes o f  a person who has been cremated.
N ot disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
13. You take a sip o f  a drink, and then realise that you have drunk from the glass that a friend o f  yours had been drinking 
from.
Not disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
14. You discover that a friend o f  yours changes their underwear only once a week.
N ot disgusting fJ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
15. A friend offers you a piece o f  chocolate shaped like dog poo.
Not disgusting G Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
16. As part o f  a sex education class, you are required to inflate a new unlubricated condom using your mouth.
Not disgusting □ Slightly disgusting □ Very disgusting □
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1.4 Beck Depression Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1987) 
This questionnaire is a tool for assessing depressed moods.
Instructions
This questiomiaire assesses your experiences of sadness. You do not have to complete this information 
if you are uncomfortable doing so. Please read the following statements and indicate which you most 
agree with from each section.
1. 0 I do not feel sad.
1 I feel sad.
2 I am sad all the time and can't snap out of it.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
2. 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
1 I feel discouraged about the future.
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve.
3. 0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 I feel I have failed more than the average person.
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot o f failures.
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person.
4. 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
2 I don't get real satisfaction out o f anything anymore.
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.
5. 0 I don't feel paiticularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time.
2 I feel quite guilty most o f the time.
3 I feel guilty all o f the time.
6. 0 I don't feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
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7. 0 I don't feel disappointed in myself.
1 I am disappointed in myself.
2 I am disgusted with myself.
3 I hate myself.
8 . 0  1 don't feel I am worse than anybody else.
1 I am critical o f myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
2 1 blame myself all the time for my faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9. 0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not cany them out.
2 I would like to kill myself.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10. 0 I don't cry any more than usual.
1 I cry more now than I used to.
2 I cry all the time now.
3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can't even cry even though I want to.
11. 0 I am no more irritated by things than I ever am. j
1 I am slightly more irritated now than usual. j
2 I am quite annoyed or irritated a good deal of the time. |
3 I feel irritated all the time now. ;
12. 0 I have not lost interest in other people.
1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be. !
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people. Î
3 I have lost all o f my interest in other people. '
iI13. 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could.
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to. j
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. i
3 I can't make decisions at all anymore. i
I
14. 0 1 don't feel that 1 look any worse than 1 used to. j
1 1 am worried that 1 am looking old or unattractive. |
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me IIlook miattractive. i
3 1 believe that I look ugly. |
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15. 0 I can work about as well as before.
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something.
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
3 I can't do any work at all.
16. 0 I can sleep as well as usual.
1 I don't sleep as well as I used to.
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep.
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep.
17. 0 I don't get tired more than usual.
1 I get tired more easily than I used to.
2 I get tired from doing almost anything.
3 I am too tired to do anything.
18. 0 My appetite is no worse than usual.
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
2 My appetite is much worse now.
3 I have no appetite at all anymore.
19. 0 I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately.
1 I have lost more than five pounds.
2 I have lost more than ten pounds.
3 I have lost more than fifteen pounds.
20 0 I am no more won ied about my health than usual.
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches or pains, or upset
stomach, or constipation.
2 I am very wonied about physical problems & it's hard to think o f much else.
3 1 am so worried about my physical problems Üiat 1 camiot think about anything else.
21. 0 1 have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
1 1 am less interested in sex than 1 used to be.
2 1 am much less interested in sex now.
3 1 have lost interest in sex completely.
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1.5 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)
This is a tool for assessing levels o f anxiety and depression.
Instructions
We would like to thank you for taking part in this project. The next few questions regard how you are 
feeling and thinking currently, not how you think you should feel or think. Your answers are 
completely confidential. Please indicate which statement comes closest to how you have been feeling 
in the past 7 days.
1 .1 feel tense or wound-up':
1. Most of the time □
2. A lot o f the time Q
3. Time to time, occasionally O
4. Not at all Q
2 .1 still enjoy the things I used to enjoy:
1. Definitely as much □
2. Not quite so much □
3. Only a little Q
4. Hardly at all □
3 .1 get a sort of frightened feeling as if something awful is about to happen:
1. Very definitely and quite badly []]
2. Yes, but not too badly [ ]
3. A little, but it doesn't woiTy me O
4. Not at all □
4 .1 can laugh and see the funny side of things:
1. As much as 1 always could O
2. Not quite so much now Q
3. Definitely not so much now O
4. Not at all Q
5. Worrying thoughts go through my mind:
1. A great deal of the time □2. A lot of the time □3. From time to time but not too often □4. Only occasionally □
6. I feel cheerful:
1. Not at all □2. Not often □3. Sometimes □4. Most of the time □
267
7 .1 can sit at ease and feel relaxed:
1. Definitely □
2. Usually □
3. Not often O
4. Not at all □
8 .1 feel as if I am slowed down:
1. Nearly all the time [ ]
2. Very often O
3. Sometimes O
4. Not at all □
9 .1 get a sort of frightened feeling like 'butterflies' in the stomach:
1. Not at all □
2. Occasionally □
3. Quite often □
4. Very often □
1 0 .1 have lost interest in my appearance:
1. Definitely O
2. 1 don't take so much care as I should O
3. 1 may not take quite as much care Q
4. 1 take just as much care as ever O
1 1 .1 feel restless as if I have to be on the move:
1. Very much indeed O
2. Quite a lot O
3. Not very much O
4. Not at all □
1 2 .1 look forward with enjoyment to things:
1. As much as 1 ever did Q
2. Rather less than 1 used to O
3. Definitely less than 1 used to O
4. Hardly at all Q
1 3 .1 get sudden feelings of panic:
1. Very often indeed O
2. Quite often □
3. Not very often O
4. Not at all □
1 4 .1 can enjoy a good book or radio or TV programme:
1. Often □
2. Sometimes O
3. Not often □
4. Very seldom O
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1.6 Positive and Negative Affectivity Scale (Watson et al., 1988) 
This is a tool for assessing positive and negative affectivity.
Instructions
This test assesses your mood in general. You will see a series of words that describe different feelings 
and emotions. Please read each item carefully and indicate on the scale of 1-5 to what extent you have 
felt this way today.
very slightly or 
not at all
2
a little moderately
4
quite a bit extiemely
Interested 1 2 3 4 5
Distressed 1 2 3 4 5
Excited 1 2 3 4 5
Upset 1 2 3 4 5
Strong 1 2 3 4 5
Guilty 1 2 3 4 5
Scared 1 2 3 4 5
Hostile 1 2 3 4 5
Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5
Proud 1 2 3 4 5
Irritable 1 2 3 4 5
Alert 1 2 3 4 5
Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5
Inspired 1 2 3 4 5
Nervous 1 2 3 4 5
Determined 1 2 3 4 5
Attentive 1 2 3 4 5
Jittery 1 2 3 4 5
Active 1 2 3 4 5
Afraid 1 2 3 4 5
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APPENDIX 2: TASK INSTRUCTIONS
1. Instructions for Face Tasks
This test assesses ability to recognise facial expressions.
You will see a series o f pictures o f faces. For each face, you must decide whether its expression is 
most like happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, disgust, or anger. You can make your response by pressing 
one of the appropriate buttons on the screen, by pressing the appropriate key, or by asking someone to 
do this for you. The faces are shown for a few seconds each, but you can take as long as you wish to 
decide on the emotion.
The next face will not be presented until you have made your decision about the previous one.
2. Instructions for the Voice Tasks
This test assesses ability to recognise vocal expressions.
You will hear actors speaking aloud a nonsense plirase/a series of numbers. Their intonation represents 
an emotion. For each vocal phrase, you are asked to decide which emotion is most closely represented 
from happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise*. You can make your response by pressing one 
of the appropriate buttons on the screen, by pressing the appropriate key, or by asking someone to do 
this for you. You can heai" the phrase again if you wish. Try to use your first impressions.
The next vocal phrase will not be presented until you have made your decision about the previous one.
* Surprise was only included as an instruction for the nonsense vocal task.
3. Instructions for Gesture Tasks
This test assesses the ability to recognise 5 basic emotions (happiness, fear, disgust, anger and sadness! 
represented by body movements.
You will see a series of 50 short video clips between 5 and 9 seconds long. On these slides an actor will 
display one of the above named emotions.
The actor always starts and finishes in a neutral position with his or her arms by their sides. There are 
two conditions: in one set o f clips, the person will be visible in fully-lit conditions, but you will be 
unable to see their face. The second set o f clips will show a display of reflective strips only. These 
reflective strips are placed at major points on the person’s body -  so you will be able to see them 
moving.
You should decide as quickly as possible which emotion is depicted on the video.
Please press the appropriate button to indicate your choice, or ask the experimenter to do so.
If you are not sure, please take a guess.
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APPENDIX 3: AGE CONFUSION TABLES
The pattern of responses by the two age groups are summarised in Tables I-X. All results are given as 
percentages. Since the emotion hexagon task was designed to manipulate confusion in a particular 
direction, confusion errors are not reported for that task. T-test analysis was caiTied out on the errors 
made in the gestures tasks.
*gioups differ significantly (p<0.05), ''trend for groups to differ (0.08>/?>0.05)
Table I: The pattern o f responses fo r  the young group on the dynamic full-light task
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
FuU-Ughtgestures
perceived
by the
young
group
Anger 86.5 2.4 1.2 13.2* 0.0 103.3 16.8
Disgust 6.8" 68.8 9.1 2.1 2.3 89.1 20.3
Fear 2.0 9.4 87.6 1.2 10.9" 111.1 23.5
Happiness 3.8 7.9 0.3 82.3 0.9 95.2 12.9
S ad n ess 0.9 11.5* 1.8 1.2 85.9 101.3 15.4
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Incorrect labels (misses) 13.5 31.2 12.4 17.7 14.1
Table II: The pattern o f responses fo r  the old group on the dynamic full-light task.
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Full-light 
gestures 
perceived 
by the old 
group
Anger 77.1 4.1 3.8 24.1* 0.3 109.4 32.3
D isgust 13.5" 55.9 5.9 4.7 5.3 85.3 29.4
Fear 2.9 10.6 85.9 1.5 15.0" 115.9 30.0
Happiness 4.1 7.9 0.0 65.6 0.0 77.6 12.0
S adn ess 2.4 21.5* 4.4 4.1 79.4 111.8 32.4
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 22.9 44.1 14.1 34.4 20.6
Table III: The pattern o f responses fo r  the young group on the dynamic point-light task
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Point-lightgesturesperceivedby theyounggroup
Anger 76.8 3.5 3.2 22.7 1.5 107.7 30.9
Disgust 6.5* 58.2 7.4 5.0 5.6 82.7 24.5
Fear 1.1 lO.O" 81.2 0.3 12.4 105.0 23.8
Happiness 10.6* 7.4 2.9 71.4 1.2 93.5 22.1
S adn ess 5.0 20.9* 5.3 0.6 79.3 111.1 31.8
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 23.2 41.8 18.8 28.6 20.7
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Table IV: The pattern o f  responses fo r the old group on the dynamic point-light task.
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Point-light gestures perceived by the old group
Anger 72.7 5.3 2.9 25.6 1.5 108.0 35.3
Disgust 16.7* 47.4 13.5 6.2 6.8 90.6 43.2
Fear 2.1 15.0" 72.7 0.9 16.8 107.5 34.8
Happiness 3.5* 4.1 2.4 65.2 0.8 76.0 10.8
S ad n ess 5.0 28.2* 8.5 2.1 74.1 117.9 43.8
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 27.3 52.6 27.3 34.8 25.9
Table V: The pattern o f  responses fo r the young group on the nonsense vocal task
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­n ess S adn ess Surprise
Total
label
use
False
positives
Nonsensevoices
perceived
by the
young
group
Anger 89.7 3.5 1.5 7.1 0.0 0.0 101.8 12.1
D isgust 6.2 64.7 5.0 7.9 0.3 0.9 85 20.3
Fear 0.3 3.7 73.2 3.8 14.4 4.7 100.1 26.9
Happiness 2.7 9.4 0.3 57.7 0.0 7.4 77.5 19.8
S ad n ess 0.3 7.9 16.8 2.9 85.3 1.7 114.9 29.6
Surprise 0.8 10.6 3.2 20.6 0.0 85.3 120.5 35.2
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 10.3 35.1 26.8 42.3 14.7 14.7
Table VI: The pattern o f responses for the old group on the nonsense vocal task.
Depicted
Anger D isgust Fear Happi­n ess Sadn ess Surprise
Total
label
use
False
positives
Nonsense 
voices perceived  
by the oid 
group
Anger 85.9 3.2 0.0 12.7 0.0 0.6 102.4 16.5
Disgust 10.3 54.7 5.3 12.4 0.3 3.2 86.2 31.5
Fear 1.2 7.9 73.2 2.4 13.8 7.4 105.9 32.7
Happiness 1.1 9.1 0.9 48.5 0.0 7.9 67.5 19.0
S ad n ess 0.3 10.9 16.2 2.9 85.3 5.3 120.9 35.6
Surprise 1.2 14.2 4.4 21.1 0.6 75.6 117.1 41.5
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 14.1 45.3 26.8 51.5 14.7 24.4
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Table VII: The pattern o f  responses fo r the young group on the verbal vocal task
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Verbalvoicesperceivedby theyounggroup
Anger 82.9 9.4 2.1 1.8 1.7 96.2 13.3
Disgust 7.9 75.0 2.1 4.7 12.4 89.7 14.7
Fear 1.8 3.8 73.5 5.0 5.3 84.1 10.6
Happiness 6.8 7.4 9.1 84.1 1.8 107.4 23.3
S ad n ess 0.6 4.4 13.2 4.4 78.8 22.6 18.2
Total depletions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
incorrect labels (misses) 17.1 25.0 26.5 15.9 21.2
Table VIII: The pattern o f  responses fo r the old group on the verbal vocal task.
Depicted
Anger Disgust Fear Happi­ness Sadness
Total
label
use
False
positives
Verbai voices perceived by the oid group
Anger 74.1 13.0 4.4 6.8 1.2 99.5 25.4
Disgust 12.9 63.8 2.6 7.0 7.1 93.4 29.6
Fear 0.9 5.0 70.9 5.3 6.7 88.8 17.9
Happiness 10.3 8.8 11.2 75.6 3.2 109.1 33.5
S ad n ess 1.8 9.4 10.9 5.3 81.8 109.2 27.4
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 25.9 36.2 29.1 24.4 18.2
Table IX: The pattern o f  responses fo r the young group on the Ekman 60 task
Depicted
Anger D isgust Fear Happi­n ess Sadn ess Surprise
Total
label
use
False
positives
Ekman 60 
perceived  
by the 
young 
group
Anger 77.5 8.9 0.7 0.0 0.4 0.0 87.5 10.0
D isgust 7.9 89.6 6.4 0.0 6.8 0.0 110.7 21.1
Fear 5.0 0.4 69.3 0.0 8.2 8.2 91.1 21.8
H appiness 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.6 0.0 0.7 100.3 0.7
S ad n ess 2.8 0.0 1.8 0.0 83.2 0.4 88.2 5.0
Surprise 6.8 1.1 21.8 0.4 1.4 90.7 122.2 31.5
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Incorrect labels (misses) 22.5 10.4 30.7 0.4 16.8 9.3
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Table X: The pattern o f  responses fo r the old group on the Ekman 60 task.
Depicted
Anger D isgust Fear Happi­n ess S ad n ess Surprise
Totallabeluse
Falsepositives
Ekman 60 perceived 
by the 
old group
Anger 79.7 6.7 4.7 0.0 1.2 0.3 92.6 12.9
Disgust 10.6 90.6 5.0 0.0 10.3 0.9 117.4 26.8
Fear 4.1 1.5 70.6 0.3 4.7 9.4 90.6 20.0
H appiness 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.4 0.3 1.5 101.2 1.8
S ad n ess 2.9 1.2 1.5 0.0 80.3 0.0 85.9 5.6
Surprise 2.7 0.0 18.2 0.3 3.2 87.9 112.3 24.4
Total depictions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Incorrect labels (misses) 20.3 9.4 29.4 0.6 19.7 12.1
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APPENDIX 4: AGE ANALYSIS WITH SEX OF PARTICIPANT AS 
A FACTOR
Ekman 60
A significant main effect of emotion was observed [F(3.5o, 230.34) = 26.27, /?<0.001]. This reflects the 
differing recognition accuracy levels for the emotions. No other effects reached statistical significance: 
between age groups [F(i,64) = 0.07, /?=0.80]; emotion x age group interaction [F(3.so, 230.34) ^ 0.67, 
/7=0.60]; sex o f participant [F(,,64) = 0.99, p=033>\; emotion x sex interaction [F(3.5o, 230.34) = 0.87, 
/7=0.48]; age group x sex interaction [F(i,g4) = 0.21,/?==0.65]; emotion x age group x sex interaction (this 
bordered significance) [F(3.5o, 230.34) = 2.46, p=0.06]. It is important to note that ceiling levels in 
performance cannot explain the lack of differences in the two age groups, except for happiness.
Emotion Hexagon
One female participant in the older group did not complete this task due to time constraints. Analysis 
revealed a main effect o f emotion [F(3.68, 231.97)=" 8.53,/?<0.001]. There were no other significant effects 
recorded: between-age group analysis [F(|,63) = 0.01, jp==0.94]; emotion x age group interaction [F(3.68, 
231.97)=  1.32, p=Q21\, sex of participant [F(i,63> = 0.15,/)=0.70]; emotion x sex interaction [F(3.68, 231.97) = 
0.78,/?=0.53]; age group x sex interaction [F(,,63)= 2.89, p=0.09]; emotion x age group x sex mteraction 
[F (i,63 )= 0 .40 ,/j-0 .79 ].
Nonsense vocal emotion test
A significant main effect for emotion was revealed [F(s,320) = 49.99, p<0.001]. The performance of the 
older participants was comparable to their younger counteiparts [F(i 64) = 2.90, /?=0.09]. A significant 
emotion x age group interaction was not revealed [F(5,320) = 0.39, p=0.85].
There was no overall effect o f sex on the results [F(],64) = 2.93, p=0.09], but there was an emotion x sex 
interaction [F(s,320) = 4.64, /?<0.005]. The age group x sex interaction did not reach significance [F(i,64) 
= 0.29, jE7=0.59]. The emotion x age group x sex interaction was not significant [F(5,320) = 1 25, p=0.29]. 
Multivariate analysis revealed that women were significantly better than men in their recognition of 
happiness [F(,,64)=  6.18,p<0.05], and fear [F(i,64) = 11.46, p<0.005]. By contrast, men attained higher
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accuracy rates for surprise recognition [F(i 64) = 4.49, p<0.05]. Men and women did not differ for other 
emotions [p>0.22].
Verbal vocal emotion test
A  significant effect o f emotion is present [F(4,2S6) = 3.93, /?<0.01]. There was no main effect o f age 
group, although the younger participants tended to achieve higher accuracy rates [F(,,64) = 3.09, 
p=0.08]. A significant age group x emotion interaction was not found [F(4 2S6) = 1.04,p=0.39].
The effect o f sex was not significant [F(i,64> = 0.03, p=0.89], nor was there a significant emotion x sex 
interaction [F(4,256) = 0.17,/j=0.95], or an age group x sex interaction [F(i,64) = 0.18,/?=0.67], or emotion 
X age group x sex interaction [F(4,2S6) = 0.32,/?=0.85].
Full-light gestures
There was a significant effect o f emotion portrayed on recognition accuracy rates [F(4,2S6) = 23.17, 
p<0.001]. There was also a main effect o f age group, with older participants performing less well 
[F{i,64) = 18.35, p<0.001]. This was qualified by a significant emotion x age group interaction [F(4,2S6) = 
2.49, p<0.05]. Multivariate analysis revealed that older participants in comparison with their younger 
counterparts showed significantly worse recognition o f happiness [F(i,64> = 25.70, p<0.001], disgust 
[F(i,64) = 5.16,jp<0.05], anger [F(i,64>= 4.55,p<0.05], but not fear and sadness[p>0.08 for them].
Again, there was no effect o f sex [F(%_64) = 0.01,/?=0.93], or an emotion x sex interaction [F(4 2S6) = 0.48, 
/?=0.752], or an age group x sex interaction [F(i,64> = 0.22, p=0.64], or an emotion x age group x sex 
interaction [F(4,256) = 0.72,p=0.58].
Point-light gestures
A significant main effect o f emotion portrayed was observed [F(4,2S6) = 23.56; p<0.001]. A significant 
main effect was recorded between the two age groups, with the younger group performing more 
accurately [F(i,64) = 8.65, /><0,01]. There was no significant emotion x age interaction group [F(4,256> = 
1.20,/7=0.31].
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No effect o f sex o f participants can be reported [F(|,64) = 0.84, j9=0,36]. There was no emotion x sex 
interaction [F(4,256) = 2.06, /?=0.09], nor an age group x sex interaction [F(i,64) = 0.94, /?=0.34], or an 
emotion x age group x sex interaction [F(4 2S6) = 1.06,p=0.37].
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APPENDIX 5: LETTER FROM NEUROLOGIST TO 
PARKINSON’S PATIENTS
See next page for information sheet.
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13 November 2003 D F P A R T M F N '! ' c/ CLIN IC A L N L U R O SC IFN C F.S
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Crewe Koail 
I'.rlinburgb KH+ 2XU
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W .\ ik
Dear
I am writing to you to ask whether you might be willing to take part in a research 
project, which will be conducted at the Western General Hospital by some 
colleagues from the Psychology Department in St Andrews University.
My colleagues are investigating the effects of some neurological conditions on how  
w e recognise emotions in other people. The tests involve sitting at a computer for a 
while, making decisions about images which appear on screen. Most people find the 
tests quite fun.
I am enclosing an information sheet about the project, so that you can read a little 
more about this. There is a form on which you can indicate if you are willing to take 
part and a stamp addressed envelope to send back to Sophia Durrani in St Andrews, 
who will get in touch with you in due course if you would like to take part in this 
study.
Best wishes.
Youis sincerely
Dr Richard Davenport 
Consultant Neurologist
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Parkinson’s Information Sheet
Emotion recognition study in Parkinson’s disease
You have been invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide to pursue wifi» this, 
it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information and discuss it with others if you wish.
Feel free to contact us if  there is anything that is not clear or i f  you would like more 
infoniiation. Take time to decide whetlter or not you wish to take port.
Thank you for reading this.
Aim  The main aim of this study is to explore your emotion recognition abilities.
Testing The testing will take place in one session, but you will be given breaks should 
you require them. The testing session consists o f a few diflermt types of task,
t . First a few background questions about yourself and your emotional experiences will be 
asked. If you feel uncomfortable answering some o f these questiorts, then you do not have to.
2. In the first main task, you will be shown a series o f video clips o f people displaying 
emotions. Your task is to indicate to the experimenter which emotion is being depicted. Tins 
task should take a maximum of fifteen minutes.
3. In the next task, you will be asked to read a list o f words aloud. This is just a control task.
4. In the next task, you will be shown as series of photographs of faces. We will want you to 
indicate which emotion is expressed by the face. Tliis task should take a maximum o f ten 
minutes.
5. In the next task, you will hear a series o f words being spoken aloud. Your task would be 
indicate which emotion is expressed by these vocalizations. This task should take ten 
minutes.
6. In the final set o f tasks, you will be asked to respond to a series o f questions regarding 
your experiences o f fear, sadness and disgust.
If you wish to complete a few more tasks, then we can arrange this.
Remember that any information you give will remain confidential and you are free to 
withdraw fi-om tlie study at any time without giving a reason, and this will not affect your 
treatment in any way.
The research will take place at the Wellcome Trust Research Clinical Facility, which is part of 
the Western General Hospital (please see the enclosed map).
Should you decide that you wish to take pari, please complete the slip below with your 
contact details and return it in the stamped-addressed envelope (provided) to Sophia Durrani. 
We will then try to arrange a suitable date and time for your participation. If  you prefer you 
can call me by ‘phone.
Please contact me if  you require any further information to help with your decision.
Yours faithfully.
Sophia J. Durrani 
Research Assistant 
School o f Psychology 
University o f St Andrews 
St Andrews 
Fife
01334 461992
Please complete if  you are interested in participating in this emotion recognition study. Once 
you have filled this in, could you place it in the stamped-addressed envelope and post to 
Sophia Durrani. Please use block capitals:
PHONE NUMBER:
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APPENDIX 6: PARKINSON’S PATIENTS’ PROFILES
Table I: Background information about Parkinson’s participants
Phase Subject No. Sex Age IQ Years of education Hoehn & Yahr score BDI Score
1 F 51 115 10 2 17
2 M 51 116 12 1 14
3 F 66 126 16 3 13
4 F 48 125 15 1 8
5 M 56 116 19 1 4
6 F 59 121 18 2.5 11
7 M 64 108 10 3 10
8 F 56 118 11 1 7
9 F 60 121 17 2 7
10 F 56 124 26 2 14
11 M 60 116 14 2 2
12 M 52 104 10 1 19
13 F 70 120 11 2 10
2 14 M 65 113 10 2 10
15 M 69 121 13 2.5 10
16 M 72 119 10 2 6
17 M 64 103 11 1 5
18 M 67 114 10 2 10
19 M 58 102 11 2.5 8
20 M 64 125 15 2.5 7
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Table II: Medication information about Parkinson’s participants
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APPENDIX 7: PARKINSON’S ANALYSIS WITH SEX OF 
PARTICIPANT AS A FACTOR
Ekman 60 Face Task 
Parkinson’s N=15, Control N =31.
There was a significant effect for emotion [F(3.o7, izs.so) = 30.73, p<0.001]. There was also an effect o f 
population group [F(i,42) = 16.22, p<0.001]. This was qualified by a significant emotion x population 
group interaction [F(3.o7, ns.so) = 3.87, /7<0.05]. The patients were significantly worse than the control 
participants in interpreting facial fear [«'(44) = -3.90, /?<0.001], and disgust [^(17.62) = -2.23, p<0.05]. 
The two groups did not differ for all other emotions all {p>0 .\2).
There was no main effect o f sex and all interactions with sex were not significant (all /?>0.58).
Voice task
Parkinson’s N=18, Control N=32.
There was a significant effect o f emotion [F(4,is4) = 17.37, /?<0.001]. The Parkinson’s patients were 
significantly less accurate on this task than the control group [7^ (i,46) = 8.62, /?<0.01]. There was no 
emotion x population group interaction [F(4j 84) = 0.89,/?=0.47].
Women were better at this task than men [F(i,46) = 8.01, /><0.01]. No interactions with sex were 
significant (all p>0.10).
Gesture task
Parkinson’s N=20, Control N =31.
The results revealed a significant main effect o f emotion [7^ (4,i8S) = 13.43, p<0.001]. This reflects 
differences in ease of recognition o f different emotional gestures. There was no significant difference 
in performance between the two population groups [/^ (i,47) = 0.18, /?=0.68]. No significant emotion x 
population group interaction can be reported [7^ (4,188) = 0.71, jO=0.59]. This indicates that the two 
groups are comparable in their performance on this task.
There was no main effect o f sex and all interactions with sex were non-significant (all p>Q.16),
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